



*Citation for published version:*

Lawson, C & Hudson, J 2009 'Anti-Americanism and Public Opinion in the European Union' Bath Economics Research Working Papers, no. 19/09, Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, UK.

*Publication date:*  
2009

*Document Version*  
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

**University of Bath**

**Alternative formats**

If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:  
[openaccess@bath.ac.uk](mailto:openaccess@bath.ac.uk)

**General rights**

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

**Take down policy**

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Anti-Americanism and Public Opinion in the European Union

Colin Lawson and John Hudson

No. 19/09

**BATH ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPERS**

**Department of Economics**



## **Anti-Americanism and public opinion in the European Union**

**Colin Lawson a,b and John Hudson\* a**

- a. Department of Economics, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK.
- b. Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University, Tajovskeho 10, 975 90 Banska Bystrica, Slovakia.

### **ABSTRACT**

The term “anti-Americanism” has become common coinage in public and academic debate, the more so since the election of President G. W. Bush, and especially since 9/11. Yet little is known of its causes and impact. Defining it as opposition to US policy, and using 2003 and 2005 Eurobarometer data we examine individuals’ attitudes to the US in five policy dimensions for EU members. We find that over a third of EU voters either approved or disapproved of the US *in all five dimensions*. We also find there are differences in attitude to US policy related to age, policy preferences and nationality. And, although anti-Americanism is associated with a preference for greater European independence, perhaps surprisingly it is also linked to a desire for a less federal and hence less powerful Europe.

Keywords: Federalism; anti-Americanism; European Union.

JEL Classification: H100, F020, H770.

\*Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK. [J.R.Hudson@bath.ac.uk](mailto:J.R.Hudson@bath.ac.uk)  
Tel. +++44 1225 385287.

Email: [C.W.Lawson@bath.ac.uk](mailto:C.W.Lawson@bath.ac.uk)  
[J.R.Hudson@bath.ac.uk](mailto:J.R.Hudson@bath.ac.uk)

## **Anti-Americanism and public opinion in the European Union**

“...in Europe, there has been an anti-Americanism that at once can be casual but also insidious.” Barak Obama, April 2009.

### **1. Introduction**

After the election of President G W Bush and especially after 9/11, it seemed to some that the United States (US) adopted radically changed attitudes to its allies and to its enemies. Allies were to be led, not accommodated; alliances were temporary and purpose-specific. Enemies might be preemptively attacked, their regimes changed, and if possible democratized. There was a new isolationism of perspective along with a wider, more vigorous projection of US power (Iwama 2004).

Unsurprisingly this apparent major change created a European crisis of trust, which is now discussed openly by politicians, commentators, and scholars. We want to examine some solid data that could help us determine the strength of European citizens' views of the US at this apparent point of change, and to allow an analysis of their different dimensions, and the characteristics of those who held them. In particular we want to explore whether opposition to US policies is accompanied by a desire for a more integrated and powerful EU, which might become a countervailing economic and political power to US influence. This leads us to try to link – at least empirically – two hitherto separate literatures: anti-Americanism and attitudes towards EU integration.

The data is drawn from the Eurobarometer March-April 2003 and October-November 2005 surveys for the European Commission. In the 2003 survey, during which the Iraq War began, some 23,000 citizens in the then 15-member union were questioned, using face-to-face home interviews in their national language. In the 2005 survey more than 29,000 citizens in the now 27 country EU were surveyed. The sample frame was those aged fifteen and above, but we wanted to study the views of those who could influence policy - that is voters - so we analyze those aged eighteen and over. The surveys' multi-stage random probability design ensures a representative sample with respect to metropolitan, urban and rural areas. For each interviewee, the data included age, sex, educational level, income, religion and nationality, plus some attitudinal variables.

We focus on the answers to two areas of questioning:

-Whether the respondent felt the US played a positive, negative, or neither a positive nor negative role in a) the search for world peace; b) the fight against terrorism; c) the fight against world poverty; d) the protection of the world environment; and e) world economic growth.

-Respondents' views on independent EU defense, security, and foreign policies, and their links to US foreign policy.

We aim to answer three basic questions: (1) is there clear evidence for the existence of anti-Americanism; (2) if so, is anti-Americanism random or is it linked to certain personal characteristics; and finally (3) if anti-Americanism exists, what does this imply for popular support for the European Union?

Section 2 of this paper discusses the definition of anti-Americanism and surveys the literature on it, as well as voters' attitudes to European Integration. Section 3 provides the theoretical basis for our analysis. Section 4 gives the results, and section 5 summarizes our conclusions.

## **2. Literature review**

Here we define anti-Americanism, and review the existing literature on its extent and causes.

### *2.1 Defining anti-Americanism*

As a term it has been widely and loosely used. What is needed is a definition that corresponds to observable phenomena. For example Spiro (1988: 120) defines anti-Americanism as “a persistent pattern of gross criticism of the main values of the US Constitution.” This is both too vague: the values need to be defined; and too specific: why is it confined to the Constitution? Alternatively Krastev (2004: 6-7) defines anti-Americanism as “opposing any policy simply *because* it is endorsed by the US government”. This is not a good choice both because it is a causal definition: it includes the cause of the phenomenon under investigation, and operationally it relies on a probably hard to distinguish preference distinction.

A more tractable definition focuses on opposition to specific American policies (Berman 2004). This leaves the motivation for the opposition open for investigation. Therefore we define anti-Americanism as “specific or general opposition to American policies”. Such a definition is value neutral, and its presence is possible to test. We extend the term to include policy effects. So a view that the re-election of President G W Bush made the world more dangerous could be viewed as an anti-American sentiment, possibly determined by views of the likely effects of his policies. Those holding such views may be irrational, mistaken, prejudiced or entirely otherwise. But what is

interesting is the frequency of such views, the personal characteristics accompany them, and how they link with the interviewees' opinions of the EU.

## *2.2 Attitudes towards the US and its policies*

Opinion poll evidence for European anti-American views in the early years of this decade, summarized by Linn (2004) reveals a growing negative view of the US, though with marked differences across European states, and more positive views in recent EU members. Kohut (2003: 1-2) quotes a 2001 State Department survey “where 78% of Germans said they had a favorable view of the U.S. That fell to 61% in our (Pew Research Center) 2002 poll – and to 45% in the survey conducted (in spring 2005). Opinion of the U.S. in France has followed a similar track: 62% positive in 1999-2000, 63% (in 2004)...and 43% (in 2005).”

But according to both Linn and Kohut, although EU public opinion has changed, the US-EU “value divide” is not widening. Linn (2004: 13) defines “basic values” as “views regarding fundamental, life and death issues that are embedded in traditional culture and do not vary quickly or significantly over time.” Such values might be the roles of the individual and the state; belief in God; or the necessary conditions for a just war. These he contrasts with “‘public opinion’ (which although it) refers to views and perceptions mainly on matters of current politics or events...” can and generally does “also cover and reflect basic values” (ibid.). These authors believe that the recent growth in anti-Americanism reflects changing European public opinion rather than a basic value change.

But even if there has been no profound change in European values, some American commentators have taken a very combative line. For example Ceaser (2003) claims that anti-Americanism in Europe influenced Islamic terrorists. He traces anti-Americanism back to the eighteenth century

biological degeneracy thesis that all species, including human beings, thrived less well in the New World. By the late eighteenth century this then dominant view also appeared in a political variant that asserted the inferiority of the American political system because it was not grounded in tradition. For Ceaser (2003: 16) anti-Americanism "...is a construct of European thought...anti-Americanism makes rational discussion impossible, it threatens the idea of a community of interests between Europe and America. Indeed it threatens the idea of the West itself."

One does not have to accept Ceaser's extreme account to agree that America's power, and hence its pervasive influence, has created the preconditions for widespread distrust of its motives. The US response to 9/11, and especially the invasion of Iraq, produced widespread European opposition. The more radical criticism went beyond policy disagreement and purported to examine alleged flaws in the American psyche that led to the violent and intimidating behavior that, some argued, has marked America since its inception (Sardar and Davies, 2002, 2004).

The degree of distrust of America varies across European countries, most plausibly because of past contacts. However opinions are constantly evolving. Germany and France provide two examples. Although relatively pro-American, Germans have recently become more distrustful. Berman (2004: 29-30) claims '...there is a specific German continuity from pre-1989 Communist anti-Americanism to post-Communist anti-Americanism, which has been particularly relevant, given the role of the former Communist Party – the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) – and its ability to influence the larger German political landscape.' Other influences he cites are the '...association of Americans with 'capitalism in a negative sense'; a '...pre-democratic anti-Americanism (that) finds expression in contempt for aspects of American mass culture', and a post-democratic anti-



Americanism...driven by resentment that the United States has been unwilling to cede sovereignty to the structures of international governance.’

But French opinion is arguably the most anti-American. Meunier (2005:1) argues that “France is the country with the deepest, most sedimented reservoir of Anti-American arguments” Toinet (1988), a French commentator sympathetic to the US, argued that after its critical help to the US in the War of Independence, France looked in vain for a ‘special relationship’ with the new state. In fact relations were characterized by intermittent tensions. For example France interpreted the 1898 American attack on the Spanish Empire as a threat to all European empires. The US did not forgive France its First World War debts. Roosevelt initially favored Vichy over the Free French, and wanted a retributive postwar military government for France. But even such an unpromising legacy cannot explain the severity of some criticisms. Toinet’s explanation is that French commentators see a clash between the ideals of French civilization and American advocacy of its view of democracy, a system which for them incorporates an unacceptably rapacious and uncaring form of capitalism (Todd 2003).

### *2.3 Citizens` attitudes to European integration*

Hass (1958) argued that supporting EU integration involved a cost-benefit calculation; a view empirically supported by Gabel (1998) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2000). Kritzinger (2003) presents an alternative view: attitude formation based on ‘national context theory’, emphasizing the political, economic, cultural and historical contexts in which attitudes developed. The key role of national concerns in European parliamentary elections supports this hypothesis (Franklin et al. 1995). Lacking specific EU knowledge voters use their evaluations of domestic politics (Anderson 1998). Much of their general EU information is also filtered through national politicians.

Ordinary citizens may link their views of national and EU politics in two ways. First the 'equal assessments' hypothesis suggests that people view both similarly, perhaps because national politicians also participate at inter-governmental meetings (Anderson, 1998). A second view sees national and EU politics as alternatives, even rivals: those disillusioned with one may see the other as an alternative way forward. But those satisfied with their national politics may see the EU as a more distant and hence less accountable rival.

Using 1994 Eurobarometer data Kritzinger (2003) concluded that politically the EU is seen as an alternative to the perceived inefficiencies of the nation state, though in some countries the domestic economic situation and support for the EU were positively linked.

Hooghe (2003) demonstrates a gulf in attitudes between elites and public opinion. On core sovereignty issues such as immigration and defense, national elites and even more so the EU Commission elites favor integration more strongly than the public. The public are more positive to integration in areas such as market regulation and redistribution. Hooghe detects a clear distinction between issues of principle and specific issues, with the public more favorable to the latter. There are three reasons why people might wish power transferred to the EU from member states. First, the appropriate assignment level is the more efficient. If there are economies of scale, externalities or transaction costs, the argument for EU powers becomes stronger. Second, EU and national redistribution policies may differ, and some domestic voters may favor the EU policy in preference to the national policy. However, organizing public services efficiently at an EU level may be difficult. Third, EU expansion may generate more prosperity but more uncertainty, as increased capital and labor mobility produce greater job insecurity. This uncertainty can be reduced by social policies, and Hooghe notes that support for the Europeanization of social policies, which soften

market impacts, is 18% higher than for other policies. If these policies involve significant redistribution then they may also be attractive to the electorate for the second, redistributive reason. On the other hand Gabel and Anderson (2002) argue that voters divide systematically between pro-EU, who tend to lean to the Left, and pro-national governments, who tend to be on the Right.

### 3. Preference Theory

#### 3.1 Attitudes to the USA

We assume the basic determinant of the  $i$ 'th person's approval of American policy with respect to the  $j$ 'th issue ( $A_{ij}$ ) depends on the gap between their policy preferences ( $P_{ij}$ ) and the USA's position,  $P_j^*$ . The policies we examine: poverty, terrorism, peace, the environment and world growth, and their approval levels are assumed continuous. A higher value indicates a preferred policy. So for poverty, increasing development aid increases  $P_j^*$ . Similarly, lower CO2 emissions increase  $P_j^*$ .

Hence:

$$A_{ij} = f_{ij}(P_j^*) \quad (1)$$

The determinants of  $f_{ij}(\cdot)$  depend on individuals' preferences, partly proxiable by their socio-economic characteristics. Specifically we assume  $f_{ij}(\cdot)$  to have the form:

$$A_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(P_j^* - P_{ij}) \quad (2)$$

$P_{ij}$  is the critical level of US performance on policy  $j$  that signals approval, i.e. if  $P_j^* > P_{ij}$  then the  $i$ 'th individual approves of the US on this issue: otherwise they disapprove. If issues directly affect someone their preferences most likely reflect their socio-economic characteristics ( $X_i$ ). So

environmental concern may rise with income, provided policy does not increase motoring costs. For issues like world poverty, individuals' attitudes may depend on the US aid/GDP ratio compared to the desired ratio for their own country. These may also be linked to income. For the environment or world poverty where knowledge may influence preferences, education may be influential. Hence:

$$P_{ij} = \mathbf{X}_i \boldsymbol{\beta}_j + u_{ij} \quad (3)$$

$u_{ij}$  is a stochastic error term. Within this framework we can define 'anti-Americanism' in several ways. It might impact directly on the linear transform  $f_{ij}(\cdot)$  linking approval to the policy gap in (1). It could directly affect the preferences in (3), as traditional party supporters may follow their party's domestic line on the same issues. If perceptions deviate from reality it could even affect perceptions of US policy.

However incorporated, if sentiment towards the US is distributed systematically according to socio-economic characteristics, policy preferences or country of origin, it will consistently impact on that variable, across issues where it would not be otherwise apparent. So we would expect, in the absence of systematic 'anti-Americanism', people with given characteristics to exhibit a range of approval responses across policies. But if we find that specific respondent characteristics, for example gender or national origin, are consistently associated with negative attitudes, this would be evidence of systematic 'anti-Americanism'. We will assume the simplest functional form for anti-Americanism and include it as an 'additive constant' in (2):

$$A_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1(P_j^* - \mathbf{X}_i \boldsymbol{\beta}_j + u_{ij}) + \beta_{2j} \Psi_i \quad (4)$$

$\Psi_i$  reflects sentiment towards the USA, and  $\beta_{2j}$  denotes its impact upon approval for American policy on the ‘j’th issue.  $\Psi_i$  may vary according to socio-economic characteristics, policy preferences or country of residence. For example if  $\Psi_i$  were age, people with personal memories of World War II or the Cold War may be more pro-American than others. We therefore assume that  $\Psi_i = \mathbf{X}_i \boldsymbol{\Pi}$ . Thus expanding (4) we obtain:

$$A_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_i (\boldsymbol{\Pi} - \boldsymbol{\beta}_j) + \beta_1 P_j^* + \beta_{2j} \Psi_{ij} + \beta_1 u_{ij} \quad (5)$$

$\boldsymbol{\beta}_j$  varies from issue to issue, whereas  $\boldsymbol{\Pi}$  does not. Hence a consistent sign on a component of  $\mathbf{X}_i$  is evidence of anti-Americanism, or more precisely systematic variations in support for the USA across issues. Even then the impact of a specific characteristic could vary, although it might be associated with anti-Americanism, if the sign of  $(\boldsymbol{\Pi} - \boldsymbol{\beta}_j)$  varies across policy issues due to variations in  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_j$  which may dominate  $\boldsymbol{\Pi} - \boldsymbol{\beta}_j$ . But a consistent sign suggests anti-Americanism, provided the policy issues are sufficiently varied to allow for differences in  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_j$ .

Our binary data are coded one for approval and 0 otherwise. Approval can be estimated using probit regression. The probability an individual will ‘approve’ of the USA with respect to policy j is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(Y_{ij}=1) &= \Pr[\beta_{0j} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_i (\boldsymbol{\Pi}_j - \boldsymbol{\beta}_j) + \beta_1 P_j^* + \beta_{2j} \Psi_{ij} + \beta_1 u_{ij}] > 0 \\ &= \Pr[u_{ij} > -[\beta_{0j} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_i (\boldsymbol{\Pi}_j - \boldsymbol{\beta}_j) + \beta_1 P_j^* + \beta_{2j} \Psi_{ij}]/\beta_1] \\ &= 1 - \Phi(-[\beta_{0j} + \beta_1 \mathbf{X}_i (\boldsymbol{\Pi}_j - \boldsymbol{\beta}_j) + \beta_1 P_j^* + \beta_{2j} \Psi_{ij}]/\beta_1) \end{aligned} \quad (6) \quad \Phi \text{ is}$$

the cumulative density function relating to the normal distribution.

### 3.2 Attitudes to European integration

We follow Hass (1958) and others and assume those who favor greater European integration feel that they will benefit from it – individually or altruistically. Their views are uninfluenced by the appropriate service delivery level (Oates, 1999), because this is a given. Also our policy areas do not include public services, which is where the arguments of fiscal federalism have most relevance. International influence and defense capability increase with economic size. Hence a single EU voice has more impact than any member country, and possibly more than the sum of all members. But integration entails a loss of sovereignty and a country may become committed to support and finance policies it opposes. The costs may be direct or indirect - such as support for a fellow EU member in an international dispute.

The expected benefits of greater EU policy co-ordination might be individual, altruistic, or civic duty inspired, involving concern for the individual's country and also the whole world. So:

$$W_i = \alpha_i W_{ii} + \alpha_C W_{iC} + \alpha_W W_{iW} \quad (7)$$

Where  $W_{ii}$  is individual  $i$ 's self interest based welfare,  $W_{iC}$  the welfare of 'the country' and  $W_{iW}$  world welfare.  $\alpha_i$ ,  $\alpha_C$  and  $\alpha_W$  are the individual's weights for these three different welfares. The subscript  $i$  on  $W_{iC}$  and  $W_{iW}$  recognises people may have different perceptions of country and world welfare.  $\alpha_i$ ,  $\alpha_C$  and  $\alpha_W$  could be normalized to sum to one, and often we might expect  $\alpha_i W_{ii} > \alpha_C W_{iC} > \alpha_W W_{iW}$ . We assume that all three types of welfare are functions of the individual's socio-economic characteristics ( $\mathbf{X}_i$ ), the power of the US (PUS) and of the EU, (PEU) e.g.:

$$W_{iC} = W_{iC}(\mathbf{X}_i, \text{PUS}, \text{PEU}) \quad (8)$$

EU power might affect individuals: for example through regional transfers. Socio economic characteristics could influence perceptions of country and world welfare: for example education increases awareness. The dependence of individual, country and world welfare on how EU power affects national governments is implicit in (8). The individual will favor a stronger EU if:

$$dW_i/dEU_i = \alpha_i \partial W_{ii} / \partial PEU + \alpha_C \partial W_{iC} / \partial PEU + \alpha_W \partial W_{iW} / \partial PEU + (\alpha_i \partial W_{ii} / \partial PUS + \alpha_C \partial W_{iC} / \partial PUS + \alpha_W \partial W_{iW} / \partial PUS) \partial PUS / \partial PEU > 0 \quad (9)$$

Socio economic factors can have various impacts on  $dW_i/dPEU$ . Although the weights,  $\alpha_i$ ,  $\alpha_C$  and  $\alpha_W$ , may vary with household income, age and education, we ignore this. There may be resource allocation costs, for example for a common defense, and individual attitudes may partly depend upon socio economic characteristics. A willingness to bear such costs is a demand for a (public) good that like others varies with income. Unlike attitudes to the USA, location may be important, for arguably the transfer of power to the EU entails a greater sacrifice for citizens of the capital city. This is consistent with Caplanova et al's (2004) study of Central and Eastern Europe citizens' attitudes to EU and NATO membership.

The impact of  $\partial W_{ii} / \partial PEU$  will also vary directly with the individual's circumstances. For example, EU equal opportunities legislation has influenced the retirement age for UK women.  $\partial W_{iC} / \partial PEU$  will be proxied by country fixed effects, together with socio-economic variables and trust in EU and national governments. It might be thought that  $\partial W_{iW} / \partial PEU$  would be common across all individuals in all countries. But *individuals' perceptions* of this impact may differ. We shall model these by socio-economic variables, by trust in the EU and by perceptions of the EU's image.

Critical in (9) is the sign of  $\partial PUS/\partial PEU$ . If negative, an increase in EU power reduces US power. For example the euro is challenging the dominant position of the dollar. But if EU power supports US power, most likely in foreign policy, then the sign is positive. Given the case we have examined we would expect that if  $(\alpha_i \partial W_{ii}/\partial PUS + \alpha_C \partial W_{iC}/\partial PUS + \alpha_W \partial W_{iW}/\partial PUS) < 0$  then the individual will favor an increase in countervailing EU power if  $\partial PUS/\partial PEU < 0$ . In the following empirical analysis we will proxy  $(\alpha_i \partial W_{ii}/\partial PUS + \alpha_C \partial W_{iC}/\partial PUS + \alpha_W \partial W_{iW}/\partial PUS)$  by the aggregate index of US sentiment. So an individual with consistently negative views of American policies would interpret increasing US power as reducing their welfare. We expect anti-American sentiment to generate support for a stronger EU where it challenges US power, and vice versa.

#### 4 Analysis

We have already described the Eurobarometer sample frame and interview procedures. Our probit regressions use the survey's attitudinal and characteristics data to explore their inter linkages. The variables are defined in an appendix. In the 2003 survey, the individuals' incomes were proxied by the mid point of their income range. Relative income was the ratio of this to the country average. In the 2005 survey, data on income was not available, but data on individual personal circumstances in the recent past and anticipated financial circumstances in the future were available. Attitudes to the US relate to five policy areas: peace, terrorism, poverty, the environment, and world growth. Attitudes to the EU are measured in relation to voter support for a greater co-ordination of defense policy and foreign policy, an EU military rapid reaction force, a common crisis response position and greater independence of foreign policy from the USA. In the 2005 survey, data on the last three were not available, but there was information on support for an EU constitution. The constitution apart, these are predominantly foreign policy and defense issues which could be addressed by inter-state agreements. Hence greater EU co-ordination implies a reduction in national sovereignty.



*Insert Table 1 about here*

#### *4.1 Voters' views on US policies*

Table 1 reports attitudinal variables. The first five columns of Table 1 record negative views of the US with respect to peace, terror, poverty, environment and growth. The alternative measure (not shown) includes positive views and respondents with neither positive nor negative feelings. For example in 2003 29.9% of the Belgian respondents did not have negative views of the US on peace. Overall the survey shows considerable hostility to US policies on peace, poverty and the environment. The most positive views are for US contributions to world growth, and fighting international terrorism.

There are considerable inter-country differences. In 2003 Over 80% of Greek views were negative in all five policy areas, but UK and Irish views were consistently relatively favorable. French evaluations were negative but Danes and Italians were more positive. Belgium, Germany, Spain, Austria and Finland all had average negative percentages on US policies of 55% or higher. But Swedish, Portuguese and Dutch opinion was more evenly balanced. The unweighted all-country averages are highest for environment (67% dissatisfied), peace (60% dissatisfied) and poverty (59% dissatisfied) Growth (42% dissatisfied) and terrorism (39% dissatisfied) were more favorably perceived.

The results for 2005 largely confirm these trends although within the EU15 there was some decline in hostility in some countries including Greece and France, but this has been countered by increased disfavor in countries such as Italy and Ireland. Dissatisfaction on US terrorism policy rose to 49%,

and overall dissatisfaction rose to 57% from 53%. However, more noticeable was the lower level of hostility of many of the new EU entrants, Romania and Estonia excepted. Their overall level of dissatisfaction across the five policy areas was only 38%. Superficially it would appear that the expansion of the EU has made it collectively more favorable to the USA.

***Insert table 2 about here***

Table 2 gives the regression results for US policies. Our focus is not on individual coefficients, but patterns of significance that can be equated to anti-Americanism or pro-Americanism. The dependent variable is the view of the USA's role with respect to each of the five policy dimensions – whether negative or otherwise. Logged variables allow for nonlinearities. The use of squares of ages allows different age cohorts to have different reactions, perhaps reflecting the history of US involvement with their countries. In evaluating the impact of the variables it should be borne in mind that they reflect both attitudes to the USA and the specific issue.

Table 2 shows

1. Women are less favorable than men to the USA with respect to peace and terrorism in both sets of regressions, tend to be less favorable on growth, but are more favorable on the environment.
2. More educated people tend to be more hostile on poverty and environment and in the more recent data set on all policy issues.
3. In 2003, with an increase in income, hostility declines on terrorism, but given the other variables is otherwise insignificant. In 2005, those who have personally fared badly in the recent past or expect that their financial position will worsen, tend to be more disapproving

4. For all the issues, apart from growth in 2005, older people are less disapproving than middle aged people. In both years, for the environment and poverty issues, disapproval increases with age across the age range. For the other issues we tend to observe an inverted U shaped pattern with a peak of disapproval for most issues for people in their forties.

Both income and age impacts might have been expected, with richer voters and those with memories from the height of the cold-war more supportive. The US's association with capitalism may attract the wealthy. Approval for US policies is highest for those growing up in the period 1949-69 - the 'cold-war generation' – a period when the US was seen as the protector of Europe against Communism.

Attitudinal variables are significant along several dimensions. Concern with terrorism tends to increase support for US policies on terrorism, world peace and growth in both years and in all policy dimensions in the original sample. Hence over time this appears to be less of a defining issue. However, the environment remains a key issue. On almost every policy issue in both years, those who feel the environment to be important are more disapproving of the USA. But even more so than the environment attitudes to big business are a defining issue. Without exception mistrust of big business is highly significant in increasing disapproval for the USA.

The country coefficients reflect differences in attitudes compared to the default case - here Finland. The choice of Finland has no substantive impact on the results. Choosing a different country would have changed the country dummy coefficients, but not their relative ordering. These country fixed effects are not shown in the tables, but Figure 1 reflects their average values. Hence given all other variables, including trust in big business, it reflects an attitude to the USA which characterizes the

country as a whole. Of the EU15 the least favorable are Greece, Spain and France. The UK, Netherlands and Sweden are more favorable. In general the new entrants are more favorable to the USA with the exception of Estonia and Romania. But it is clear on this that ‘new Europe’ is less disapproving of the USA than ‘old Europe’.

*Insert Figure 1 about here*

*Insert Table 3 about here*

.

#### *4.2 Voters' views of EU policies*

Table 2 shows respondents' attitudes towards EU policies. Unweighted country averages show that in 2003 only 9% were opposed to an EU foreign policy independent of US foreign policy. Finns (4%) and Greeks (5%) were the least disapproving; the Danes (17%) were the most disapproving. Other foreign and defense issues follow a similar pattern. Overall, 20% oppose an integrated EU foreign policy and 18% an integrated defense policy. In 2005 these figures were 22% and 18% for the original EU15. For the full EU27 the figures are slightly lower at 20% and 15% respectively.

*Insert Figure 2 about here*

Many EU voters have negative attitudes to the USA in all five policy areas, from peace to growth. Figure 2 shows the sum of all responses as coded in the data index. Hence a zero score signals positive attitudes in all dimensions: true for 8.8% of respondents in the 2003 sample. But 10 signals wholly negative attitudes: true for 28.8% of respondents. By 2005 the proportion of positive signals amongst the original EU-15 countries had fallen slightly, indicating that there was little sign

of declining anti-Americanism. But when we turn to the EU-27 countries, in 2005 we find slightly more support and less hostility to the USA. The expansion of the EU to include countries primarily from Central and Eastern Europe appears at least at first to have initially lessened hostility to the USA within the EU as a whole.

In Table 3, we focus on the impact that attitudes to the USA have on support for European integration. In 2003 support for EU independence of the USA increases with the level of education, and is greater for men. The variable, 'summed USA attitudes', combining attitudes along the five dimensions of support for the USA as in Figure 2, is also significant, so the less favorable are respondents' views of the USA, the more likely are they to support an independent EU foreign policy. Table 3 also shows that for EU positions on foreign and defense issues in 2003, including a rapid reaction force, men are more favorable towards an expanded EU role. Northern European countries are the most hostile, though the UK is favorable to a rapid reaction force. Replies again reflect both attitudes to integration and willingness to project military force. On the issues, concern with the economy is consistently associated with support for a stronger EU. Also the 'summed USA attitudes' variable is significant for EU foreign policy and defense policy co-ordination, the creation of a rapid reaction force and for holding common positions in the face of crises. So *increased negativity* to the US *reduces* support for closer European integration. Finally, mistrust of national governments is evident, and is linked to reduced support for a stronger EU. Hence it seems mistrust of either the USA or the national government breeds mistrust of the EU. In the more recent sample we have data on attitudes to defense and foreign policy but not the other issues. However, there is now a question on the EU constitution. The results are largely consistent with those for 2003, including with respect to education, attitudes to the economy and the USA. In addition those whose personal situation had deteriorated or who expected it to deteriorate tend to be more hostile to a

strengthening European union. Distrust of big business also, in general, reduces support for EU integration, although more so in 2005 than in 2003.

## **5. Conclusions**

We defined anti-Americanism as consistent opposition to US policy. Our three questions were: (i) does anti-Americanism exist in the EU, (ii) is it linked to respondent characteristics and attitudes, and (iii) what is its impact on support for greater EU integration? There is strong evidence of anti-Americanism linked to age, gender, policy preferences, national origin, and in particular those who mistrust big business. The latter is strongly suggestive that a root cause of anti-Americanism is anti-capitalism. If so the financial crisis of 2008/9 is unlikely to increase support for the USA, notwithstanding the considerably greater popularity of President Obama compared to that of his predecessor.

In 'old Europe' 'pro-Americanism' is found in the UK, Italy, Ireland and possibly Sweden. France, Greece and Spain stand out in having consistently more unfavorable attitudes. France has possibly the most ancient and complex set of anti-American sentiments. Greek hostility dates back to WWII and US anticommunist intervention. Spanish hostility can be traced back to 1898 with the Spanish-American war which saw Spain lose considerable territory to the USA. However, attitudes to the USA are considerably more positive in 'new' than in 'old Europe'. EU expansion does appear to have made it, collectively at least, more pro-USA.

Excepting Ireland this pattern of country support also matched explicit initial support for the Iraq war. It may also impact on American multinationals and US exports (Anholt and Hildreth, 2004).

The lesson is that a "hard power" victory can come at the expense of a "soft-power" defeat (Nye, 2004).

European hostility to America also has implications for the EU. We showed that EU voter anti-Americanism leads to a demand for less dependence on the US, though not for an EU to rival America. Indeed the reverse is the case – disapproval of America was not linked to a desire for greater European defense and foreign policy integration, nor for an EU constitution. EU voters who feel American policies have been bad for the world do not want a more powerful EU.

**Acknowledgments:** We are grateful to Alice Leonard and Roger Eatwell for comments.

## **APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS**

**Male:** female=0, male=1.

**Age:** Respondent's age in years.

**Education** Age individual finished full time education. Coded: 1, <16 years; 2, 16-19 years; 3, >19 years.

**Self-employed, unemployed, house person, manual worker:** Coded one if the respondent fell into any of these categories otherwise zero.

**Household income relative to country average** Ratio of household income to average income in respondent's country. Income data uses a fifteen-point scale. Its proxy was the mid point of the range corresponding to the scale point.

**Attitudes to the USA** Responses to the question "In your opinion would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor negative role regarding ..." Answers were coded 0 (positive), 1 (neither positive nor negative) and 2 (negative). Don't knows were omitted. The questions covered (i)world peace, (ii)the fight against terrorism, (iii)the fight against world poverty (iv)protecting the world environment and (v)growth of the world economy.

**Summed USA attitudes** The sum of the responses to the five questions on attitudes to the USA.

**Independent of USA** Responses to the question "The European Union already has a Common Security and Foreign Policy and a European Security and Defense Policy. There is now a debate about how much further these should be developed. Do you tend to agree or disagree with each of the following statements? European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States Foreign Policy". Coded 0 (tend to agree), 1 (don't know) and 2 (tend to disagree).

**European Defense and Foreign Policy** Responses to a question on whether the EU should have common defense and foreign policies. Coded 0 (for), don't know (1) and against (2).

**Military Reaction Force** Response to a question on whether the EU should have a military rapid reaction force for international crises. Coded 0 (for), don't know (1) and against (2).

**European Constitution** Coded 0 if the respondent was in favor for a constitution for the European Union, don't know (1) and against (2).

**Attitudes to Terror, the economy, defense and the environment:** a question that asked for the two most important issues then facing the country; from a choice of twenty four. Coded 1 if mentioned and zero otherwise.

**Trust in big companies and also in the national government.** Coded 1 for no trust, and zero for trust or do not know.

**Situation 5 years:** coded 1 if the individual believed their personal situation had improved over the previous five years; 2 if was unchanged; and 3 if it had worsened.

**Finances will improve.** Coded 1 if the individual expected their household financial position to improve over the next five years, 2 if was expected to stay the same, and 3 if it was expected to get worse.



## References

- Anderson, C.J., 1998. When in doubt use proxies. Attitudes toward domestic politics and support for European integration, *Comparative Political Studies* 31, 569-601.
- Anholt, S., Hildreth, J., 2004 *Brand America: Mother of all Brands*. Cyan Books, London.
- Berman, R., 2004 *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem* Stanford: Hoover Press, Stanford.
- Caplanova, A., Orviska, M., Hudson, J., 2004. Eastern European attitudes to integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, 271-87.
- Ceaser, J. W., 2003. A genealogy of anti-Americanism. *The Public Interest* no.152, 3-18.
- Franklin, M., van der Eijk, C., Marsh, M., 1995. Referendum outcomes and trust in government: public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht. *West European Politics* 18, 101-17.
- Gabel, M., 1998. Public support for European integration: an empirical test of five theories. *Journal of Politics* 60, 333-54.
- Gabel, M.J., Anderson, C. J., 2002. The structure of citizen attitudes and the European political space. *Comparative Political Studies* 35, 893-913.
- Haas, E.B., 1958. *The Uniting of Europe*. University of California Press, Stanford.
- Hooghe, L., 2003. Europe divided: elites vs. public opinion on European integration. *European Union Politics* 4, 281-304.
- Iwama, Y., 2004. The new shape of the US alliance system. *Gaiko Forum: Japanese Perspectives on Foreign Affairs* 4(1), 20-29.
- Kohut, A., 2003. *Anti-Americanism: Causes and Characteristics*. Pew Center for the People and the Press, Philadelphia. <http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=77> Accessed 20.1.08.
- Krastev, I., 2004. The anti-American century? *Journal of Democracy* 15, 5-16.
- Kritzinger, S., 2003. The influence of the nation state on individual support for the European Union. *European Union Politics* 4, 219-41.
- Linn, J. F., 2004. Rebuilding transatlantic relations – it's time to repair damaged bridges. The Brookings Institution, Washington. <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20040220linn.pdf> Accessed 20.01.08.
- Meunier, S., 2005. Anti-Americanisms in France. *French Politics, Culture & Society* 23, 125-40.

Nye, J. S. Jr., 2004. The decline of America's soft power – why Washington should worry. *Foreign Affairs* 83(3), 16-20.

Oates, W.E., 1999. An essay on fiscal federalism. *Journal of Economic Literature* 37, 1120-49.

Sanchez-Cuenca, I., 2000. The political basis of support for European integration. *European Union Politics* 1, 147-171.

Sardar, Z., Wyn Davies, M., 2002. *Why Do People Hate America?* Icon Books, Cambridge.

Sardar, Z., Wyn Davies, M., 2004. *American Dream, Global Nightmare*. Icon Books,  
Spiro, H., 1988. Anti-Americanism in western Europe. *Annals, AAPSS* no.497, 120-132.

Toinet, M-F., 1988. France pique and pique Francaises. *Annals, AAPSS* no.497, 133-141.

Todd, I., 2003. *After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Table 1: Attitudes to US and European Integration

2003	US:					European Integration:					Independent USA
	Peace	Terror	Poverty	Environment	Growth	Foreign policy	Defense policy	RMF	Crisis		
Austria	65.7	47.4	62.9	70.5	47.6	22.5	25.8	15.0	15.9	12.3	
Belgium	70.1	42.4	60.7	69.4	51.9	13.4	10.7	11.8	7.3	11.5	
Denmark	36.3	20.1	52.1	74.2	25.1	32.1	31.2	10.3	14.9	16.5	
Finland	71.5	37.3	62.9	68.1	38.6	33.2	38.8	9.4	15.9	5.0	
France	75.9	50.7	73.6	79.5	58.7	20.9	14.4	10.1	6.0	9.3	
Germany	74.2	38.7	61.1	73.9	40.8	13.3	9.8	13.3	6.7	7.1	
Greece	91.2	80.7	86.5	85.9	80.3	10.8	8.3	8.4	6.8	4.3	
Ireland	44.0	32.7	39.1	43.5	25.8	18.5	26.6	23.7	9.6	6.3	
Italy	53.3	32.1	46.0	50.0	30.7	8.9	5.9	10.6	5.2	10.0	
Luxembourg	49.5	35.6	57.9	72.2	40.8	11.3	5.3	5.8	5.3	10.4	
Netherlands	47.6	27.0	60.1	73.5	39.1	16.6	14.7	10.9	10.4	11.7	
Portugal	54.7	40.0	53.0	58.5	42.2	15.1	9.4	17.0	8.0	10.1	
Spain	71.3	51.6	64.0	65.1	47.0	11.9	9.9	19.1	7.8	6.7	
Sweden	52.0	26.3	59.7	69.5	26.0	34.3	36.7	7.1	10.8	7.6	
UK	34.1	18.4	40.0	56.2	29.8	35.8	29.2	15.1	12.6	11.5	
2005	Peace	Terror	Poverty	Environment	Growth Policy	Foreign Policy	Defense	Constitution			
Austria	65.4	51.5	61.2	71.9	35.9	26.9	27.9	28.5			
Belgium	58.3	46.3	51.1	55.0	38.4	21.0	16.0	19.7			
Denmark	47.4	33.4	55.9	75.9	18.6	31.9	25.6	40.3			
Finland	54.7	39.5	59.7	76.9	22.6	38.8	33.1	34.4			
France	67.9	61.7	66.6	69.6	51.3	15.6	10.9	12.8			
Germany	62.9	42.8	60.2	76.4	35.6	17.8	11.4	19.2			
Greece	76.6	52.2	71.5	80.9	34.2	15.0	9.8	18.3			
Ireland	68.1	50.7	61.8	75.1	35.6	33.7	34.7	41.7			
Italy	67.0	50.3	74.2	83.3	53.6	20.8	12.6	21.5			
Luxembourg	53.5	45.6	42.6	54.4	25.4	16.9	22.4	13.8			
Netherlands	42.2	36.8	42.9	42.8	33.9	15.5	13.6	15.5			
Portugal	62.4	50.9	61.2	78.3	42.4	17.5	7.5	19.8			
Spain	90.5	83.0	83.6	79.7	76.8	22.3	18.5	28.0			
Sweden	62.5	55.4	55.3	60.3	39.4	18.4	14.0	14.3			
UK	46.4	33.2	60.5	78.9	34.9	25.2	14.7	32.8			
Bulgaria	48.7	30.7	35.2	44.2	26.4	19.5	8.4	16.4			
Cyprus	47.2	35.0	45.9	72.9	32.5	35.3	29.8	32.6			
Czech	57.7	53.1	57.9	70.0	48.8	20.7	19.1	18.4			
Estonia	77.4	67.5	70.8	69.1	62.0	9.76	6.2	12.6			
Hungary	29.3	17.7	28.1	41.6	15.3	24.6	9.2	31.2			
Latvia	42.3	28.0	19.8	36.9	13.2	12.4	6.2	14.4			
Lithuania	44.4	32.0	37.2	42.4	23.2	14.5	8.9	8.20			
Malta	45.4	32.9	25.4	34.9	19.8	13.0	5.2	14.3			
Poland	27.3	17.2	13.9	17.5	13.4	9.6	6.1	13.3			
Romania	66.0	61.1	59.6	69.1	41.5	15.7	10.3	12.4			
Slovakia	29.2	24.5	24.2	29.7	19.0	20.0	16.4	17.0			
Slovenia	37.6	21.7	28.5	31.7	13.1	11.8	8.1	18.9			

Figures show percentages (i) disapproving of the US on the different policy issues and (ii) not in favor of greater European co-operation or independence from the US, or fearing crises.

Table 2: Attitudes to the US with respect to:

Variable	Peace	Terror	Growth	Poverty	Environment	Peace	Terror	Growth	Poverty	Environment
<i>2005</i>						<i>2003</i>				
Age	0.0036 (1.56)	9.50E-04 (0.42)	0.0075** (3.27)	0.0169** (7.45)	0.015** (6.28)	-0.0085** (2.75)	-0.0096** (3.19)	0.0042 (1.36)	0.0073* (2.38)	0.0083* (2.56)
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	-0.0074** (3.11)	-0.0052* (2.20)	-0.0069** (2.90)	-0.0184** (7.73)	-0.0149** (5.94)	0.0049 (1.49)	0.007* (2.18)	-0.0038 (1.16)	-0.0108** (3.29)	-0.0091** (2.64)
Male	-0.0981** (6.32)	-0.1467** (9.51)	-0.0182 (1.18)	0.0182 (1.18)	0.1169** (7.19)	-0.183** (8.61)	-0.1926** (9.29)	-0.0962** (4.62)	-0.0255 (1.21)	0.0623** (2.79)
Education	0.0508** (5.78)	0.051** (5.86)	0.0178* (2.05)	0.0429** (4.92)	0.0774** (8.42)	-0.0115 (0.72)	-0.0118 (0.75)	-0.0311* (1.98)	0.0382* (2.38)	0.0898** (5.34)
Self-employed	-0.059* (1.98)	0.0318 (1.07)	0.0643* (2.21)	-0.0077 (0.26)	-0.0597 (1.93)	-0.0745 (1.88)	0.0638 (1.64)	0.0122 (0.32)	0.0254 (0.64)	-0.0626 (1.50)
House person	-0.056* (2.00)	0.0408 (1.47)	0.0863** (3.10)	-0.0052 (0.19)	-0.0702* (2.42)	-0.0568 (1.52)	0.0194 (0.53)	-0.0021 (0.06)	-0.0651 (1.74)	-0.076 (1.95)
Unemployed	-0.0729* (2.28)	-0.0934** (2.93)	0.0097 (0.31)	-0.1056** (3.32)	-0.1438** (4.32)	-0.0267 (0.59)	0.0022 (0.05)	0.0772 (1.75)	-0.0098 (0.22)	-0.0537 (1.13)
Manual	-0.0972** (4.75)	-0.0868** (4.28)	-0.0146 (0.72)	-0.0922** (4.54)	-0.1664** (7.79)	-0.0559* (2.05)	-0.0146 (0.55)	0.0275 (1.03)	-0.1061** (3.91)	-0.1339** (4.69)
Situation 5 years	0.0173 (1.70)	0.0355** (3.51)	0.0715** (7.07)	0.0253* (2.49)	-0.0133 (1.24)					
Finances will improve	0.0213** (3.17)	0.0311** (4.68)	0.0323** (4.87)	0.0223** (3.35)	0.003 (0.43)					
Household income						-0.0626 (1.16)	-0.1779** (3.40)	-0.0531 (1.00)	-0.0098 (0.18)	0.0514 (0.91)
<i>Attitudes</i>										
Terror	-0.0738** (2.78)	-0.0728** (2.73)	0.0697** (2.61)	-0.0265 (1.00)	-0.0291 (1.02)	-0.1877** (5.95)	-0.103** (3.27)	-0.1467** (4.66)	-0.1754** (5.58)	-0.1859** (5.72)
Economy	0.0074 (0.42)	-0.0444** (2.57)	0.0203 (1.18)	0.0167 (0.97)	0.0327 (1.80)	0.021 (0.84)	-0.0285 (1.18)	-0.0288 (1.19)	0.0147 (0.60)	0.0739** (2.81)
Defense	0.0071 (0.13)	-0.028 (0.52)	-0.0075 (0.14)	0.0521 (0.95)	0.0489 (0.84)	0.1621** (3.63)	0.1272** (2.94)	0.0925* (2.16)	0.062 (1.40)	0.1544** (3.23)
Environment	0.1092** (2.62)	0.2148** (5.18)	-0.0545 (1.32)	0.2132** (5.03)	0.34** (7.17)	0.1961** (3.90)	0.2026** (4.22)	0.1376** (2.82)	0.274** (5.30)	0.2795** (5.01)
Trust	0.2602** (17.21)	0.2439** (16.17)	0.2474** (16.37)	0.2537** (16.84)	0.2863** (18.04)	0.2652** (13.00)	0.2244** (11.24)	0.2885** (14.38)	0.334** (16.43)	0.3214** (15.04)

Observations	26794	26735	25555	26129	25749	15538	15350	14523	14768	14642
Log Likelihood	-25358	-25919	-25941	-25303	-22589	-13431	-14402	-14456	-13480	-11868
X <sup>2</sup>	2908	3292	2980	3793	4318	2191	1960	1564	1490	1279

Notes: (.) denotes t statistics. \*\*/\* denotes significance at the 1%/5% levels of significance. Equations estimated by ordered probit in STATA. Country fixed effects included. X<sup>2</sup> denotes the likelihood ratio statistic.


Table 3: Attitudes to European Integration

Variable	Foreign policy	Defense	Constitution	Foreign policy 2003	Defense	Military Re-action force	Crisis position	Independent of USA
<i>2005</i>								
Age	-0.0183** (6.95)	-0.0124** (4.30)	-0.0106** (4.18)	-0.0118** (3.34)	-0.0072* (1.97)	-0.00068 (0.19)	-0.0133** (3.31)	-0.0039 (1.00)
Age <sup>2</sup> /100	0.0184** (6.71)	0.0155** (5.18)	0.0125** (4.76)	0.0105** (2.76)	0.0069 (1.75)	0.0032 (0.87)	0.0122** (2.83)	0.0024 (0.59)
Male	-0.0971** (5.43)	-0.0808** (4.11)	-0.0436** (2.55)	-0.1072** (4.41)	-0.0845** (3.35)	-0.1769** (7.56)	-0.1135** (4.10)	-0.0786** (2.92)
Education	-0.0417** (4.20)	-0.039** (3.65)	-0.0512** (5.29)	-0.1025** (5.55)	-0.0935** (4.88)	-0.0407* (2.31)	-0.0161 (0.76)	-0.1293** (6.35)
Self employed	0.075* (2.22)	0.1149** (3.17)	0.0803* (2.50)	0.0213 (0.47)	0.0554 (1.18)	0.089* (2.07)	0.0439 (0.86)	-0.0183 (0.37)
House person	0.1185** (3.75)	0.1532** (4.55)	0.1044** (3.41)	0.0638 (1.52)	0.1162** (2.68)	0.0563 (1.37)	0.0119 (0.25)	0.0654 (1.46)
Unemployed	0.0545 (1.48)	0.0833* (2.07)	0.0499 (1.41)	0.1083* (2.15)	0.0382 (0.72)	0.146** (3.00)	0.0321 (0.55)	0.026 (0.46)
Manual	0.1365** (5.82)	0.0828** (3.19)	0.0853** (3.79)	0.0708* (2.28)	0.0436 (1.35)	0.0288 (0.95)	0.044 (1.24)	-0.00094 (0.03)
Situation 5 years	0.0687** (5.85)	0.0702** (5.46)	0.0764** (6.80)					
Finances will improve	0.0311** (4.10)	0.0406** (4.92)	0.0461** (6.36)					
Household Income				-0.0391 (0.65)	-0.0198 (0.31)	-0.0102 (0.17)	-0.0778 (1.13)	0.0464 (0.69)
<i>Attitudes</i>								
Terror	-0.0272 (0.89)	-0.0023 (0.07)	-0.0421 (1.42)	-0.0031 (0.09)	-0.065 (1.70)	-0.1012** (2.79)	0.0877* (2.18)	0.1372** (3.63)
Economy	-0.1171** (5.79)	-0.0974** (4.37)	-0.0777** (4.03)	-0.1158** (4.04)	-0.0573 (1.93)	-0.0463 (1.70)	-0.0925** (2.81)	-0.0951** (2.99)
Defense	-0.0399 (0.64)	0.0889 (1.36)	0.0431 (0.73)	-0.1177* (2.34)	-0.144** (2.73)	-0.0665 (1.36)	-0.0735 (1.28)	-0.0031 (0.06)
Environment	-0.0354 (0.74)	0.089 (1.77)	-0.1001* (2.14)	-0.0111 (0.19)	-0.0168 (0.28)	0.0022 (0.04)	-0.0469 (0.70)	-0.1769* (2.56)
Trust	0.1526**	0.1408**	0.215**	0.1322**	0.114**	0.0539*	0.0724*	0.0616*

government	(8.09)	(6.82)	(11.9)	(5.34)	(4.44)	(2.26)	(2.56)	(2.25)
Trust	0.116**	0.0812**	0.106**	0.0137	0.075**	-0.0097	0.0191	-0.0852**
big business	(6.28)	(4.01)	(6.01)	(0.55)	(2.89)	(0.40)	(0.67)	(3.11)
Summed U-	0.033**	0.0415**	0.036**	0.0303**	0.0358**	0.0456**	0.0302**	-0.0371**
SA attitudes	(11.62)	(13.41)	(13.12)	(7.89)	(8.95)	(12.14)	(6.93)	(9.13)
Observations	23980	23980	23980	13037	13037	13037	13037	13037
Log Likeld.	-18082	-14489	-20443	-10046	-9170	-10384	-7159	-7819
X <sup>2</sup>	1219	1926	1778	983.9	1404	564.4	354.7	481.1

Notes: (.) denotes t statistics. \*\*/\* denotes significance at the 1%/5% levels of significance. Equations estimated by ordered probit in STATA. Country fixed effects included. X<sup>2</sup> denotes the likelihood ratio statistic.

Figure 1: Anti-Americanism



Note: This reflects the average of the country fixed effects in the regressions in Table 2. For the EU15 countries it is the average of the coefficients in both regressions. For the new member states it is an average of their values in 2005. Darker shading indicates greater disapproval of the USA in the various policy dimensions, given the other variables in the regressions, including for example trust in big business.

