Explaining the Dynamics of Regional Integration: Democratisation, Identity, Institutions and Leadership in the Case of ASEAN

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of Bath
Department of Social and Policy Science
March 2014

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Signed on behalf of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Dedication

For my late grandmother
who was unable to see my completed thesis.

&

For my parents
who give me unending support in everything I do
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Abstract

This thesis contributes to the theoretical understanding of the dynamics of regional integration by focusing on the key elements in regional integration process: democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership. The thesis is based on the premise that while theorisation of the EU experience of integration has provided an invaluable range of theoretical tools, the application of these theoretical perspectives to other regional organisations is often relatively uncritical. The contribution of the thesis is hence a theoretical examination of the applicability of concept derived from the European experience to the dynamics of integration in ASEAN. Specifically, the thesis analyses the importance of democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership as critical mechanisms and driving force in regional integration process. The thesis provides a systematic analysis by addressing the roles of the four factors, whether or not they take part in constructing and solidifying regional community, as well as the interaction and causal relationship between these variables in the regional integration process. The thesis finds that while democratisation, identity, institution and leadership are important driving force in the intriguing dynamics of ASEAN integration, they are interrelated and function in different ways from the European experience while some of them have a complicated role and are subject to other influential factors. Importantly, in the context of ASEAN, democratisation probes problematic and causes a lot of internal tension among member states. At the end of the thesis, it contends that the problem of democratic deficit and the divergent political ideologies among ASEAN members lie at the root of all emerging major criticisms as well as lead to a slow progress of regional integration. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the association’s norms should be reinterpreted to allow constructive consultation on the existing problems and moving towards a more participatory community could be one way to break the deadlock and should be set as a long-term goal of ASEAN.
# List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>ASEAN Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AICHR</td>
<td>ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSC</td>
<td>ASEAN Political Security Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>ASEAN Security Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
<td>ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+6</td>
<td>ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACM</td>
<td>Central American Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPT</td>
<td>Common Effective Preferential Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLMV</td>
<td>Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Code of Conduct in the South China Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cambodian People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EESC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euratom</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-3</td>
<td>France, Germany and the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Other People Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>People’s Action Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJC</td>
<td>Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>People’s Power Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIA-FIN</td>
<td>Roadmap on Monetary &amp; Financial Integration of ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSIS</td>
<td>S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTA</td>
<td>Regional Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBY</td>
<td>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAC</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNO</td>
<td>United Malays National Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUL</td>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAP</td>
<td>Vientiane Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis intends to make a contribution to the comparative understanding of the dynamics of regional integration by focusing on the key elements in the integration process in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The thesis is premised on the observation that while there has been quite substantial empirical study of ASEAN, theoretical investigations of the region have primarily focused on its role in international security.

Theories of regional integration per se, which have unsurprisingly emerged from the European experience, have been less systematically applied to the ASEAN context. As regionalism gains momentum around the world, it is important for a strong comparative empirical base to be built upon theoretical foundations. A strongly theoretical comparative knowledge base is important not only to understand the dynamics of regional integration in ASEAN and elsewhere, but also to provide a comparative foil for reflecting on the European experience itself. The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to such a theoretically-informed comparative project through a focus on the application of existing theories of regional integration to ASEAN.

Specifically, the objective of this research is to analyse the importance of democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership as being critical mechanisms and driving forces in regional integration processes. As discussed in Chapter 3, these concepts emerge clearly from the EU experience as important drivers of integrations. It also aims to produce a systematic analysis by addressing the roles of the four factors, whether or not they take part in constructing and solidifying regional community, as well as the interaction and causal relationship between these variables in the regional integration process. From this analysis, a firmer grounding for comparative regionalism between ASEAN and other areas, including the EU, is established.

1.1 Explanation and general understanding of regional integration

The world has considerably changed in recent decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the increasingly integrated and interdependent economies of a globalizing world have taken centre stage in international political economy. Some scholars such as Omae (1995), Strange (1996) and Lupel (2004) suggest that this might lead to the end of nation-state as the dominant form of political organisation. Others, however, have argued that ‘globalization’ is a misnomer, and that regional integration of autonomous nation-states, rather than globalization and degradation of the nation state, is the more significant and important phenomena in international politics. As nation states are likely to move away from confrontation towards more political compromise and economic cooperation, it is argued,
Regional integration has become a reality of the international scene and achieves new significance and requires more studies.

The growth of regional cooperation has been recognized as one of the major developments in recent international relations (Haokip, 2012: 378). The number of regional agreements has multiplied in the past few decades, with the world now seeing many hundreds of regional cooperation agreements. One important driving force is that the perceived success of the EU draws attention of countries to extend their relations with other countries in order to gain the economic benefits that regional integration brings, creating imperatives for new forms of regional cooperation. Furthermore, the more recent structures of regional integration are increasing in terms of scope, depth and complexity as many scholars are moving their attention to a new mode of thinking. Regional integration has been argued to contribute to the development and sustainability of national governance and has been responsible for economic growth and prosperity. This trend highlights the significance of closer economic and political cooperation in the region and the need for strategically focused studies in this area.

Regional cooperation has considerably increased in number and multiplied in the past few decades with most of the world now involved in more than one hundred regional agreements (Ethier, 1998: 1149) and many countries belong to multiple regional groupings, for example Mexico has 7 Regional Trade Agreement memberships and Tanzania is a member of 4 RTAs (ODI, 2005). According to statistics, the accumulated number of Free Trade Agreements signed between 1948 and 1990 was 30. From 1990 to 1995, the number increased to 79 and expanded to 155 in 2000. As of July 2005, the total number reached 213 (Urata, 2005: 5). By 2007, the number of regional trade agreements climbed to 300, with every country in the world a member of at least one such regional trade agreement and more than one-third of world trade taking place within such arrangements (Di Mauro et al., 2008: 5). As of January 2012, there have been 511 notifications of regional trade agreements in the world, of which 319 are in force (WTO, 2012).
Table 1.1: A typology of regionalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of regionalisation</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structured regionalisation</td>
<td>A complex multi-issue entity, using informal politics despite deep institutionalisation. No hegemon exists; substantial power is delegated to the new centre in many policy areas, and costly to ‘repatriate’.</td>
<td>European Union; African Union (in aspiration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominance regionalisation</td>
<td>An alternative to a global regime, established by regional/global hegemon to counter threats to its power from other regionalisation processes or states. Focuses on narrow range of issues, with emphasis on trade.</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security regionalisation</td>
<td>Focus on security issues, either military or socio-economic. May be geographically contiguous or transregional in membership.</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network regionalisation</td>
<td>Regional identity-driven response to globalization. May acquire significant or more limited range of powers, but relies primarily on non-institutionalised or intergovernmental working methods.</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); African Union (in actuality); South American Common Market (Mercosur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjoined regionalisation</td>
<td>Strategic partnership of one regionalisation process with either another such process or with key states outside the region for the sake of economic or foreign policy advantages.</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); putative Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Warleigh-Lack, 2008: 52)

The definition of a region (and, by extension, regionalism) is, however, relatively fluid because there is no precise method to distinguish one group of states from another by geographical, cultural, historical, economic or other grounds. Seemingly, the only way to overcome this issue is just to draw a line around them on a map and their members perceive themselves as linked together in one or more ways (Armstrong et al., 2004: 212). Substantively, the processes of regional integration have their own dynamics and diverse natures which identify their different features and core rationales. As reproduced in Table 1.1, Warleigh-Lack (2008: 52) categorized the types of regional cooperation into five patterns: Structured, Dominance, Security, Network and Conjoined. Each type of regional integration has significant features and some of them might have an intersection between each other in some particular areas. In addition to types of integration, regional integration also varies by degree of integration, from looser to deeper integration. Table 1.2 shows the five such degrees of regional integration varying in their...
respective depth: Preferential Trade Area, Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market and Economic Union (Smeets, 1996: 60).

Table 1.2: Forms of regional integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Preferential Trade Area</th>
<th>Free Trade Area</th>
<th>Customs Union</th>
<th>Common Market</th>
<th>Economic Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduce tariff or free</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Certain goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete liberalization</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of trade in goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Area plus</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>common external tariffs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free movement of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>factors and services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated or common</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Smeets, 1996: 60)

As noted above, recent regional integration projects have been heavily influenced by the creation of the European Union. The development of regional integration in Europe and deepening of relationships of European states raised concerns among their erstwhile trade partners as they might expect a sharp decrease of trade with Europe, which is relatively large. However, the stimulation to regionalisation may also include consideration of a desire for greater bargaining powers, as well as considering the trend whereby the world’s superpowers and major influential organizations began to participate in regionalization processes, notably through the US involvement in NAFTA. Although ‘many [regional agreements] were established for defensive purposes, and not all of them were based on voluntary assent’ (Mattli, 1999: 1), implying that the world is getting more integrated and cooperative, moving from a horizontal structure toward a more vertical structure. In the simplest economic sense, these regional agreements aim at reducing or removing altogether tariffs on trade flows between member countries, with some also eliminating non-tariff barriers and liberalising investment and other policies. At their deepest level, regional agreements expect to achieve the formation of political community which implies the establishment of common institutions (Schiff and Winters, 2003) and involving the construction of share substantial institutions.

We can discern from the above that contemporary regionalism is a very varied phenomenon, from simply economic to political, and from loose to deep. Yet dominance of the EU
experience in the historiography of regionalism has also arguably affected the way in which regionalism is theorized – whether explicitly or implicitly, the EU is taken as the paradigmatic example of regional integration. This highlights the centrality and the exceptionality of the EU and leads to a tendency to consider the EU as a blueprint of regional integration or a potential model for other integrating regions. Most theories of integration emerged from examination of the European experience and have often been applied unquestioningly to other regional projects. However, several decades ago, Nye (1968: 855-856) laid the early groundwork about the comparison of regional integration processes as he argued that the problems of comparative regional integration can only be sorted by ‘the formation of precise hypotheses (with clearly stated limits)’ and this indicates the need for a consideration of ‘the static foundations upon which our dynamic or causal theories rest’. In a similar manner, Murray (2010: 309) argued that the historical differences between Europe and Southeast Asia made a direct comparison far from being productive or useful. It is this challenge that this thesis confronts. The approach, elaborated further below and in subsequent chapters, is not to try to generate a new theory of regionalism ex nihilo, but rather to take a more critical and reflexive approach to the application of concepts of regionalism in a comparative perspective. ASEAN is a compelling case to use for such a project, arguably lying at the further empirical extreme from the EU in terms of its scale, level of development, and extent of integration (see Table 1.3 for basic comparative statistics).

This position taken in this thesis – and its major contribution – is to articulate a comparative approach that stands between empiricism and high theorisation by focusing on the conceptual level. On the one hand, as noted above, empirical differences between different regions make direct empirical comparison problematic. On the other hand, however, highly theorised approaches risk ignoring or undermining important differences for the sake of theoretical consistency. By focusing on concepts derived from the theorisation of European experience, this thesis strikes a middle ground between empirical and theoretical analysis. The examination of how concepts derived from the European experiences have played out in ASEAN allow us both to see and understand the different empirical and historical dynamics of regionalism and, drawing on these differing trajectories, to reflect back on the concepts and theories used to make sense of regionalisation processes.
Table 1.3: Background information on EU and ASEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Member states</strong></td>
<td>28 states</td>
<td>10 states 2 observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters</strong></td>
<td>Brussels (de facto capital)</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Working languages</strong></td>
<td>24 languages</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population (2012)</strong></td>
<td>507,890,191</td>
<td>616,614,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- total (US$, millions)</td>
<td>16,214,000 (2013)</td>
<td>2,311,315 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- per capita (US$)</td>
<td>31,948 (2013)</td>
<td>3,748 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area (km²)</strong></td>
<td>4,381,376</td>
<td>4,479,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key dates</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>The establishment of ECSC</td>
<td>1967 The Bangkok Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>The establishment of EEC</td>
<td>1976 The first summit in Bali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>The Merger Treaty</td>
<td>and the signings of the AFTA Concord</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>The signing of the Single European Act</td>
<td>and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>The Maastricht Treaty</td>
<td>1992 The creation of AFTA</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Single European Market enters into force</td>
<td>2003 The adoption of AEC proposal</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>The adoption of the euro</td>
<td>2008 The ASEAN Charter entered into force</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The European Union’s largest enlargement</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Treaty of Lisbon</td>
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1.2  The focuses of this research

As mentioned in the previous section, regional integration is a very complex and multi-faceted process, but that theoretical explanations to date have tended to rely predominantly on the European experience. The focus of this research is to problematize these theories by explicit and reflexive application of key concepts to the ASEAN experience. More specifically, the thesis identifies four key concepts in Eurocentric theories of regionalism – democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership – and examines their application to the ASEAN experience.

The dynamics of regional integration from this approach are understood to be the ways in which the forces of development and change in the regional integration process derive from the conceptual combination of these four key processes. This allows us to use to conceptual advances gleaned from the European experience but without presuming a particular causal relationship. For instance, to prefigure some of the findings of this thesis, while democratisation has played an important role in the process of integration in both Europe and Southeast Asia, it has played out in ways that are almost diametrically opposed. As discussed further in the literature review, although each of these concepts has been applied with considerable explanatory power in the context of the EU, they are rarely studied in other regional integration models or in term of comparative studies.
Intuitively, there are clear reasons why we might expect these concepts to play out differently in theorizing ASEAN integration from the European experience. Democratisation, for instance, has been a cornerstone of EU integration; in the 1970s, Greece, Portugal and Spain were all admitted to full membership only after their respective restoration of democratic government. In Southeast Asia, however, western liberal democracy is not considered as essential to good governance in Southeast Asia, unlike the European norms (Camroux, 2008: 10). Likewise, while the substantive nature and extent of a European identity is subject to continued debate, the idea that there is (and was) some form of pan-European identity is not widely disputed; conversely, there is little evidence of or argument for the existence of any kind of ‘Asian’ political identity, let alone ‘Southeast Asia’. Indeed, while the concept of ‘Europe’ as a geopolitical region has often been traced back to the empire of Charlemagne at the end of the Eighth Century, the idea of Southeast Asia as a region at all is largely a product of the particular nature of Allied operational command during the Second World War (Fifield, 1976).

1.3 Why ASEAN and the European Union?

It is clear that there are many models of regional integration in the international system. They are distinct to a certain degree and structured in different environmental contexts. Some of them are centrally focused on free trade areas or employing external tariff regulations, while others formulate much deeper integration which includes, for example, the free movements of labour and technology. Some of them are intensely structured and institutionalized, while others rely on networking and informal personal contacts. ASEAN, founded by the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, is a model of regional integration rising as a new centre of power in Asia. It is generally thought that ASEAN emerged as a response to various external threats, such as political disorder in China, the colonial experiences, the spread of communism and the regional influence of external powers. It has also been suggested that ASEAN is determinedly an attempt to avoid a setting up of intensive institutional structures (Armstrong et al., 2004: 220).

Even more than other regions, Southeast Asia is characterised by vast diversity and disparity, and ASEAN members exhibit significantly different levels of political, economic and social development. For instance, Singapore’s and Brunei’s per capita GDP are approximately between 25-30 times higher than Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.¹ Their political regimes cover a wide spectrum ranging from electoral democracy to full-scale authoritarianism. In term of culture, ASEAN includes the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia, and the countries

¹ Please see IMF (2013)
claiming to have the highest Buddhist population density Cambodia, Burma and Thailand. Indeed, Southeast Asia is ‘religiously and culturally more heterogeneous than Europe, with significant minorities and little multiculturalism’ (Murray, 2010: 319). For these reasons, ASEAN integration has been very much considered as a unique political phenomenon and Southeast Asia itself a research area where much is yet to be explored theoretically, methodologically and empirically.

### 1.4 Research questions and objectives

Drawing on the above discussion, the aim of this research is to analyse the importance of democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership in ASEAN integration, with comparative reference to the European Union. It mainly intends to understand how these concepts help explain the experience of ASEAN integration, with the objectives both of establishing a more systematic base for comparative regionalism and of contributing to the development of regionalisation theory through the critical interrogation of Eurocentric concepts in a non-European context. Empirically, the main research question is:

“What roles have democratisation, identity, institutions, leadership played in the ASEAN integration process?”

However, this main question can be divided into other related sub-questions as follows:

- How are the four concepts explained and understood in the context of ASEAN and in the general theories of regional integration?
- How far and in what way have these factors shaped ASEAN?
- How do these factors interact in the dynamic of integration?
- Can theories of European integration be applied to ASEAN?

All critical findings as a result of this study are outlined and analysed based on appropriate theoretical frameworks. Contrasting these two integration models by drawing on the same theoretical context could, on the one hand, provide various insights from different perspectives and, on the other hand, demonstrate the generalization ability (and limitations) of the theories in explaining different integration models. All findings from empirical studies in this research would help refine theoretical understandings of the four key concepts and their roles in the process of regional integration as well as generalization of integration theories. Hence, the European studies may also benefit from this research as the empirical findings discovered from ASEAN case appear to produce some interesting reflections on the EU. Overall, this study should foster a better understanding of regional integration, formulate the
settings of comparative regional integration studies and be a constructive guide for further studies or more focused research in this area.

1.5 Research methodology
The ambit of this thesis is primarily theoretical. In terms of research method, the primary data is generated through written and archival documents from a wide range of books and articles published in English. This includes charters, declarations, plans of action, research reports, speeches, website, newspapers, figures and official statistics. Most of the archival sources were obtained from ISEAS Library, at National University of Singapore. However, some of the official documents were obtained from the ASEAN Secretariat’s official website (www.asean.org). In addition, to supplement the archival data, this thesis has also adopted in-depth and semi-structured interviews of scholars and key informants in ASEAN. Briggs (1986: 61) noted that ‘the interview, along with observation, is generally the primary means of gaining the [empirical] knowledge’. Similarly, according to Punch (2005), an interview would help explore people’s perspectives and their subjective meanings for understanding of the realities. Burnham (2004: 219) also argued that interviewing remains the most appropriate techniques because it ‘brings the world of practitioners and the academic together in a hopefully fruitful mutual dialogue’. The interviews were conducted in Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Key informant interviews included former Secretary General of ASEAN, national permanent representatives to ASEAN, former directors of the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN eminent scholars.2

In this research, the data obtained from the interviews is considered as a crucial supplement to the archival sources in which questions are designed to avoid the repetition or to obtain additional findings and some points that are unanswered or unclear in the documentary research. Consequently, the interview data was coded in order to pick out themes and analysed in the light of the theoretical frameworks (Burnham, 2004: 217). Content analysis was then applied in order to generate findings and inferences and with an attempt to obtain answers being in line with theoretical explanation. This is to help building knowledge and understand more clearly about what has occurred and, perhaps, even predict what may occur. Interpreting and evaluating interviewee responses required careful consideration of their position and positionality in respect to the thesis topic. On the one hand, for instance, policymakers and bureaucrats working within ASEAN would be likely to give more positive

2 See Appendix 1.1
views of ASEAN than national policymakers or independent analysts. On the other hand, however, the responses from such policymakers can provide important insights into how regionalisation is perceived by different actors within the region and, hence, the relatively importance of different concepts to their own action. Evaluation of interviewee responses was hence both read ‘against the grain’ to the extent that respondents’ own position and interests were taken into account when weighting their responses, but also ‘with the grain’ to the extent that there is no reason to dispute the self-reported importance of different concepts to actors’ own actions. Moreover, all findings from the primary data were synthesized with the secondary data acquired from empirical studies from the EU literatures (Chapter 4) in order to gain insights from the differences or similarities between the two models and to assess the generalizability of the concepts and theories. This triangulation of data would be helpful for cross-checking and increasing validity.

1.6 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is arranged in eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a more detailed overview of historical background that underpins the development of regional integration in Europe and Southeast Asia. It also highlights significant progress along their development routes and identifies major incentives and influential factors that motivate countries to join the community formation. Chapter 3 critically reviews relevant theoretical frameworks of analysis employed in this research: neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, new institutionalism and constructivism. The second part of the chapter aims to bring all the theoretical discussions into the context of the four key debates in order to reveal how the four elements are explained in the context of these theories and, on the other hand, how these theories illustrate the importance and functions of the four elements in the process of regional integration. Then, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are dedicated to provide European perspectives related to each concept and analysis of empirical findings from the ASEAN case, democratisation, identity, institution and leadership respectively. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the thesis by synthesizing all main findings from empirical chapters in order to generate main arguments and a generalisation of data. Then, it also reveals the theoretical implications for integration theories and the study of regional integration, some reflections on the European Union as well as a consideration of research limitations and some suggestions for future research.
BACKGROUND TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

This chapter provides an overview of the political and economic backgrounds that underpin the formation of the European Union and ASEAN. It also highlights the significant progress made along their development routes including identifying major incentives, which have motivated countries to decide whether to join or not to take part in these communities as well as other influential factors that have shaped their formation. This chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section will provide a history of political community formation in chronological order. The second is designed to acquire an understanding of the economic developments in Europe and Southeast Asia as they have been markedly important in shaping their economies and regional integration.

2.1 Introduction

Many hundred years ago, Europe created a nation-state system, the most effective form of political organization, through a series of wars and conflicts. Until the twentieth century, it was considered to be the only way of organizing politics (Leonard, 2005: 210). Then, after the end of the Second World War, regional integration clearly began to mature and prosper, with the prime initial objective being to avert wars and conflicts between nations as well as foster a constructive sense of cooperation. Later, Europe started inventing a new model in the second half of the twentieth century. Other parts of the world watched the success of Europe’s growing new form of organization and began to develop their own unions based on the same principles of peace and international laws as a core ideology. Along the way, we have seen a significant progress step by step, in the European Union, with its degree of integration now going far beyond a single market and, in fact, moving closer to what Winston Churchill termed in 1946 a ‘United States of Europe’.

Being a forerunner of having a regional identity and becoming the largest contributor to the world economy, the European Union could act like the chief conductor of an orchestra. That is, they could aid the promotion of intra-regional cooperation, foster economic integration, finance regional infrastructure projects, and enhance regional organizations contributions to security (Leonard, 2005: 210). Moreover, being the world’s biggest economy it could accelerate progress and negotiations regarding the removal of regional trade barriers internationally. With the increasing importance in international politics strengthening region-to-region relationships, instead of dealing individually as nations, could prove beneficial, especially to weaker nations. Already in this regard, Europe has taken the initiatives through
region-to-region collaborations, such as EU-Mercosur, ASEM and EU-AU³, in the last few decades.

In recent years, ASEAN has evolved as another interesting model rising up as a new power in the Eastern world created for the purposes of the acceleration of economic growth and the protection of peace and stability within the region. It is a good example of a successful organization that has been responding to external pressures and common challenges (Limtanakool, 2010: 17). However, many argue that while the EU is approaching the position of inaugurating itself as a unitary entity, ASEAN still lags behind to a certain extent due to its considerable diverse structures and heterogeneity as well as the limited capacity of its governments, which seem to have deterred growth and development in the region. Nevertheless, the extended cooperation to other three East Asian countries (ASEAN+3) indicates its significant deeper and wider integration in the region as well as its posing a new challenge to the current world order.

2.2 The emergence and evolution of regional integration

“We must build a kind of United State of Europe”

Winston Churchill, on September 9, 1946

The history of regional integration dates back hundreds of years. For example, the provinces of France proposed the signing of a customs union in 1664, whilst Austria and five of its neighbours had agreements on free trade during the 18th and 19th centuries (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 4). Subsequently, it was successively followed by a series of integration attempts: the Bavaria Wurttemberg Customs Union; the Middle German Commercial Union; the German Zollverein; the North German Tax Union; the German Monetary Union; the German Reich; and economic and political union in Italy and Switzerland (Mattli, 1999: 1), including many other colonial empires that were based on preferential trade arrangements. In the last decade of 19th century, the idea of European integration was reinforced by projects supported by a number of politicians, economists, philosophers and journalists such as Fritz Fischer, Giuseppe Mazzini and Victor Hugo. However, all such projects were finally fruitless and came to nothing (Mattli, 1999: 2).

³ The European Union – African Union.
From the beginning of the 20th century onwards, the world witnessed a significant transformation of the global trading system as countries struggled with economic slump and several major conflicts. Although the exact causal explanation of these circumstances during this period is still under debate, most of the discussions pinpoint the consequences of two world wars and the Great Depression as being major causes of the frustration. As a result of the two world wars, European countries experienced their hardest times, with there being unprecedented human and economic catastrophes. Millions of people died and European nations were desperate to secure a lasting peace. In order to ensure that such circumstances could never happen again, regional alignment was adopted by many as the most effective way to recover from the suffering and sustain peace as well as to confront any possible incoming threats in the future. In 1946, Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, delivered an important speech at the University of Zurich calling for the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’ under the operation of a ‘Council of Europe’, with a reduction of trade barriers, free movement of people, a common military and a High Court (Palmer and Lambert, 1968: 111). This led to the foundation of the Council of Europe later in 1949 by the Treaty of London. However, although its membership greatly expanded and it later made considerable progress on human rights and cultural issues, the Council did not go any further from being a loose intergovernmental organization and hence, was not what most Europeans were looking for (McCormick, 2002: 64).

In 1947, the US showed support rebuilding of Europe and economic cooperation among its countries by introducing the Marshall Plan. That is, given the destruction of the Second World War, the plan was aimed at reconstructing Europe’s economic and political base as well as preventing Soviet hostility and the rise of domestic communist parties (Hogan, 1987: 26-27). The goals of the Marshall Plan are still hotly debated today. On the one hand, although many believed that the plan was put forward as it would be a profitable investment for the United States, on the other hand, they could not deny that it promoted the idea of European integration, whereby its countries would be encouraged to collaborate together and thus underlined the interdependence among their economies (Urwin, 1995: 20-22).

“*It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.*”

George Marshall, on June 5, 1947
One year later, on 17 March 1948 the three Benelux countries, France and the UK agreed to sign the Treaty of Brussels. The most crucial feature in this agreement was probably the last item of its title, collective self-defence (McAllister, 2007: 10-11), which was intended to ensure the mutual defence and security of the member states. Later, the signing of the Treaty of Brussels spurred the European countries to engage in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1949. This security alliance was an expansion from the Brussels Treaty, covering other European and North Atlantic countries, including Italy, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Canada, and notably the participation of the US who had the goal of helping their European allies to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (McCormick, 2002: 62).

The achievements of acquiring defence and security from the Brussels and NATO Treaties as well as the US’s support for economic reconstruction from the Marshall Plan were key successes as a primary step towards integration, which thereafter had considerable influence over the creation of the European community. However, the first major event considered as the instigation of European integration took place on 9 May 1950 at a press conference held at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris. After having discussions with the Planning Commissioner, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, declared a plan, known as the Schuman Plan, to merge the coal and steel industries of France and Germany under the control of a single mutual administration (McCormick, 2002: 56). This subsequently led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, which was agreed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg under the enforcement of the Paris Treaty.

“The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately assure the establishment of common bases for economic development as a first step for the European Federation. It will change the destiny of regions that have long been devoted to manufacturing munitions of war, of which they have been most constantly the victims. This merging of our interests in coal and steel production and our joint action will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not only unthinkable but materially impossible.”

Robert Schuman, on May 9, 1950
“There will be no peace in Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty... The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation....”

Jean Monnet, on August 5, 1943

After the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, Europe embarked on travel along a long harmonisation road. In the meantime, the world also witnessed the rise of regional integration schemes in other regions, for they had monitored the successful development of the European project and the way that it had empowered small countries to have a firm position on the international stage, without the need for vast wealth, a strong military capacity or a large population size. What is more, across the globe it was recognised that regional integration could help to avoid future conflict among neighbouring countries as well as fostering democracy and economic development.

![Figure 2.1: Regional trade agreements notified to the GATT/WTO (1948 – 2009)](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm)

Source: WTO Secretariat

Figure 2.1 shows the configuration of regional arrangements as notified by GATT/WTO between 1948 and 2009. According to the WTO, in the period 1948-1994 the GATT received 124 notifications of regional trade agreement relating to trade in goods. Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, a dramatic increase in the number of regional agreements has been witnessed, with at least 300 additional arrangements notified.
As a result of the significant changes in international politics since the middle of the 20th century, such as the loosening of the Cold War, the decolonization of states from the Western empires and, in particular, the successful development of the forerunner European integration which played a key role in the surge of later regional integration activities, other regional integration schemes emerged accordingly. The Organization of African Unity (later changed to African Union in 2002) was founded in 1963 and this was followed by the creation of ASEAN in 1967, with Mercosur established in 1991. Then, the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market (CACM) were set up, in 1991 and 1993, respectively. Next, NAFTA was formed in 1994 when the free trade agreement between Canada and the US was extended to Mexico, and for the first time a developing country merged with influential countries as an equal partner. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was signed in 1997 and transformed itself into the South Asian Free Trade Area, which now represents the world’s largest regional agreement in terms of population size.

As Mark Leonard (2005: 207) stated, “while the global institutions such as the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank continue to be playthings of the great powers, these regional organizations are starting to deliver real benefits”. Perhaps, this is because regional integration has come to be seen as a way that countries can leave behind their historical conflicts and tensions. As mentioned above, it has also enabled small countries to gain more bargaining power on the international scene, despite lacking wealth, military forces or having a small population size. The cooperation of neighbouring countries has changed considerably since the 1990s, moving from a security-driven pattern, towards a more dynamic and multidimensional one concerned with matters of economy, culture, politics and social aspects. In sum, the world seems to be moving in a multi-polarity direction involving a diverse range of matters under the perspective that this is the best way to create a durable path that can represent the various needs of a complex world and provide long-term stability.

2.3 The development of regional integration in Europe

The idea of a united Europe has been repeatedly put forward for centuries, but tangible efforts to promote a European Community of nations really began in earnest in the 1950s, the period after the Second World War. Since the signing of the Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the progress of European integration has continuously developed, step by step. However, soon after the establishment of the ECSC, there were at least two significant attempts to make further progress to this end, but they failed hopelessly. First, the European Defence Community (EDC) was aimed at promoting western European cooperation to unify military forces without the rearmament of West
Germany. But the scheme failed to be ratified and was rejected by the two influential countries, France and the UK, because they did not desire to give up their control over their armed forces (Urwin, 1995: 63). Second, the European Political Community was ambitiously intended to forge a premature experiment for a European Federation. However, with the collapse of the EDC, the hope of this being achieved was accordingly impossible.

The failure of the two integration efforts influenced the operation of the ECSC. Jean Monnet, the man who played a crucial role in initiating the Schuman Plan and was the first president of the ‘High Authority’ (what later became the European Commission) of the ECSC, resigned its presidency, because of disillusionment and political resistance to his work (Monnet and Mayne, 1978: 398-404). In reality, the ECSC scheme was a solid achievement and relatively successful because it was at least the first time that European countries gave up their sovereign power to a supranational organization, thus signifying the feasibility of European integration (McCormick, 2002: 66). In addition, the High Authority was regarded as the first ever supranational institution serving as the executive body of the focal community. However, the capability of the ECSC was limited and European integrationists felt that something more needed to be done in order to revive the European ideal and give the momentum back.

Later, a meeting of the ECSC foreign ministers at Messina in June 1955, participated in by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, resulted in the affirmation of the Benelux Proposals to establish a general common market and an atomic energy community (Weigall and Stirk, 1992: 94-97). It was further agreed to set up a working committee to develop the details of the proposals and for it subsequently to report back. The committee was known as ‘The Spaak Committee’, being chaired by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak. Apart from working on the proposals, the committee was tasked with sketching the broad outline of the future European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) (European NAvigator, 2011a). As a consequence, the two Treaties of Rome were signed on March 25, 1957 by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany as an extended cooperation from the earlier European Coal and Steel Community. The treaties were divided into 2 parts, one establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the other creating the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

The passing of the EEC treaty is universally considered to be the origin of European economic integration. Its first key aim was to set up a common market by removing all restrictions on internal trade and imposing a common external tariff for all goods imported into EEC nations.
Furthermore, it was intended to reinforce the free movement of people, services and capital as well as developing agricultural and transport policies, along with establishing financial institutions: a European Social Fund and a European Investment Bank (McCormick, 2002: 66). Meanwhile, Euratom was targeted at setting up a common market for nuclear energy, but this was considered to be less important and remained only a minor actor in the process of integration due to it focusing mainly on research (McCormick, 2002: 66). From an institutional point of view, both organizations were modelled according to the procedures of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), including maintaining of the supranational elements (European NAvigator, 2011b).

The EEC subsequently emerged as the most significant organization in Europe and, along the way, it made several noticeable achievements. First, the removal of barriers for internal market was sufficient to enable the member countries to agree on common external tariffs in 1968 and to declare an industrial custom union (McCormick, 2002: 68). Second, as a consequence of economic integration, the quota restriction that the countries had used to protect their domestic markets from imported products was removed, resulting in a substantial increase in intra-EEC trade, which was growing almost three times since 1958 compared to the rate of non-member countries (Urwin, 1995: 130). Third, although the working committee encountered some conflicts of interests due to the disparities in the size of production units, the production costs and the volume of agricultural products exported (European NAvigator, 2011c), the Agreement on a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was succeeded in 1968 with the creation of a single market for agricultural products, resulting in improvements in production and productivity (McCormick, 2002: 68-69). Last, the EEC provided a cooperative platform for member countries to work more closely together on international negotiations in which they could perform better than by negotiating individually (McCormick, 2002: 69).

However, the UK remained the most obvious absentee in the community as the British continued seeing themselves as a superpower and insisted on maintaining their Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the UK did not resist European integration, but was deeply suspicious about what had been proposed by the French and rather, preferred intergovernmentalism to supranationalism, so instead, decided to raise the idea of an intergovernmental organization. In 1960, Britain suggested the creation of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with the emphasis being on intergovernmental policy aimed at the creation of a free trade area with the removal of tariffs and control over exports (Bono, 2003:...
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal, countries excluded from the EEC, agreed to join the scheme and signed up in January 1960.

Under the umbrella of EFTA, the scheme did cut tariffs but it was not sustainable in the long term, because most of its members did more trade with countries in the EEC than their EFTA partners (McCormick, 2002: 69). Consequently, it soon became clear that the association would not be successful as it was not efficient enough to reconstruct the economy. Given the impressive progress in economic and political growth of the EEC countries, the UK realized that it was actually viable and by staying out of the EEC the country could face domestic political pressures and economic exclusion. Accordingly, the UK decided to submit an application to obtain full EEC membership in 1961, along with Denmark, Ireland and Norway, and the negotiations began in early 1962.

Charles de Gaulle, the President of France who had played a dominant role in the process of European integration, was clearly in opposition to the British accession. He viewed the British as rivals to the French regarding influence in the community and ‘a continuing threat to the emergence of preferred kind of ‘third force’ Europe’ (Camps, 1964: 504). As a result, Charles de Gaulle vetoed the British application and delivered a speech at a press conference in Paris explaining his stance.

“Whether Great Britain can now place herself like the Continent and with it inside a tariff which is genuinely common, to renounce all Commonwealth preferences, to cease any pretence that her agriculture be privileged, and, more than that, to treat her engagements with other countries of the free trade area as null and void”

Charles de Gaulle, January 14, 1963
Source: (Nicholson and East, 1987: 30-32)

As it was a joint package of application, Denmark, Ireland and Norway were also rejected from joining. Meanwhile, soon after, 1963 and 1964 were considered as one of the most productive periods in the construction of the community (Marjolin, 1989: 346) due to the consolidation of the CAP, which shaped its direction for the rest of the 1960s.

Moreover, before the end of the decade, there was some considerable further reconstruction of the community. First, in 1965 in Brussels, the executive bodies of the three organizations originated by the Treaty of Rome (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) were combined into a single institutional body together known as ‘The European Community (EC)’. Second, a crisis about policy scope and balance between the institutions as well as about the power of members to
interrupt the integration process (McAllister, 2007: 27-28) led to the Luxembourg compromise of 1966. As Charles de Gaulle’s self-centred actions to ensure their interests in France’s agricultural products would remain unhindered, this agreement resolved the problems of majority voting in the Council by promoting unanimity voting as the norm and that members would agree to practically acceptable solutions within a reasonable time. Overall, the consequences that resulted from these crises delayed the enforcement of a merger treaty and shaped the political climate in which the community operated during the next decade (Dinan, 2005: 51).

Then, the second Britain accession application for the EC membership was made in May 1967, along with Denmark, Ireland and Norway. Charles de Gaulle restated his opposition when he announced during his biannual press conference that British accession to the EC ‘would obviously mean the breaking up of a Community that has been built and that functions according to rules which would not bear such a monumental exception’ (Nicholson and East, 1987: 52-53). The rejection by the powerful French man, with the same reasons as before, resulted in the application being stalled again and Britain could do nothing but await a favourable moment to renegotiate. Two years later, defeat in a French referendum on regional and senate reform was a profound setback that resulted in Charles de Gaulle resigning from his position. After that, in 1969, Georges Pompidou replaced him and thus held the key to the future of the EC as the President of the French Republic. This replacement provided a more positive stance to the pending requested application by the UK and also an ‘open sesame’ perspective for the future development of the community (McAllister, 2007: 32).

In the meantime, West Germany, under the control of its new Chancellor Willy Brandt, recovered and became growing economic power with political influence (Dinan, 2005: 57), eventually emerging as the region’s driving force. The changes of leadership in France and West Germany in 1969 brought new momentum to the community and the EC was once more on the move. Georges Pompidou was less antagonistic than the former French president, de Gaulle, towards strengthening community ties, while Willy Brandt was strongly in favour of British entry and monetary union (McCormick, 2002: 73). Subsequently, Britain reactivated its application and this time it was accepted. That is, membership was actively discussed during 1970-1971 and the UK, Denmark and Ireland finally joined the EC in January 1973. Surprisingly, Norway would have joined as well but was blocked by the result of a public referendum in September 1972 that narrowly disagreed with membership. For Denmark, it would have been economic suicide to stay out of the enlarged community due to the vast majority of their exported products pouring into Britain and Germany, while the Irish were very much
economically tied to Britain, so it would have been idiotic to stay outside once Britain went in (Dinan, 2005: 63).

Soon after, the leaders of the three most influential countries in the community were substituted in 1974. That is, Harold Wilson won the British election and returned to office, whilst Helmut Schmidt became the new chancellor after the resignation of Willy Brandt. Georges Pompidou unexpectedly passed away in 1974 and Valery Giscard d’Estais won the election to become the president (Dinan, 2005: 63). These significant transformations had a considerable impact on shaping the future of the EC. Furthermore, as a consequence of the US’s abolition of dollar convertibility in 1971 and the oil crises in 1973 which both pushed the EC into recession for the rest of the decade, governments began to act more protectively and the road to a complete integrated union became far more implausible than previously (Williams, 1991: 50).

The next development of European integration was the European Monetary System (EMS), launched in 1979, aimed at linking members’ currencies in order to create a zone of monetary stability and prevent the community from global fluctuating exchange rates. The scheme was initiated and much credited to Roy Jenkins, Commission president from 1977-1981, also known as the Jenkins Commission. At the latter stage, the EMS was taken over by the French and German leaders, Giscard d’Estais and Schmidt. They, as good collaborators, replaced Jenkins and took a leading role in the formation of what became the EMS (Dinan, 2005: 79). The beginning of the EMS ‘came from a clear convergence of French and German interests, confirming the two countries’s leading roles in the Community’ (Simonian, 1985: 277). The Deutsche Mark and the German Bundesbank were undoubtedly the centre of the EMS, due to their strength and the growing dominance of Germany within the EC. According to Dinan (2005: 79), the British did not participate from the beginning, because of their resentment of the close Franco-German relations and doubts about the scheme’s validity. On the whole, the EMS did represent a major step in economic integration and later became the fundamental platform for the establishment of the euro.

According to the terms of their 1973 entry, the new member states were forced to comply with all the community’s regulations as they stood. From then on, the UK appeared to be the most problematic member state in the EC, because of the high costs of membership, such as higher food prices, substantial amounts in customs levies and high budgetary contributions (Jones, 1996: 19). As Britain’s economic structure had a relatively small agricultural sector and greatly relied on food imports, it would not gain any significant benefit from the Common
Agricultural Policy. As a result, there followed a series of negotiations and budget rebates during the 1970s-1980s. For instance, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, who had replaced James Callaghan in 1979, was not interested in the EC’s institutions and policies, as arguing that Britain was paying too much and receiving too little (Dinan, 2005: 81). The obstructionism of the UK raised political tension among member states and restrained the ability of the community to address the further issues of integration (Williams, 1991: 77).

In the 1980s, it was a time for an additional round of enlargement and the potential candidates were three European countries from the southern periphery: Greece, Spain and Portugal. Greece had first showed interest in joining the EEC in the late 1950s, but had been turned down due to its economy being too underdeveloped, however it was given associate membership in 1961 as a path to full accession (McCormick, 2002: 70). After the Greek military coup in 1967, the hope to become a part of the community became very improbable, but on returning to civilian government in 1974, their membership application was actively remade in 1975 and at this time the community agreed membership would help rebuild democracy. Finally, it became the tenth member in 1981.

Similar to the Greeks, Spain and Portugal submitted membership applications soon after the formal transition to parliamentary democracy, in 1977. In principle, they both had strong and direct trade links to the EC and desired to gain the entry as a way of stabilizing their newly established democratic institutions. Nevertheless, by the time of membership application, the surrounding conditions had become more demanding as both the community and the applicants had many difficulties with each other, due to several apparent differences between the EC9 and the three Southern applicants, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Moreover, Spain had a large economy and its influence were seen as likely to affect both industrial and agricultural producers within the community (McCormick, 2002: 67). However, the EC believed that membership would encourage democracy on the Iberian Peninsula and foster good relations between the two applicants and Western Europe (McCormick, 2002: 72). The negotiation for this enlargement was difficult and complicated. In fact, it took a long time to reach agreement and the treaty of accession was not signed until 1985 with Spain and Portugal, having just become democracies, entering EC territory in January 1986.

Almost immediately, the next step was progress towards the single market, signed in February 1986 and which came into force in July 1987. The Single European Act was seen as a major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome and widely considered as the most crucial and successful step of European integration since the Treaty of Rome. It was brought about by the
intergovernmental conference in September 1985 as a revival of the original outlined goal of creating a single market. The act identified the measures required to overcome all obstacles and set a detailed timetable for the removal of all barriers by 1990 (European Commission, 1985). That is, the 1986 Single European Act defined itself as ‘an area without international frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’ (European Parliament, 2000). However, the negotiation towards this end experienced some difficulties in arriving at a consensus. Finally, the member states revised the Treaty of Rome and agreed to sign the Single European Act subject to it being on the basis of majority voting, rather than the usual unanimous form, for most of the measures outlined in the single market programme (Williams, 1991: 90).

In more detail, the process of creating a single market had been introduced in the 1960s and most tariff barriers had consequently been eliminated. The act itself was an extension to the previous attempt, which was aimed at eliminating the remaining barriers and in particular, sought harmonization of some newly pioneered areas, such as: procurement, designs, technical standards, taxation, R&D, and the environment. This included social policy, which had often been overlooked by European leaders, with the focus being on helping the poorer parts of Europe. Besides, the Single European Act also had one significant political implication. That is, apart from gathering member states to work towards radical issues more closely, the commitment to employ majority voting on most of the measures, mainly related to taxation and health matters, was seen as an essential key feature for the success of the programme (Williams, 1991: 98).

Indeed, the Single European Act paved the way for further institutional reform and the Maastricht Treaty, which brought about the EC and the EMU. There was no guarantee that the Single European Act would raise concentration of economic integration, but the success of the scheme relied very much on global economic relationships as well as economic and political development within the community. Accordingly, between 1986 and 1992 the EC created about 280 single pieces of legislation geared towards unveiling closed national markets and, in most areas, 12 sets of national regulations were replaced by one common European rule, which greatly lessened the complications and costs for any business operating throughout the community (European Commission, 2002b). However, the task of building the single market is a permanent job without end and even today the Parliament, the Commission and the participating members spend much time in reaching agreement on complicated pieces of legislation affecting many different interest groups in the community.
A few years after the establishment of the Single European Act, there was an important historical occurrence that would greatly affect the future economic integration and the balance of political influences in the community. This was the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, for the defeat of the communists that had held half of Europe for many decades, was a watershed and symbolized a stronger united Germany. Moreover, it paved the way for the coming of democracy to Central and Eastern European nations as they broke away from Soviet control. In general, for a generation that had grown up with the fear of war and global communism, the collapse of the wall was a welcome tiding (Scaliger, 2009). The fall was a beginning of the process of European reunification and implied that the union could become much larger. In fact, the size of potential market was doubled, not only Germany itself becoming the largest market in Europe but also other former communist states such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania now becoming large promising growing markets.

“The European Union Treaty... within a few years will lead to the creation of what the founding fathers of modern Europe dreamed of after the war, the United States of Europe.”

Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor, 1992

A few years later, the European community officially became known as “The European Union” for the first time by the endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty, or the so called the ‘Treaty of the European Union’. It was signed in February 1992 and came into force in November 1993. After the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and subsequent German reunification, member states desired to seek a commitment to reinforce the Community’s international position and to extend the achievements of the Single European Act with other reforms (EUROPA, 2007). The Maastricht Treaty represented a new stage in European integration, bringing several new important aspects to the community. Apart from renaming the community ‘the European Union’, the treaty served two overarching purposes. First, there were several initiatives set out under the Single European Act, which involved creating a new framework based around three ‘pillars’, covering economic relations, foreign affairs and home affairs. Second, there was the deepening of integration, geared towards the process of Economic and Monetary Union, which would lead to the creation of the euro (CIVITAS, 2010). However, the Maastricht Treaty is widely recognized ‘not only for the long and fractious negotiations and baffling terminology involved in drafting it, but also for the difficulties many member states had in ratifying it’ (BBC, 2001).

“We’re not just here to make a single market, but a political union”
The Maastricht Treaty was also considered as the blueprint for Europe's biggest project for the next decade: Economic and Monetary Union. It identified the three stages of achieving the EMU, which would eventually lead to the employing of single currency, and drew the convergence criteria or economic tests that member states had to be qualified (BBC, 2001). Structurally, it reconstructed the way in which the organisation had been established. That is, while the Commission retained responsibility for the economic 'pillar' of EU activity, the European Communities, the new 'pillars', the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJC), were to be controlled by the European Council, not the Commission. However, the three separate pillars would all be linked under the overarching structure of the European Union (CIVITAS, 2010). Table 2.1 demonstrates the three-pillar structure of the EU.
Table 2.1: The three-pillar structure of the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Pillar: European Community</th>
<th>Second Pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy</th>
<th>Third Pillar: Police and Judicial Cooperation in criminal matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EC</strong></td>
<td><strong>Foreign Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Common policy:</td>
<td>- Cooperation, common positions and joint actions</td>
<td>- Judicial cooperation in criminal matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural, fisheries</td>
<td>- Peacekeeping</td>
<td>- Police cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>- Human rights</td>
<td>- Combating racism and xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>- Democracy</td>
<td>- Fighting drugs and the arms trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Custom Union and Internal market</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Fighting organised crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Economic and monetary policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Combating criminal acts against children and trafficking in human beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Industrial policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy to strengthen economic and social cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Employment and social policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Research and development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Environment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Consumer Protection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Audiovisual policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Public health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Education, training and youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Trans-European networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Taxation and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximation of laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Judicial cooperation in civil matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Citizenship of the Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Asylum and immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- External borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EURATOM</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(European Atomic Energy Community)</td>
<td>- With the support of the WEU: questions concerning the security of the EU</td>
<td>- In the long term: European security framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Disarmament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Economic aspects of armament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- In the long term: European security framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One major radical issue stemming from the Maastricht Treaty was the proposal to substantially enlarge the EU over the next few decades. At their summit in Copenhagen in 1993, this was the first time that the EU member states formally made a definitive decision declaring enlargement as an explicit goal of the European Union. They drew up what has become widely known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which have to be fulfilled if a country is to be eligible to join the European Union. That is, by the time they join, new applicants must meet the three requirements as follows (European Commission, 2010):
• stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
• a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including support for the aims of the Union. They must have a public administration capable of applying and managing EU laws in practice.

These regulations were called ‘*acquis communautaire*’, the body of the EU’s law used as a standard frame in order to measure a country’s ability to meet the requirements to join the European Union (Hillion, 2004: 2). In other words, the Copenhagen criteria stipulate that the candidate country possesses a consolidated market economy that performs free movement of goods, capital, people, and services; a consolidated democracy, rule of law, and consequently a well-established human rights regime, which also encompasses protection of the rights of minorities; the candidate must be aiming at monetary, economic and political union with the EU member countries, and the adoption of the acquis communautaire, and related laws, regulations and EU treaties (Müftüler Baç, 2002: 12).

In the long run, this declaration had legal consequences for aspiring member countries. It is also interesting that issues such as rules of law and human rights, were for the first-time included in the formal set of criteria. The collapse of socialist countries and the German unification produced a growing number of Eastern European requests for associate or full membership with the EU. The larger entity, particularly extending to the east, meant that the EU became more linked to problematic areas and this meant it had to develop a strategy to tackle these challenges. As a consequence, institutional reform of the Union without losing coherence and any ability to act was recognised as being crucial by member states (Woyke, 2001: 385).

At the same time, the enlargement process of the EU made significant progress in January 1995 when Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the community, although Norway had a referendum result that once again went against EU membership. This enlargement seemed simple, straightforward and less controversial because the economic conditions of the candidate countries were superior to many existing member states, having appropriate structures capable of implementing the EU legislation (Dinan, 2005: 135). As a consequence, the impact of the 1995 enlargement brought changes to the community in a variety of ways. In particular, it can be clearly seen that the EU extended into the far north of the continent, with
an increase in size of 33 percent, GDP by 7 percent and its population by 6.2 percent (Dinan, 2005: 141). Furthermore, the joining of the two widely respected Nordic counties, Sweden and Finland, improved the standard of democracy, civilian participation and transparency of government, seemingly a desirable development at an appropriate time of widespread public concern about accountability and legitimacy in the EU (Spence, 1997: 24). In terms of the institutional and policy implications, the fourth enlargement extended the period of each country rotating the presidency from 6 to 7.5 years and also increased the number of votes in the council from 76 to 87, as votes were allocated in accordance with population size (Jones, 1996: 277).

On the other hand, the new accession also brought another stream of questioning, but this time from Sweden rather than the UK, as they did not seem to be interested in EU membership. That is, while Austria and Finland were both satisfied with the community, Sweden appeared to be one of the most EU sceptical countries in the group and having only achieved a narrow victory in the referendum on EU accession (53.1% yes vote), with only a few tangible benefits of membership being recognised, this aggravated the distrust of the Swedish people. In fact, in accord with public opinion in 1998, the Swedish government decided not to participate in the final stage of EMU (Dinan, 2005: 142). However, it was very unlikely that Sweden would leave the community because, as with other member states, EU membership would probably be essential for long-term economic prosperity.

As the EU was moving closer to political union and preparing for the next enlargement, another two treaties were ratified between 1997 and 2001. First, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in October 1997 and came into force in May 1999. Indeed, the treaty did not achieve any significant progress on enlargement of the union as it had been expected. Disappointedly, the Council was unable to agree anything more than modest changes to the institutional structure in preparation for future enlargement (McCormick, 2002: 74). However, it did make progress in the field of justice and home affairs, social policy, employment and environment. According to Dinan (2005: 169), ‘the Amsterdam Treaty was a fitting testimonial to the impossibility of reconciling the complexity of EU governance with citizen’s demands for greater simplicity and comprehensibility’. Second, the Treaty of Nice was signed in February 2001 and came into force in 2003. Mainly, this agreement amended the two previous treaties, the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, with the intention of adapting the institutional structures to meet the challenge of enlargement. Unfortunately, the treaty achieved only a limited institutional reform in preparation for enlargement and its most important outcome was to mitigate the accession criteria (Dinan, 2005: 172), including redistributing the votes in
the Council and increasing the size of the European Commission and the European Parliament (McCormick, 2002: 75).

In 2002, there was a watershed moment in the financial and economic integration of the community. That is, on the first of January 2002, twelve of the fifteen member states implemented the euro for the first time, which represented the first pan European currency since the fall of the Roman Empire, with Denmark, Sweden and the UK remaining outside (European Commission, 2002a: 9). This combining of national currencies was a dramatic step forward on the economic front, as trade among the EU countries had previously been frequently disrupted by instability and fluctuation of exchange rates between these currencies. That is, the prior adoption of the single market programme could not be fully exploited on the grounds that high transaction costs of currency conversion and uncertain exchange rates persisted. Furthermore, it was considered to be consistent with the notion of the Single Market Programme regarding which the view was that the continuation and efficiency of the scheme required the financial stability that monetary union could deliver.

Once the scheme came into force, monetary policy was in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), an independent financial unit specially created for that purpose, and the national central banks of the participating member states, which were together known as ‘the Eurosystem’. However, major parts of fiscal policy and other structural policies, such as labour, pension and capital markets, were the responsibility of national governments, but they did agree to cooperate with the ECB in order to achieve the common goals of stability, growth and employment (European Commission, 2011). All in all, the euro now is a common recognized entity and is a part of everyday life in 16 European member states as well as having become the second most important international currency after the US dollar.

Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the aftermath of the euro implementation has had several significant impacts on the European Union. It makes the community look more robust and vibrant. Moreover, apart from making all financial matters and travelling easier, the integrated currency initially stimulated the European economy. As mentioned before, the single currency is a sensible addition to the earlier Single Market Programme, for it has made the scheme work more efficiently. The increase in terms of size and stability is likely to protect the community from external sensitivity such as oil price rises, economic shocks and turbulence in the financial markets. Also, it does multiply the importance of its currency and bargaining power as being given a more powerful voice in the world, particularly in trade negotiations (European Commission, 2011).
Just two years after the adoption of the euro, the EU took the most crucial steps in their enlargement with the accession of ten Eastern European and Mediterranean states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Although this enlargement did not imply any explicit implications in terms of economic development and size of population owing to their economies being relatively much smaller than most of the existing members, the real significance of the 2004 enlargement is that the EU now is “no longer an exclusive club for wealthy west Europeans” (McCormick, 2002: 77). Moreover, the cases of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania who had been under Soviet occupation confirmed that the Cold War has completely ended as they now became part of the union. The 2004 enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe was truly an essential part of political, economic and cultural restoration across the continent (Dinan, 2005: 143).

Without a doubt, the obvious differences in development between the existing members and the newcomers subsequently produced tensions between these two different types of members. Obviously, apart from the need for serious institutional reform, the enlargement would have a considerable impact on the two largest sectors of EU expenditure: agricultural policy and cohesion policy (Dinan, 2005: 154). These concerns resulted in a growing opposition to enlargement as well as leading to unresolvable arguments about such matters as mass immigration, employment, social security and contributions to huge subsidies to the poorer states. That is, with the wider EU it became more difficult to achieve deeper integration and, with so many members, more and more difficult to manage and be able to agree on anything (BBC, 2007). This raised the troubling question about what were the appropriate limits of EU enlargement, for in the Maastricht treaty (1993, article 6) it states that any European country can apply to join the community if it meets the Copenhagen Criteria: ‘principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’.

More recently, the latest progress of the EU was the joining of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. This enlargement extended the EU’s external territory further east, closer to sensitive areas in the Balkans. In terms of structural changes, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania increased the EU’s population by 6% and GDP by less than 1%, with two more seats added to the European Commission and 54 to the European Parliament (BBC, 2007). Apparently, they were the poorest countries in the EU and experiencing problems of high-level corruption and organized crime. Nevertheless, both were seen as a connection to the Balkan and Black Sea regions for possible future enlargement. At present, Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro
and Iceland have acquired the status of EU official candidate and Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia are expected to join this list in the future. Last, the 2007 enlargement also geographically had political implications because it expanded the EU’s borders to meeting those of Russia, thus implying ‘the EU has now become a Black Sea Power…further drawn into closer involvement in the area of the former Soviet Union’ (Flenley, 2008: 189).

On the whole, the 2004 and 2007 as well as future enlargement further east have confronted the European Union with unprecedented institutional and political challenges. That is, as enlargement continues to be a major issue in the community, the future of the EU will largely depend on the achievement of institutional reform, having effective institutions to tackle the wider range of differences between existing and incoming members as well as adaptation of the EU standards and legislation.

Table 2.2: Details of new EU members from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>GDP (billions of USD)</th>
<th>GDP per cap (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004 Enlargement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>45226</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>11000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>64589</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>8900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>65200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>312685</td>
<td>373.2</td>
<td>9700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>78866</td>
<td>157.1</td>
<td>15300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>93030</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>13300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>48845</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>12400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>20253</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>19200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>17200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9250</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>738260</td>
<td>851.4</td>
<td>11413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007 Enlargement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>110910</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>238391</td>
<td>169.3</td>
<td>7600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>349301</td>
<td>218.5</td>
<td>7332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Inc. 2004)</strong></td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>1087561</td>
<td>1069.6</td>
<td>10245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.factindex.com/e/en/enlargement_of_the_european_union.html

The two world wars, originated by suspicion and hostility, physically demolished most European countries after which they were pulled into a military and economic vacuum as the United States and the Soviet Union gained rising power and influence, becoming the dominant forces in world politics (McCormick, 2002: 77-78). As a consequence of the collapse of communism in the central and eastern regions following the fall of the Berlin Wall, European countries become ever closer neighbours. The 1986 Single European Act, setting out the timetable for the creation of the single market by 1993, represents the completion of the ‘four
freedoms': movement of goods, services, people and money as well as bringing about the world’s largest trading area. The Schengen agreements allow people to travel without having their passports checked at the borders, thus facilitating millions of people studying or working in other countries. The subsequent adoption of the single currency ‘the euro’ inaugurated a new era of economic integration. Finally, the series of enlargements significantly grew the community, particularly in terms of size and weight of international bargaining power.

The EU has clearly shown several facets of united cooperation to the rest of the world, covering many policy areas, such as foreign policy, trade policy, financial policy, social policy, agricultural policy, environmental policy etc. However, it is widely believed that it is time for the EU to have a constitution, but it will not be easy to agree on what form this should take and hence would appear for many a rocky road to go down. That is, it is likely that the process of ratification of such a constitution will trouble many of the citizens of the EU and hence is probably the biggest challenge it faces for the foreseeable future. However, although a constitution would seem to be advantageous, it is not absolutely essential. As Dinan opined, ‘arguably, the EU needed better leadership and more congenial political and economic environment to restore its luster and sense of purpose’ (2005: 182).

Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Supranational_European_Bodies.png

Figure 2.2: The relationship between supranational organizations in Europe
2.4 The development of regional integration in Southeast Asia

Similar to the EU zone, the Second World War brought enormous consequences to Southeast Asian nations. Southeast Asia unofficially acquired the status of a geographical region during the Second World War through the formation of an allied group, as a part of US-Britain military operations in the region. That is, the South-East Asia Command (SEAC), a group of military allies comprising Siam (Thailand), French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), was created in 1943 with the purpose of liberation of the Japanese occupied territories. Although the SEAC was not the originator for what has become, Southeast Asia today, it did signal political implications of the notion of a region with strategic and political coherence (Emmerson, 2005: 1-21). In 1954, there was another cooperative agreement concluded in Manila. The South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was signed by the US, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, France, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, with the purpose of providing security for the region against Sino-Soviet power. However, SEATO was not successful and effective, which consequently led to the failure of its operations. As Segal (Segal, 1990: 238) stated ‘SEATO never made much practical sense and was more a public-relations organization. Certainly in Comparison to NATO, it lacked a regular unified command’.

The war resulted in deep suffering being inflicted on the native populations of the region and the Japanese occupation triggered the development of nationalist movements, either explicitly or implicitly (Stockwell, 1992: 336). Hence, after the war the European colonial powers were confronted with the local waves of nationalism. Consequently, during the following few decades, a series of decolonizations occurred in the region, as India, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore all were given their independence. Brunei came later, only gaining independence from the British in 1984 although it had been self-governing since 1959. Finally, Timor-Leste, annexed by Indonesia in 1975, gained full independence in 2002.
Table 2.3: The Southeast Asian states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Area (Miles²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Banda Seri Begawan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Phnom Penh</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>69,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>231.4</td>
<td>741,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Vientiane</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>91,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>127,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td>Yangon (Rangoon)</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>261,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>115,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>198,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Hanoi</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>127,243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook (in Weatherbee, 2005: 3)

The history of regional integration in Southeast Asia was significantly bolstered during the Second Indochina War in the 1960s, when Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines formed the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), with the main objective being to promote cultural and economic cooperation (Turnbull, 1992: 615). Although the achievements of this cooperation attempt were considered relatively limited, this arrangement has been widely seen as the forerunner of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Afterwards, in the mid of 1960s, there were many important changes of leadership in Southeast Asian nations, notably in Indonesia and the Philippines. The different styles of administration of the new leaders improved relations among non-communist countries in Southeast Asia and paved the way for further regional cooperation (Wunderlich, 2007: 80). Finally, the foreign ministers of five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, introduced the ASEAN Declaration on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, or commonly known as ‘the Bangkok Declaration’, forming a geo-political and economic organization with the establishment of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the words of Thanat Khoman, the Foreign Minister of Thailand:

“building a new society that will be responsive to the needs of our time and efficiently equipped to bring about, for the enjoyment and the material as well as spiritual advancement of our peoples, conditions of stability and progress. Particularly what millions of men and women in our part of the world want is to erase the old and obsolete concept of domination and subjection of the past and replace it with the new spirit of give and take, of equality and partnership. More than anything else, they want
to be master of their own house and to enjoy the inherent right to decide their own destiny ...”

Thanat Khoman, on August 8, 1967

In comparison, although this formation was motivated by the consequence of wars and gaining independence, ASEAN was not intended to act as a collective defence organization like NATO, but rather the existence of this regional cooperation was seen similarly to a repetition of the birth of European Integration. Besides, the Bangkok Declaration did not set up any legal framework or institution unlike the Treaty of Paris or Treaty of Rome. There was nothing about the challenging of national sovereignty in the region and, in fact, it was more likely to foster nation-building and confidence building, which provided space for the member states to consolidate their power and start thinking about economic development. Thus, the primary goal of the community was economic development, not political integration. Interestingly, ASEAN is also considered as the only successful attempt in regional cooperation among the world’s developing areas (Hsiung, 1993: 137). Subsequent to its establishment, deteriorating relations between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, as the former sought closer ties with the US, created a power triangle in the region. In 1971, ASEAN reacted to the change by forming the Declaration on the ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN), an adjustment to accommodate their diverse interests and preferences (Wunderlich, 2007: 84). However, this was a highly ambiguous concept and did not progress much in terms of deeper integration because the agreement was just seen as a statement of good intention.

Importantly, the next remarkable progress came in 1976, soon after the communist victory in Vietnam in 1975, when for the first time the heads of government of ASEAN met at the 1st ASEAN Summit in Bali. There were two crucial agreements signed: the ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The purpose of the first Declaration was to ‘consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields’ (ASEAN, 1976a). Meanwhile, the second Declaration was underpinned by the desire to “enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations ... and the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation” (ASEAN, 1976b). Both agreements provided ASEAN with something similar to a legal framework, which was considered to be necessary to manage a regional community (Wunderlich, 2007: 84).
Nonetheless, unlike the EU treaties, neither the TAC nor the ASEAN Concord made changes to the political structures of member countries. Just a year later, ASEAN leaders, as a group, met the leaders of Japan, Australia and New Zealand at the 2nd ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, which was the first time that had held a meeting with leaders of non-ASEAN countries. The meeting was generally agreed to have strengthened the cooperative framework on human resource development, regarding such matters as eliminating poverty, women and youth development, rural development, literacy and drugs.

During the foundation years of ASEAN regionalisation, the conflicts in Indochina were a fundamental factor for the development of community. The intensified hostilities in Vietnam in the 1960s were, of course, among the factors driving the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. The ensuring communist victory, which led to them gaining control of Indochina, signified a substantial change of the security environment in the region and ASEAN responded to the volatile situation with the setting up of the TAC and the ASEAN Concord. Subsequently, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 led to the deterioration of these developments and in fact, challenged the core principles and functioning of ASEAN. Soon after, ASEAN worked hard for resilience and acted in response to the Vietnamese occupation by calling an emergency meeting in January 1979 demanding its withdrawal of all troops from Cambodian territory (ASEAN, 1979). In truth, this incident was further away from a simple conflict of two nations. The Jakarta Post expressed its nation’s position as ‘it is high time to spell out clearly to our ASEAN partners, as the largest archipelagic state in Southeast Asia with a growing national interest to protect, that we simply cannot afford the endless prolonging of the Kampuchean conflict’ (Lee, 2006).

The case of the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia reflects the incapability of ASEAN in resolving conflicts among member states. The threatening actions of Vietnam not only violated sovereignty of another country, but also the two core principles of ASEAN: non-intervention and the rejection of use force in regional conflicts. Although ASEAN played a great role in reconciling this hostile incident and actually worked quite actively, both individually and collectively, it was still widely thought not to be powerful. As a consequence it needed to seek help from a larger more influential body, namely, the United Nations. In other words, in this case the UN actions imply the powerlessness of ASEAN as an organization itself (Lee, 2006).

“ASEAN is an association, not an alliance and certainly not a military, but overall a cultural, social and economic alliance.”

(ASEAN, 1998: 75-76)
The period of the 1990s witnessed ASEAN taking a major forward step again. This was perhaps driven by the difficulties in international trade negotiations at the Uruguay Round, the influences of the 1987 Single European Act programme as well as the creation of the NAFTA (Wunderlich, 2007: 112). In 1992, the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore resulted in the Singapore Declaration, focusing on economic and security cooperation, as well as enlargement issues, which were similar to those of the EU. In addition, the Singapore Declaration also introduced the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) established as a key mechanism aimed at increasing competitive advantage as a single production unit as well as promoting greater economic efficiency and productivity. All existing tariffs were supposed to be reduced to 0-5% within a 15-year timeframe and as such, it was a drastic change with the goal of the liberalisation of intra-ASEAN trade. Interestingly, one core instrument of AFTA was the agreement on Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). This scheme was intentionally designed, on the basis of safeguarding measures, which enabled countries to impose tariffs on goods entering from outside ASEAN, while items originating within ASEAN were to be applied at the aforementioned tariff rate of 0-5% (ASEAN Secretariat, 1993: 29-39).

For Southeast Asian countries, AFTA was seen as the first major step in helping them to achieve a better position for their respective economies against external powers such as China, Japan, the US and the EU. Further, the establishment of AFTA was geared towards attracting more foreign investment and also to offer a solution to the decline of foreign investment in the region, as each of the five ASEAN original members had experienced a considerable decrease in their share of global FDI flows during 1990-1992, falling from 35% to 24.3% (Nesadurai, 2003: 81). Moreover, it was believed that AFTA could, in particular, intensely help to challenge China, as the main competitor for FDI, as a result of its economic opening up. This can be inferred from the statement of Thailand’s Prime Minister in 1993, Mr. Chuan Leekpai, who noted that ‘the possible diversion of direct foreign investment... is a perpetual reminder that smaller countries have to unite’ (in Business Times, 8 Jan 1993).

In the late 1990s, there was another significant challenge coming to hit the ASEAN community. That is, the economic and financial crisis during 1997-1998 ended the region’s impressive economic performance and deterred the ongoing successful development of ASEAN. The destructive flow of the crisis swept over the region and severely undermined the confidence and capability of Southeast Asian regimes, which spread to affect many other countries in the region. The crisis hit Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea particularly hard and there were also economic slumps in such places as Hong Kong, Laos and the Philippines. In fact, the economies of the entire region fell like dominoes.
Consequently, soon after the crash of ASEAN economies, the IMF came to take part in the economic restoration, particularly regarding the structural adjustment programmes for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. That is, the fund was called in to provide financial assistance as well as to reform the economic structures and regulate the macroeconomic policies of the damaged countries. It was seen as an opportunity for the US to prove that what the ASEAN countries had done so far, including incomplete liberalisation and bad governance, was not working and that their neoliberal policies represented the best way to resolve the problems (Wunderlich, 2007: 124). However, many scholars later observed that the IMF era brought further economic and political difficulties to ASEAN members and in particular, that the implementation of its structural adjustment programs aggravated the situation (Beeson, 2007: 208-210, Stiglitz, 2000).

On the plus side, the crisis brought ASEAN’s members together to work more closely and seriously and what could be seen after the cooperation was that many practical and expedient measures had been taken to improve the situation. Soon after the crisis struck, in December 1997 its members met, in order to resolve the deteriorating economic situation and maintain the stability and confidence of the community. At this time, ASEAN Vision 2020 was issued to call for socio-economic development and closer economic integration within the region. In particular, the statement also demanded the creating of a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region, in which the free flow of goods, services, investments and capital was ensured (ASEAN Insurance Council, 2009). In addition, as an aftermath of ASEAN Vision 2020, its members were agreed to extend the level of cooperation to include three other countries: Japan, China and the Republic of Korea, known as ASEAN plus three.

The next essential achievement of ASEAN took place during 2002-2003. In November 2002, its heads of government discussed a proposal to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020. After they resolved to pursue comprehensive integration, this was formalized in the following year by the declaration of Bali Concord II, which provided milestones for reaching the goals of ASEAN Vision and establishing the three pillars: the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Regarding financial and monetary integration, this was blueprinted through the Roadmap on Monetary & Financial Integration of ASEAN (RIA-FIN), concerning market development, financial and capital liberalisation and currency cooperation. However, AEC, as an primary ultimate goal, will be a place ‘where there is a free flow of goods, services, investment, and freer flow of capital, equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020’ (Guerrero, 2009: 54).
According to Plummer (2006), AEC was formulated and driven by many factors: the desire to create a post-AFTA agenda, the need to deepen economic integration within the increasing role of free trade areas (FTAs), the possibility that bilateral FTA agreements would jeopardize ASEAN integration and the lessons from the recent Asian financial crisis that highlighted the importance of regional cooperation. Certainly, once all measures and required conditions have been agreed upon, ‘the AEC shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production base, turning the diversity that characterizes the region into opportunities for business complementation and making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain’ (Guerrero, 2009: 54). Moreover, the AEC is supposed to increase regional prosperity, stability and also minimize the development gap among member countries. However, it is still not clear what sort of model the AEC is going to be and discussions regarding this are still ongoing.

ASEAN continued seeking the remarkable achievement of building a regionally integrated market in the region. Then, this made significant progress as a result of the 12th ASEAN summit in 2006 in Cebu when its leaders agreed to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community, with the original target of achieving the goals of monetary and financial integration being brought forward five years from 2020 to 2015. Subsequently, the declaration of the AEC Blueprint was signed at the 13th Singapore summit in November 2007 calling for a single market and production base. In detail, the AEC blueprint is a single and coherent plan developed to identify the priority measures and actions with clear targets and timelines (ASEAN, 2008). It is also composed of twelve priority integration sectors designed to speed up the establishment of the AEC by 2015.

The AEC is a very crucial development milestone, both in ASEAN itself as an organization and in its efforts to strengthen regional economic integration. That is, the blueprint could be a turning point for ASEAN because it is a clear departure from its tradition, as it is the first time that a roadmap has been created before achieving its objectives and also the first time that the targets have not been left open-ended. In sum, with the AEC blueprint, ASEAN now has departed from a process-driven integration into a goal-driven one with clearly defined objectives and timeframes (Soesastro, 2007: 48).
Table 2.4: ASEAN’s three-pillar structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Pillar:</strong> ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- criminal Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- counter-tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Pillar:</strong> ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- trade enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- human resource development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- information and communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- consumer protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third Pillar:</strong> ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- human development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- social welfare and protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- social justice and rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- environmental sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- identity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reduction of development gap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Essentially, ASEAN was designed to prevent conflicts among member countries and create a peaceful and stable scene for economic development and governing domestic concerns. Undoubtedly, the large sum of Japanese direct investment in the region embedded greater production networks and indirectly facilitated economic integration of the ASEAN countries. The 1997-1998 financial crisis that massively hit the region was a crucial lesson for them to learn, for it explicitly brought member countries together to cooperate more closely and made ASEAN increasingly aware of the importance of cooperation among members and non-members (Limtanakool, 2010: 17). The completion of the AEC, as a core mechanism of the ASEAN Community establishment, would ensure the commitment of the ASEAN members to achieve significant progress in economic integration and it would be a major breakthrough in building a stronger, more united and cohesive community. Although ASEAN integration has not yet met many of its long term goals, it is generally a force for good as it has begun to engage its member governments in constructive meetings, consultation and cooperation. Furthermore, ASEAN integration is not only important in terms of economic development, but also the way it is contributing to politics through the building up of confidence as well as establishing peace and stability in the region.
2.5 Conclusion

In comparison to the EU, perhaps the most obvious differences between the two organizations lies in the method of decision making and the institutional forms. The European Union is clearly an example of supranational integration with its ruling bodies residing above all member states, while ASEAN, by contrast, remaining under the influence of national governments. ASEAN has weak institutional structures as a baseline preference, which are characterized by the ‘ASEAN Way’, the principle of non-intervention and flexible engagement, thus resulting in a high degree of autonomy for national governments in regulating domestic policies (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 78). Furthermore, the influential countries’ degree of involvement is another interesting matter. In the EU, France and Germany took a crucial role in shaping the integration of community while Indonesia, as the largest population and geographical entity in Southeast Asia, did not favour very much influencing or receiving intervention from ASEAN as it was rather more concerned with its own domestic interests. Both organisations were formed after having different historical backgrounds as well as their motivation for integration being divergent. Thus, it is relatively hard to find common ground between ASEAN and the EU since their goals are different and ASEAN’s members are much more diverse than the latter’s. However, as a pioneer, the EU can serve as an exemplary testing model for ASEAN and other subsequent integration attempts.

In summary, the Second World War fundamentally changed the global setting and thus had profound implications for the Southeast Asia region. That is, it facilitated decolonization in the region and lessened the colonial influences of Western European countries. In the early stage of regional integration, security interdependencies and geopolitical essentiality were among the most important driving factors. Later, economic prosperity became more crucial as globalisation came to foster liberal ideology and changed the role of nation state. This was accompanied by the emergence of cooperation at the regional levels, leading to the emergence of new layer of governance between the global and national arenas. Regional integration created a stable environment providing a productive space for member countries to consolidate their power and focus on economic development (Wunderlich, 2007: 91). It also came to be seen as an imperative direction to take, if small and medium-sized states were to increase their bargaining power across the globe.
3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

3.1 Introduction

Neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism predominantly continue to underpin the theorizing of the process of regional integration, particularly the early phase of European integration. On the one hand, neofunctionalism assumes that ‘supranationality is the only method available to states to secure maximum welfare and then offers a subtle account of how integration unfolds over time, using concepts such as functional spillover, updating of common interest and subnational and supranational group dynamics’ (Mattli, 1999: 19). On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism contends that ‘Integration is viewed as a sequence of interstate bargains triggered by a convergence of policy preferences among states...it serves to maximize state’s wealth and power’ (ibid). Both theories have emerged to conceptualize, clarify and predict the process of regional integration. Although both represent two antagonistic ends of the theoretical spectrum as they are competing and contrary in most respects, Puchala (1972) reckons that the different theories can only explain different aspects of the integration process. That is, one should not consider either as the opposing polarity because they both have analytical focuses on different aspects and describe the phenomenon of regional integration as being driven by different forces. Alternatively, as has been mentioned by a number of scholars, for example, Cornett and Caporaso (1992), existing theories of integration do not need to be overarching, but rather a combination of different theories or multi-causal frameworks that offer various instruments for different aspects and levels of analysis. In other words, in relation to explaining the dynamics of integration, perhaps it is more fruitful to progress towards a variety of analytical frameworks and to create more workable tools from different approaches, as understanding the whole process by relying on one single theory is not feasible.

Another interesting question frequently asked is that, as most of the integration theories are rooted in or applicable only to European integration, are they capable of explaining regional integration projects in other regions or, otherwise, whether other more effective approaches need to be developed and applied. In this research, four key issues of interest, namely, democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership, are selected to be examined. Two other relevant theoretical concepts, namely new institutionalism and constructivism, are drawn upon to compensate for those aspects of regionalism that the two integration theories are found to be incapable of explaining.
In the previous chapter, the background and path development of the regional integration process in Europe were reviewed to provide understanding of the internal dynamics within the union. This chapter presents an overview of the relevant existing theories as analytical frameworks employed in this research project. As pointed out above, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have emerged as the most influential schools of integration theory providing decisive explanations for the whole process as well as the individual elements. More recently, constructivism has gained increasing credibility, becoming one of the most favoured approaches in international studies and new institutionalism has been engaged with to provide a more precise explanation regarding specific aspects of the EU. Hence, all of these perspectives are considered in part one. The second part of the chapter aims to map the selected key issues with the theoretical perspectives that have been presented in the previous section. That is, it brings all the theories into the context of the four aforementioned focal elements in order to explain their role in the regional integration process.

3.2 Analytical framework of the research
As explained above, as has been frequently observed, in the study of regional integration no theory appears to be capable of explaining the whole process, because each of them tends to focus on different areas. However, these endeavours have not been fruitless because, at least, the theorists have provided tools to acquire an explanation of some aspects of this process, which when taken together, allow a capturing of its multidimensionality. In this section, the theoretical concepts that are considered to be relevant to this research are briefly outlined. As mentioned above, this research focuses on democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership by drawing on the theories of: neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, new institutionalism and constructivism.

3.2.1 Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism has continued to dominate the debate about regional integration right from the outset, with its prime focus being on the European context. The theory mainly highlights the importance of supranational entities viewing regional integration as an incremental process, which increasingly develops by spillover effects as a mechanism for integration. It also focuses on the existence and roles of subnational actors or non-state actors, such as interest groups, that are influential in shaping the integration process. Furthermore, although regional integration is multi-faceted and puzzling to conceptualize, neofunctionalism is to some extent capable of capturing the entire process and hence has been adopted in nearly all studies of regional integration, particularly those about the governance of the EU.
Neofunctionalism, with its roots in the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas (1958), is a pluralist theory of international relations founded on the critique of Mitrany’s functionalism. Its proponents re-established the ideas, refined the analytical tools and embedded the concepts of functionalism into an analytical framework aimed at understanding regional integration, rather than internationalism (Mattli, 1999: 23). Initially, it was designed in order to theorize the European integration movement during the period from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community to that of the European Economic Community. After studying the integrative organizations involved, Haas developed a theory of integration which differed from its predecessor, both in terms of the basic concepts and scope of application (Mutimer, 1994: 26). In his ground-breaking book “The Uniting of Europe”, Haas (1958: 16) made the following radical statement: ‘political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’.

Fundamentally, the main analytical emphasis of the theory itself is placed on the involvement of non-state actors, such as interest associations and social movements, in providing the dynamic for further integration (Schmitter, 2002). That is, neofunctionalism puts the focus on a political community rather than a nation-state and searches for the suitable conditions in which this new type of entity will evolve (Özen, 1998: 2). Interestingly, the important point of departure from functionalism is the critique about the separation of the political from the economic. Haas (1964: 23) wrote in his second book “Beyond the Nation-State” stating that:

“Power and welfare are far from separable. Indeed, commitment to welfare activities arises only within the confines of purely political decisions, which are made largely on the basis of power considerations. Specific functional contexts cannot be separated from general concerns. Overall economic decisions must be made before any on functional sector can be expected to show the kind of integrative evolution that the Functionalist describes.”

And, as he continued in his subsequent work, ‘the history of the European Union movement suggests that the relationship between politics and economics remains somewhat elusive’ (Haas, 1967: 315).

In the works of Mutimer (1989, 1994) regarding the critique of functionalism and the development of neofunctionalist integration, he described that this raised two major questions. First, how does neofunctionalism explain the dynamics of integration? In simple
terms, the answer is that integration is a result of a response to the pressures created by the process of spillover. Moga (2009) claimed that spillover is one of the most significant features of neofunctionalism and that is an improvement its functionalist predecessor, regarding its ability to explain this important aspect of European integration. As Haas (1958: 292) wrote:

"Thus a spillover into new economic and political sectors certainly occurred in terms of expectations developing purely in the national contexts of the elites involved. Yet these expectations were reinforced along supranational lines not only because action was demanded of the High Authority but because continuous joint lobbying with labour leaders from other countries became both necessary and possible."

In a similar vein, Mutimer (1994: 29) argued that the various matters of states and regions are interconnected in the sense that problems in one area will raise problems, or require solutions, in another area. In this regard, when particular economic functions are held by central bodies, the need to look for solutions beyond the originally integrated area will lead to a demand for increased power at the centre. These solutions do not require the agreement from states, but rather a consolidation of similar interests within the scope of the original common undertaking.

Being introduced by Haas and subsequently developed by Lindberg, there are two types of spillover. First, functional spillover (some scholars call it ‘economic spillover’ or ‘sectoral spillover’) is rooted in the fact that, as the different sectors of modern economy are greatly interconnected and cannot be isolated, any integrative activity in one sector can lead to a condition in which the original objective can only be ensured by further integration in other related sectors (Lindberg, 1963: 10). This can be clearly understood by the spillover of integration in some areas, for example, in energy or the environment, which technically need harmonization among members. Second, political spillover implies the incremental shifting of expectations, the changing of values, increased politicization as well as the blending of national interest groups and political parties at the supranational level in response to functional integration (Mattli, 1999: 26). Bache, George and Bulmer (2011: 14) described political spillover as being about creating political pressures in favour of further integration among members. That is, once one sector of the economy becomes integrated, the interest groups operating in that sector will have to apply pressure to the organization in charge at the supranational level. Hence, the organization will contain representatives of related industries in all of the member states as they switch their lobbying from national governments to the new supranational bodies.
The second question pertaining to neofunctionalist enquiry, according to Mutimer (1989, 1994), relates to the results of the spillover process and is: What is the final product of integration or what will integration produce? Regarding this, Haas (1970: 631) opined that ‘political community, security community, political union, federal union - are inadequate because they foreclose real-life possibilities’. Mutimer (1994: 31) interpreted Haas’s statement to imply that neofunctionalism conceives of integration as a process which allows for an open ended product and hence does not require the identification of the final destination of integration or even offering any alternative. However, although the final product is unclearly specified, both Mutimer and Sweeny agreed that it is intended to be institutional, for as the latter put it, ‘institutions are an important outcome of the integration process, that is, they are a measure of the success of the integration project’ (1984: 25). Further to this, but in a similar vein, Caporaso (1972: 27) contended that ‘the end result would be a community in which interest and activity are congruent and in which politics is replaced by problem-solving’.

In general, neofunctionalism introduces the idea of the ‘pooling of state sovereignty’ or what is simply called ‘supranationality’. That is under this lens, the spillover process will bring the extension of the sovereignty of states to the supranational authority in which sovereignty is pooled with that of its members (Mutimer, 1994: 31). Hence, under this theory this pooling of sovereignty will act as the catalyst for the creation of a federal state as the end product of integration. Naturally, neofunctionalism resembles federalism in the sense that both approaches expect to see a supranational state or political community at the final stage of integration as well as both being in search of means to avoid international conflicts. However, they apparently differ regarding the way to reach their ultimate goal. That is, Özen (1998) illustrated that the method of neofunctionalism is directly taken from functionalism and while federalism clearly aims to see a federal state as the end product of integration, neofunctionalists view integration as an incremental process with no end point, proceeding step by step from economic sectors spreading to political fields aimed at creating a supranational political community, which arises as a new centre of almost all activity in the community.

Moreover, Haas (1958: 16) viewed political integration as directly associated with the emergence of ‘a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones’, which is derived from the shift of the loyalty of political leaders from the national to the supranational setting. The setting up of well-suited institutional bodies and the transfer of the necessary competencies would limit the role of national governance of participating members. Moreover, the newly established supranational organs are expected to supply judicial
frameworks, or autonomous procedures for dispute resolution, in order to satisfy those needs. Sweet and Sandholtz (2010: 7-8) noted that neofunctionalism views the creation of supranational authority as bringing ‘changes in the expectations and behaviour of social actors, who in turn shift some of their resources and policy efforts to the supranational level’ and supranational institutions become the centre of all kinds of political activity, inducing the creation of transnational associations and interest groups.

In relation to the economic viewpoint, apart from a concern about how supranational institutions are formed, the theory itself also focuses on how national economic interests contribute to these institutions. As shown in his book ‘Beyond the Nation State’, Haas (1964) clearly outlined that political integration is derived from economic integration, as this starts in an economic sector and spills over to other sectors, thereby creating strong interdependence and increase in wealth (Özen, 1998). In particular, the integration process will develop more rapidly in areas which are dependent on technical knowledge and dialogue between participants (Cummings and Chand, 2007: 9). Therefore, in order to achieve a political community, it is necessary to begin with the integration of national economies and markets under a supranational institutional structure based on the idea of the delegation of national sovereignty. Moreover, while its predecessor theory affirms the separation of political power from economic welfare, neofunctionalists claim that the two features are essentially interlinked and inseparable. As Haas (1968: 152) put it, ‘the supranational style stresses the indirect penetration of the political by way of the economic because the purely economic decisions always acquire political significance in the minds of the participants’. In sum, neofunctionalism accepts the connections between economics and politics in the integration process and claims that cooperation must begin in the relatively low politics areas, the economic, technical and social ones (Dash, 2008: 9).

With regards to its limitations, neofunctionalism is much the same as other theories in social science that claim to be unable to explain perfectly every important element in relation to the topic of inquiry. At the early stage, neofunctionalism was pleasingly practicable, particularly in explaining the transition from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Community. However subsequently, the 1960s seemed to be a challenging time as neofunctionalist approaches did not fit most events. The most prominent obstacle to its justification was the so-called ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1965–66, when there was the use of the power of veto by the French president Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle’s nationalism paralyzed the operation of the EEC for seven months and thus exposed failures in the Council’s workings. Since then, the flourishing time for neofunctionalist theory in its original form came to end,
with the acknowledgement that national governments clearly had retained a lot of power and were still able to determine the nature of integration as well as determine its speed (Bache et al., 2011). As a result, neofunctionalist scholars had to rethink the theory and reformulate its inadequate analytical concepts. However, despite some reformulations of the theory, many of its weakness remained, and hence it fell out of favour until the early 1980s. Then, with the revival of European integration in the mid-1980s it regained popularity in the IR literature.

It is arguably the case that the development of supranational administration in Europe was one of the greatest political innovations of the last century and neofunctionalism appears to be capable of explaining the process quite handsomely. Consequently, a significant number of people have supported or truly believed in neofunctionalist ideology, of which Jean Monnet would be one of the obvious examples. However, neofunctionalism has been strongly challenged by intergovernmentalists, who have criticised the downplaying of the roles of national governments. That is, neofunctionalists argue that the precedence of national governance will no longer exist, declining in the light of a central supranational authority. By contrast, intergovernmentalists claim that national governments will still play a key role in international affairs and external policies. For example, Cini (2003) has contended that it is in the interests of the states to have national representatives in the EU Commission in order to protect their state interests. Interestingly, Wiener and Diez (2009: 51) pointed out that neofunctionalism is not applicable to all settings of regional integration, claiming that the model only works in particular conditions, such as democracy and high levels of development and hence, is not capable of explaining integration in other regions. In addition, in relation to the spillover process they argue that neofunctionalism pays too much attention to the internal dynamics of integration and ignores a more general concept of this integration as well as its international surroundings.

In relation to this research, neofunctionalism, as a comprehensive theory of European integration, is indispensable when attempting to understand regional integration, particularly in Europe. Firstly, it identifies the existence of supranationality and the requirements for institutional settings, which are supposed to become a new centre of governance. Secondly, neofunctionalism uncovers the fact that interstate politics are not always driven by rational sentiments and hence, regional integration is not just a place where state interests are pooled and balanced. For, there are many other important concerns, not least ideational values, such as belief and identity, rather than simply matters of interest or power. Lastly, although neofunctionalists are not quite accurate in their claim regarding the incrementality of the integration process as it sometimes can get stuck, it is true in the sense that regional
integration is an ‘unstoppable’ and ‘irreversible’ project. This is because it involves substantial mutual commitment and interdependence between countries and hence, would prove punitively costly in many respects if were suddenly reversed or abandoned.

3.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

On the other side of the spectrum, liberal intergovernmentalism does not see regional integration as an incremental process amplified by spillover effects, but rather as the converging national interests of states. The theory was developed from the original version of intergovernmentalism, based on realist ideas, arguing that the state, and its government, play a key role in international relations and control the degree and pace of integration. The goals are literally achieved through intergovernmental negotiation and interstate bargaining, rather than through the administration of a supranational body. The outcome is thought to be determined by their relative bargaining powers within the community, that is, it is frequently dominated by larger states. With these sorts of assumptions accompanied by the emphasis on welfare and economic interests, liberal intergovernmentalists claim to reflect political reality of contemporary regional cooperation, as a process guided by accompanying rules and framed by institutions, whereby participating states are willing to delegate their sovereignty only as sufficiently as required.

In detail, Liberal Intergovernmentalism was initially originated from Intergovernmentalism, presented by Stanley Hoffman in 1965, as a counter-argument to neofunctionalism. Later, in 1993, Andrew Moravcsik revised it into a new version by building on the fundamental critiques of neofunctionalism, which, as explained above, had experienced difficulties in explaining the development of the EC. Moravcsik repeated most of the main principles of intergovernmentalism, particularly the importance of absolute and relative gains, the importance of security in the state’s calculation of its interests as well as the implications of anarchy for the prospect of international cooperation and international institutions (Pollack, 2001).

In the main, intergovernmentalists reject the idea of neofunctionalists that the process of supranational integration would bring peace to the region. Rather, peace is likely to be maintained because of the progress in democratization in those countries and the increase of economic interdependence between them, which results in the costs of war becoming a lot more than in the past. This can be associated with Keynes’ idea in the early 20th century arguing that free trade can promote peace and harmony among countries. Basically, the theory profoundly emphasizes the importance and influence of national governments in the
process of integration as they legally gain formal sovereignty from their countries and fully had legitimacy, as being the only elected officials in the integration process, to perform activities in international sphere. Moreover, the theory recognizes the impact of domestic politics upon governmental preferences and rejects the concept of spillover as well as the significance of supranational bodies as proposed by neofunctionalism.

In general, Moravcsik’s liberal Intergovernmentalism has achieved the status of a baseline theory (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 67) and has been widely read and cited in the study of regional integration. In his book “The Choice for Europe” he starts from intergovernmentalist assumptions and then gathers evidence to modify this perspective. In the end, he proposes what he regards as a revisionist explanation of the course of European integration (Puchala, 1999: 326), liberal intergovernmentalism, which draws its elements from many other fields of study, such as international relations theory, international political economy and bargaining theory (Disegni, 2010). The scope of Moravcsik’s (1998) analysis covers the motives for the Treaty of Rome up to consideration of the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, as liberal intergovernmentalism is grounded in a more consistent and discerning underpinning of what regionalism entails, it allows for specification of the motivation of all actors in the international arena and can ‘derive predictions of aggregate behaviour or dynamic effects from their interaction that can be subjected to empirical tests’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 13-14).

Interestingly, Moravcsik (1998: 3) wrote his ‘central claim’ at the beginning of his exposition:

“...is that the broad lines of European Integration since 1955 reflect three factors: patterns of commercial exchange, the relative bargaining power of national governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments. Most fundamental of these was commercial interest. European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy. When such interests converged, integration advanced.”

He also highlighted the significance of economic gains as they have affected the trends of the post-war international political economy:
“The resulting expansion of intra-industry trade both predated the EC and induced policy changes regardless of whether the countries in question were members of the EC. Similarly, in the 1970s and 1980s, rising capital mobility undermined the autonomy of national macroeconomic policies, creating greater pressures for monetary cooperation. At its core, I argue, European integration has been dictated by the need to adapt through policy coordination to these trends in technology and in economic policy.” (Moravcsik, 1998: 3)

At the heart of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the core of theory relies on two main basic assumptions. Firstly, states are seen as the critical actors on an international stage, because they achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through the administration of a supranational body (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). This classical realist view is relatively captivating in relation to explaining the dynamics of European integration every time it suffers from a crisis, stagnation, or even conflicts between its members (Disegni, 2010). Secondly, states act as rational actors. That is, they calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and, in order to achieve goals and objectives, define their priorities through policy options in terms of costs and benefits. Collective outcomes are seen as the result of aggregated actions based on efficient pursuit of these preferences and, also, cooperative efforts or attempts to set up institutional bodies are seen as the outcomes of rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 68).

Liberal Intergovernmentalism describes the integration process as being divided into three stages of analysis: national preferences, interstate bargaining and delegation of sovereignty. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 69) posit that each stage is specified by a separate theory, with each feeding into the successive step, these being: a liberal theory of national preference formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations and a functional theory of institutional choice. The first stage, preference formation, is undertaken by national governments who aggregate the interests of their domestic constituencies. Then, collective preferences are defined and prioritized, which national governments position and articulate towards intergovernmental negotiations, where agreements reflect the relative power of each member state and where supranational institutions have only little or no causal influence (Pollack, 2001: 225). Regarding national preferences, Moravcsik (1993: 517) wrote that it is the economic interests of producers that shape national preferences. Furthermore, he added that ‘important changes in the priorities, policies and preferences of national governments appear to have reflected shifts in the domestic and international economic environment’ and the
action in favour of Europe, for example, is a reflection of the preferences of national governments, not supranational organisations (Moravcsik, 1998: 474).

The second stage is interstate bargaining, which pertains to how varied antagonistic national interests are reconciled at the negotiating table. Moravcsik (1998) explained that involved member governments or private individuals are the ones who initiate and mediate major negotiations, not supranational officials. Similarly, the bias, if any, in the supply of proposals considered by governments are in favour of political viability, not the vision of supranational bodies. Moreover, whether or not supranational actors intervene, negotiated agreements appear to be efficient because preferences are transparent. Finally, he concluded that ‘supranational actors have only a rare and secondary impact on the efficiency of negotiations’ (1998: 485) and the final distributional outcomes will reflect the relative bargaining power of governments.

The third stage is delegation of sovereignty, which seeks to explain the circumstances under which governments delegate powers to supranational institutions (Bache, 1998). In other words, the integrating community establishes institutions to secure their desired outcomes in the case of uncertainty. In this regard, Moravcsik tested three relevant frameworks to uncover the patterns of institutional choice: federalist ideology, technocratic management and credible commitments, with three aspects of observable implications: cross-issue and cross-national variation, domestic cleavages and discourse, and institutional form. As a result, he found that the credible commitments perspective best explains the delegation and pooling of state sovereignty. More specifically, Moravcsik (1993) concluded that the potential gains from cooperation, the level of uncertainty regarding the details of specific delegated or pooled decisions and the level of political risk for individual governments or interest groups with intense preferences are the reasons that countries decide to delegate their powers and become involved in institutional establishment. Furthermore, those delegated supranational organs are ‘deliberate instruments to improve the efficiency of bargaining between states’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 507). On this point, Pollack (2001: 226) added that ‘the supranational institutions only serve to provide member states with information and reduction of transaction costs, not leading to the transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational level as neofunctionalists had predicted’.

One matter of interest is that of how Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism differs from the neorealist approach to intergovernmentalism, its predecessor. In this regard, Pollack (2001) wrote that, basically, liberal intergovernmentalism represents a two-fold departure from
neorealism. First, national preferences are thought to be generated by domestic concerns, particularly in economic matters, and not derived from security concerns in the international system. Second, bargaining power is regulated by the intensity and relative degrees of preference, not by military capabilities. More specifically, Moravcsik pointed out that major intergovernmental bargains are driven by a gradual process of preference convergence among the most powerful member states. In sum, while its forerunner illuminates state behaviour, liberal intergovernmentalism addresses the limitations existing in intergovernmentalism by adding the theory of national preference formation and analysis of interstate negotiation (Lee, 2006: 15).

However, Moravcsik's theory itself is not immaculate for it is insufficiently universal to explain every aspect or the whole process of regional integration. As a result, subsequent to liberal intergovernmentalists having presented their newly developed version from the prototype, there have been a significant number of scholars who have classed themselves as being against the theory, by highlighting three of its fundamental flaws. First, a group of constructivists drew attention to membership issues arguing that membership matters can change the preferences and the identities of national leaders involved in the process of regional integration (Risse-Kappen, 1996, Sandholtz, 1993, Sandholtz, 1996), which liberal intergovernmentalism by its very nature has ignored. Second, institutionalists contend that the influence of existing supranational institutions on intergovernmental policy making has been overlooked. In general, they argue that the theory fails to provide an active role for the EU institutions, such as allowing for qualified majority voting for agenda setting (Pollack, 2001). Also, they are sceptical about the capability of liberal intergovernmentalism to explain the EU legislative process as they believe that EU institutions are the critical actors that shape or constrain the integration process. The third group of scholars would appear to be the most forceful opponents of liberal intergovernmentalism. Their main argument is that the EU should be explained by the multi-level governance concept, which draws attention to the involvement of diverse actors in the process. For example in this regard, the Acquis Communautaire involves the participation of national leaders, subnational political actors and supranational actors (Lee, 2006: 19).

On the whole, according to Moravcsik, welfare and economic interests are the dominant issues in the process of integration that the EU member states wish to cooperate on. That is, the primary goal of national governments during this process is the balance between the competing economic interests within the domestic sphere, rather than political concerns. Moreover, being in possession of formal sovereignty and legitimacy, national governments are
the most critical actors who are eligible to control the speed and outcome of regional integration. That is, most significant international bargains are not driven by supranational actors regarding their outcomes, but by the accumulated bargaining power of the individual states. Further, potential gains from integration, such as the lessening of political risks and uncertainty, are the most plausible reasons regarding why states decide to delegate their powers and participate in supranational institutionalization. This claim is substantiated by the findings of Manfield (1993), who discovered that trade is higher among countries that are cooperating and lower among those that are actual or potential enemies. In sum, liberal intergovernmentalism does not view the integrated region as a challenge to the nation state, rather as a mechanism for strengthening state sovereignty (Craig and De Búrca 1999).

In relation to this research, liberal intergovernmentalism is indispensable for shedding light on the significant antagonistic attitudes in relation to the European integration story. Basically, it is more universal and a better fit for the facts than neofunctionalism, in the sense that it can also accommodate other regional integration settings, in this case ASEAN, which are almost entirely based on intergovernmental arrangements. The downplaying of supranational institutions does not imply that liberal intergovernmentalism rejects the need for institutions. Instead, under this lens the establishment of institutions is required in order to secure mutual commitments, ensure the effectiveness of policy implementation and to reduce uncertainty. Moreover, the emphasis on the importance of national governments shows the convergence of power and influence among member states as it embraces the need for important debates on such matters as leadership, power distribution and institutional design. Finally, when the case of the EU is taken into account, the liberal intergovernmentalist stance views democratisation as an important mechanism as it maintains peaceful relations among member states and thus ensures that disputes and complications are reconciled collectively on a legitimate basis.

3.2.3 New Institutionalism
Institutions, nowadays, have become a key factor in any analysis of policy making as they construct the input of social, economic and political forces and have considerable influence on policy results (Bulmer, 1998). While the old institutionalism set itself the task of analysing the formal forms of government institutions from a comparative perspective, new institutionalism is a theory that provides a broader means of evaluating institutions beyond this classical view. Moreover, the insights gained from this perspective have come to dominate the study of international politics, for it is now widely acknowledged across all the social sciences that ‘institutions matter’. It represents an extension ‘beyond the formal organs of government to
include standard operating procedures’, such as norms and conventions of behaviour, which may influence the pattern of political behaviour (Bulmer, 1993: 355). That is, new institutionalism treats institutions as shaping political strategies by imposing an independent or intervening influence on political outcomes (Steinmo et al., 1992). However, even though the importance of institutions in shaping political outcomes has been clearly acknowledged, the scope of new institutionalism is broad and divided into several diverse views. According to Pollack (2009: 2), new institutionalism ‘has evolved into plural institutionalisms, with rational choice, sociological and historical variants, each with a distinctive set of hypotheses and insights about the EU’. Regarding which, three main categories of institutionalism have been developed with their own explanations of institutions, as discussed next.

Arguably, one of the most influential frameworks in EU studies in recent decades, *Rational Choice Institutionalism* is a theory that accounts for the significance of both structures and actors in the international arena. Historically, it came about as a result of a study of congressional behaviour by American political scientists in the late 1970s in order to understand better institutional factors, including the formation of institutions, the behaviour of political actors and the outcome of their interactions. Although this form of institutionalism originated from the context of American political institutions, it is, to a certain extent, applicable across a range of other comparative and international political contexts including the study of regional integration (Pollack, 2009: 3).

Importantly, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and Huber and Shipan (2002) studied the transaction costs of political institutions. That is, they argued that political institutions are deliberately and systematically created to minimize the transaction costs associated with collective activity and policy making. Moreover, institutions do not produce behaviour or shape actors’ preferences directly, but rather they influence their behaviour by affecting the structure of the situation in which actors choose strategies for the acquisition of their preferences. Further, it is contended that people follow the rules of institutions because they are rational actors who want to maximize their personal gain (Steinmo, 2008: 162). In addition, under the lens of rational choice institutionalism, institutions are created and continued to ensure the desired gains from cooperation that the designers and participating actors value (Hall and Taylor, 1996). According to Pollack (1996: 433), it ‘employs a functionalist logic to institutional choice in which institutional creation and design is a consequence of rationally anticipated effects.’ As a consequence of these pioneering works accompanied by the main assumption of rational choice institutionalism arguing that institutions matter and can radically affect the actions of states, scholars could study institutions both exogenously, as the rules of
the game, and endogenously, as particular patterns or procedures designed by actors to secure mutual gains.

Sociological Institutionalism describes institutions in a much broader way than rational choice and historical institutionalism, to include the socio-cultural structures in which action takes place. That is, it embraces conventional practices and informal norms as well as formal rules, emphasizing their ability to socialize actors and thereby influence interests and identities (Rosamond, 2000). While rational choice institutionalism considers actors as strategic utility-maximizers whose preferences are taken as a given, sociological institutionalism assumes that ‘people act according to a logic of appropriateness, taking cues from their institutional environment, as they construct their preferences and select the appropriate behaviour for a given institutional environment’ (Pollack, 2009: 127). In other words, as March and Olsen (1996: 249) argued, institutions should be viewed as a constituting units providing actors with ‘identities, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment and behavioural rules’. As a consequence of these insights, organizational forms and practices are interpreted as ‘being culturally embedded, reflecting culturally specific practices, rather than functional efficiency’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948).

Lastly, Historical Institutionalism fundamentally locates its position in between the two former strands, drawing attention to the effects of institutions over time (Thelen, 1999). That is, this theoretical perspective shares some common features of rational choice institutionalism, such as the interpretations of formal and informal institutions and actors’ pursuance of interests, but its main departure is about preference formation. This difference is explained in Lindblom’s work, in which he argued that the participation in a policy-making process is regarded as an educating force in which actors learn many things, such as how to form policy positions, what policy positions are feasible and how to tune up those positions in order to increase the chances of success (Lindblom, 1968). That is, under this lens preferences are created through processes of interaction with other actors and the formal and informal institutions themselves, so they are endogenous to the political system (Lindblom, 1968). Furthermore, according to the functionalist view of institutions, they are, very little or, not at all concerned with historical legacies, but rather deliberately designed by actors for the efficient performance of specific functions. Pollack (1996: 437-438) explained that historical institutionalists reject this assumption and argue that ‘institutional choices taken in the past can persist, or become “locked in,” thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time’. 

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In relation to this research, consistent with Lecours (2005: 6) stance that ‘political analysis is best conducted through a focus on institutions’, it is held here that new institutionalism can provide crucial insights and features into many key subfields of political science, such as comparative politics, public policy analysis and international relations. Moreover, institutions shape individual behaviours, influence policy outcomes, impose constraints and offer opportunities for action, being the rules of the game or patterns of behaviour which link all actors and their actions together. In line with the stance of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, new institutionalism confirms that institutions do matter and they are a prerequisite for constructing a regional community. For instance, according to rational institutionalist assumptions, institutions are created to minimize the transaction costs and to ensure the desired gains from cooperation. In general, it is contended here that in addition to the EU where institutions are solidly established, an institutionalist perspective can be fruitfully employed for analysing the case of ASEAN where certainty and stability are still problematic and lack consolidated commitment.

Indeed, the researcher is of the opinion that new institutionalism opens up a new world of regional integration studies. That is, by focusing on a central driving mechanism of the EU, namely, the nature of its institutional structures this represents a major shift in regional scholarship that can provide solutions to key questions that are outside the limits of integration theories. It is possibly the case that new institutionalism is relatively more practicable than the two integration theories in the sense that it does not need to distinguish between high and low politics, because it can apply to all levels, and it ignores the endogenous effects of actors on the integration process (Oneuropenow, 2011). Finally, according to historical institutionalism’s concept of path dependency, this form of new institutionalism concurs with the neofunctionalist contention that ‘once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice’ (Levi, 1997: 28).

3.2.4 Constructivism
Constructivist theory has become one of the most favoured IR approaches in recent years, gaining strong credibility since the 1990s, as a result of the failure of realism and liberalism to predict the end of Cold War, and thus becoming an important approach to international politics. This theoretical perspective supports the institutionalist arguments by partially emphasising the normative as well as material structures, by focusing on the importance of institutions to state action, and their relationships to norms in shaping the interests and
identities of states. Basically, the key assumption of the theory is the belief that international political action is socially and historically constructed and shaped by ideas, collective values and social identities. This is to say, as an essential premise it allows researchers to examine the processes involved in the forming of the state’s identities and interests.

It is logical to tell the story of the development of constructivist ideas starting from the Cold War period. As background, Guzzini (2000) pointed out that, without a forceful arbiter, states have to face the dilemma of two equally costly options: do not arm and you risk defeat (insecurity); arm and you risk escalation (insecurity). To put it simply, the two contrasting political ideologies at the time, led by the US and the Soviet Union, identified each other as enemies and defined their national interests in antagonistic terms. Once they no longer perceived each other in these terms, the Cold War was bound to eventually come to an end. This shows that states are indeed motivated by constructed interests and identities, rather than their structures or natures. The end of the Cold War by Guzzini’s explanation is consistent with the view that the world of international relations is not fixed like the natural world, which is completely independent from human action and cognition. That is, the international system is ‘a system whose rules are made and reproduced by human practices. Only these intersubjective rules, and not some unchangeable truths deduced from human nature or from international anarchy, give meaning to international practices’ (Guzzini, 2000: 155). Similarly, Koslowski (1994) explained that, within the international political sphere, the system does not exist because of its structures, but depends on the reproduction of structures as determined by the practices of the actors and significant changes in this international system will only happen when actors change the rules and norms through these practices. In other words, changes in international politics are caused by the alteration of beliefs and identities of domestic actors and this can subsequently alter the rules and norms that are constitutive of their political practices.

The rise of constructivism has had a significant impact on the development of international relations theory and analysis. At the very least, it has brought a new level of conceptual clarity and theoretical implications to the analysis of international society as well as led to a re-think about what has long been treated as a given in the study of international relations, which has recently penetrated into the scholarship of regional integration. Regarding its substance, the principal argument underpinning constructivism is that state interests and identities are socially and historically constructed and thus understanding state behaviour is equal to comprehending the international context in which it evolves (Narine, 1998). In the notorious words of Alexander Wendt (1994: 385), constructivism is defined as follows:
“Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are inter subjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are an important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.”

Narine (1998: 39) pointed out that identities can be divided into two types: corporate and social identity. The former generates basic state demands, such as the desire for security, stability recognition by others and the development of citizens’ lives, whereas the latter refers to how states perceive themselves in relation to international society. As this author explained, states construct their interests on the basis of these two identities (ibid). However, corporate identity is prioritized and will provide the motivating force for state action, whilst social identity will be structured to fulfil the needs of the former.

In relation to the functions of institutions, constructivists see the relation between them and states as that of mutually constituting entities. Moreover, Wendt (1992: 136) defined an institution as a:

“relatively stable set or "structure" of identities and interests. . . . Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works.”

That is, according to this perspective, the social relationships that define state identities and interests are developed within the context of institutions, which represent the constitutive and regulative norms and rules of international interaction. Therefore, they define, shape, constrain and give meaning to state action. In the meantime, they continue to exist because states produce and reproduce them through practices (Narine, 1998). Moreover, institutionalized norms and ideas ‘define the meaning and identity of the individual actor and the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals’ (Stack, 1989: 12). Furthermore, Wendt (1995, 1992) added that state identities and interests can be changed at the systemic level through various types of institutionally mediated interactions.

Reus-Smit (2005: 198) posited that actors’ identities and interests are shaped by normative and ideational structures through three mechanisms: imagination, communication and constraint. The first mechanism concerns what actors consider necessary and possible, in both
practical and ethical terms: how they think they should act; what the perceived limitations on their actions are and what strategies they can imagine. For instance, a prime minister in a liberal democracy regime will only imagine and think about certain strategies to enhance his or her power, and the norms of the liberal democracy will condition his or her expectations. Next, normative and ideational structures can be influenced through communication. Reus-Smit (2005) argued that when states seek to justify their action, they will usually refer to the established norms of legitimate conduct, such as the conventions of the executive government. Lastly, even if normative and ideational structures do not affect actors’ behaviour by shaping their imagination or by providing communication, they still can control their behaviour. Regarding this, under a constructivist perspective it is concluded that ‘institutionalized norms and ideas work as rationalizations only because they already have moral force in a given social context. Furthermore, appealing to established norms and ideas to justify behaviour is a viable strategy only if the behaviour is in some measure consistent with the proclaimed principles’ (Reus-Smit, 2005: 198).

Notably, Checkel (1998) wrote that constructivism is an approach, rather than a theory, which is based on two assumptions: 1) the environment in which states take action is social as well as material; 2) this setting can provide states with understandings of their interests. By way of explanation, Checkel pointed out that the first assumption reflects the view that material structures are given meaning only by the social context through which they are interpreted. The second assumption addresses the relation between states and broader structural environments. This opens up what Powell (1994: 326) calls ‘the black box of interest and identity formation’ for neoliberals and neorealists. Moreover, one indicative account of constructivism is a model of state behaviour which is controlled by rule-governed action and logics of appropriateness. Checkel explained that such logics involve reasoning by analogy and metaphor and are not about ends and means, but rather pertain to norms helping to provide understanding of interests.

This contrasts with the rational choice perspective, which uses a behavioural model based on utility maximization, whereby states when confronted with various options will select the best one that serves their objectives and interests. Realists and neoliberalists agree that norms serve a regulative function, helping states with given interests to maximize their utility, and as such are built on a material base. By contrast, constructivists consider norms as collective understanding that influences state behaviour as they constitute state identities and interests and do not obviously regulate behaviour (Checkel, 1998). Moreover, Reus-Smit (2005) pointed out that constructivism treats interests as endogenously determined by social interaction,
which is learned through processes of communication, reflection on experience and role enactment. He added that, while rationalists view society as a place where actors pursue their interests, constructivists see it as a place that generates actors as knowledgeable social and political agents, or arguably the realm that makes them who they are. From this, it is clear why they are called “constructivists”, for their emphasis is placed on the social determination of social and political agency and action. In addition, neo-realists and neo-liberals would appear to ignore where state preferences come from, whereas constructivism consider society, both domestic and international, as a strategic domain where previously constituted actors stay to pursue their goals. Thus, in the view of constructivists, focusing on the social identities of states is important in order to understand the formation of state interests and to explain the existence of international political phenomenon (Reus-Smit, 2005).

However, constructivism is often introduced in a superficial and misleading manner, superficial in the sense of it being presented as a substantive theory and misleading in that it is promoted as a coherent position (Jørgensen, 2010: 160). In reality, it is not a substantive IR theory and did not even originate from this field, but rather should be perceived as a general approach to social theory. That is, fundamentally, constructivism provides grounds for including social ontology in research into politics and economics. In general, the focus of the theory on the importance of institutions to state action, their relationships to norms as well as the roles of identities, ideas and values in the development of state relationships provide a platform to generate a completely different set of questions when examining regional integration phenomena, such as: What are the social structures characterizing the region? How do states and those of their neighbours perceive their identities? and What kinds of interests are followed as a result of these perceptions? (Narine, 1998).

In relation to this research, it is taken as given that constructivism does contribute to the study of regional integration by highlighting the solid ties that exist between institutions and identity in the integration process. It is also accepted that regional integration is a process of social construction in which ideational factors play an important role as they help to construct and consolidate this process. That is, in the view of constructivists, regional integration is not viewed from material perspectives, but rather ideational ones. Therefore, mutual responsiveness, trust and beliefs, or what is called ‘cognitive interdependence’, are required in order to construct regional cohesion based on a solid sense of community (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995: 64). Additionally, if we stick with the line of reasoning of Wendt (1994: 385), constructivism informs us that states are the key principal actors in the process, whereby their identities and interests are constructed by the social structures of the system. At the same
time, very much along with the new institutionalist assumptions, institutions considered as
regulative norms and rules of the game play a key role in defining, shaping, constraining and
giving meaning to state action. So, understanding state behaviour means understanding the
environmental context in which it evolves. To sum up, the contributions of constructivism to
this research is the affirmation of the complexity of the integration process as well as the
needs for institutions and a certain degree of shared identity among members.

3.3 Operationalization of the theoretical concepts
The previous section provided an overview of the theoretical frameworks that underpin this
research. This section is assigned to putting the selected theoretical frameworks into
operation, thus transforming them from an ideational level into a more concrete one within
the research context, in order to make the concepts more distinguishable and to understand
them in terms of empirical observations. Regional integration is a very broad, complex and
multi-faceted subject. Consequently, even grand theories in political science, which have a
broad range of explanatory power, cannot explain the whole process. Thus, a combination or
set of theoretical concepts is required. However, it is important to provide a clear explanation
as to how each of the relevant theories can be operationalised so as to reveal comprehensive
insights into the focal elements of this research, namely: democratisation, identity, institutions
and leadership. Basically, this section aims to formulate the main concepts of this research by
mapping the specific issues that are going to be investigated with the theoretical concepts in
the previous section in order to see what sorts of explanation the different theoretical
perspectives can provide for each selected issue.

From the previous section, it is apparent that each theory reveals a particular agenda
indicating what to look at specifically in the integration process and thus taken together help in
the identification of the research focus. From this review, the issues of democratisation,
identity, institutions and leadership in regional integration process are chosen for investigation
in this research. In general, although each of them has been extensively studied in the context
of the EU, they have rarely been studied in other regional integration models or in relation to
comparative studies. This is despite the fact that they are widely thought to be important
elements in ensuring the continuity and progress of regional organization. For instance,
leadership is probably one of the most complex issues and as such is poorly defined and
understood, being hence subject to recurrent controversy in the contemporary debates about
the EU (Young, 1991: 281). Democratisation is another interesting issue as it highlights the
uniqueness of European integration and shows an obvious contrast between the two cases of
the integration model. That is, the EU uses the attractive membership as a key method to
incentivise democratisation while there is no similar attempt in ASEAN, which is also the case in most other regional organizations. Recently, regional identity has also become a popular debating issue in Europe, which is derived from the idea that the EU needs to establish a common set of values to define the meanings of mutual commitments and to deal with the multicultural societies in the union. However, systematic research of the impact of regional identity has been generally lacking and that which there is has been focused heavily on the EU. Needless to say, the issues relating to the form and functions of institutions have been covered widely in the existing literature, with it being argued that regional organizations need to create institutions in order to shape perceptions and behaviours as well as to reduce uncertainty and anxiety among member states. Furthermore, such institutions are considered as one important factor that set an integrating region apart from a state or an ordinary international integration.

Regarding this research setting focusing on ASEAN, this is likely to be particularly revealing, given that democratisation, identity, institutions and strong leadership have been in short supply in its member states. Contrasting ASEAN with the EU by drawing on the same theoretical context could, on the one hand, provide various insights from different perspectives and, on the other hand, demonstrate the generalization ability of the theories to explain different integration models. All the empirical findings from this research are intended to contribute to the study of ASEAN and the hope is that European studies might also benefit from this work, both empirically and theoretically. Next, in this section, the four selected elements subjected to theoretical discussion in order of range of coverage, that is, from the broadest to the most specific debates, this order being: democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership.

3.3.1 Democratisation

Democratisation, owing to its wide ranging conceptualisation would appear to be remote from specific arena of regional integration studies. Perhaps, this is because it is a rather general political ideology adopted by governments or international organizations to support the spread of a political system that is widely believed to be the best available for citizens, with the claim that under this arrangement all adult citizens have freedom and equal say in any decisions that affects their lives (Diamond and Plattner, 2006). As such, it did not originate or was rooted in the concept of regional integration, but it does seem to have been a crucial element in European integration. Also, democratisation is thought to be a concern of domestic conditions, such as social structures, industrialisation, urbanisation and education, rather than conditional on international political factors. As a consequence, whilst literature on the EU
highlights the importance of the democratisation, in other regional integration contexts it has largely been ignored (Warleigh, 2004).

However, despite the Eurocentric bias, other international or regional scenes can also be places where democratisation forces play out. For example, apart from direct intercommunication and intercooperation between governments, the influence of democracy promotion can stem through transnational relations, such as cross-border interactions and exchanges, in which at least one actor is not a government (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2010). For instance, as witnessed in the Arab Spring, political demonstrations generated by successful democratic transition in another country can also encourage and help the spread of democratisation. In the long run, some economic factors, such as the intensification of trade and investment, might make people more active, change their attitudes and motivate them to demand civil liberties and political rights as well as through social and cultural exchanges (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2010).

According to the extant literature, democratisation originally stemmed from the democratic peace theory, one of the most sustainable ideas in politics and most influential contributions to the debates on the causes of war and peace. The main idea underpinning it is that democracies do not fight among themselves. This was first proposed in 1795 by Immanuel Kant in his classic work ‘Perpetual Peace’ and later this work influenced many modern political thinkers. According to Maoz and Russett (1993), the reasons why democracy can reduce the likelihood of war can be categorized into two forms. First, according to the structural perspective, democracy possesses many mechanisms that can help to prevent countries going into a war, such as an electoral system (leaders can be replaced), the promotion of individual freedom and public opinion as well as separation of power. Second, under the normative perspective it is contended that when facing each other, democracies expect the other side to resolve disputes through a peaceful reconciliation process rather than violent conflict.

Later in the 1980s, Kant’s philosophy was built on by Michael Doyle and since then the idea has been widely acknowledged, having now become the most sustainable concept of peace. Doyle (1983: 206) began by taking Kant’s definition of liberalism as having ‘been identified with an essential principle - the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only’. He also added that this sort of principle initiates rights and institutions in international society. Furthermore, he noted that no explanation had clarified why liberal states are peaceful only in relations with other liberal
states and he claimed that Kant’s explanations were a key guidance to the question. According to the *Perpetual Peace*, Kant posited that peace will be guaranteed by the acceptance of three ‘definitive articles’: republicanism, a treaty of the nations among themselves and the operation of a cosmopolitan law (Doyle, 1983: 225-227). In the end, Doyle (1983: 235) concluded that it is not the resources and morale, but constitutional structures that help to establish peace among democracies.

Although democratic peace theory does not deal with regional integration directly, this notion has been used by some scholars as a way to explain cooperation among new democracies after the collapse of dictatorship (Caballero Santos, 2008: 8). In general, the theory suggests that democratic states can sort out disputes among themselves peacefully. However, in cases of disputes between democracies and authoritarian nations, war seems highly inevitable, due to the inherently aggressive nature of the latter, which tend to deny peaceful negotiated settlements (Grayson, 2003: 8). That is, under these circumstances, war is considered the only way of defending against threatening forces. Hence, if Kant and Doyle were right, democracy would be absolutely crucial for regional integration in the sense that it helps to create a zone of peace and cooperation. That is, it is profoundly logical to promote it because Kant’s effects of democracy means that such a security situation can only come into play when all members share these values.

In addition to the democratic peace theory, there needs to be more clarification about why democracy matters in the regional integration process, and vice versa, and hence why it needs to be promoted. One general explanation is that regional integration and democracy are to some extent linked and therefore likely to reinforce each other. More specifically, regional integration fosters democracy by bringing states within the realm of liberal democracy, which makes them more legitimate by increasing the generation of public goods (Mattli, 1999). Perhaps more importantly, regional integration poses new significant challenges to democracy as it changes ‘the ways in which public policy is made, political structures are built and used, and individuals relate to both each other and the various political and economic orders in which they live’ (Warleigh, 2004: 310). On the other hand, democracy is a vital factor for regional communities, because regional integration is based on a high degree of voluntarism as participating countries join the union not because of hegemonic pressure or fear of military attack (Schulz et al., 2001). This would lead to the likelihood that the union would work democratically and attempt to avoid the alienation of its member state publics (Warleigh, 2004). Moreover, democracy would relax the pressures that maintain the unity of the state,
allowing for the opening up of space for subnational actors to extend their range of activities and, in particular, facilitating the creation of cross-border regions (Schulz et al., 2001).

In the case of the European Union, democracy promotion has been directly and significantly concerned with the enlargement, being an important political conditionality for EU accession. Sets of democratic rules and practices (such as democratic elections, human rights and the rule of law) are employed as conditions that the candidate countries have to meet in order to gain membership or other benefits, such as financial assistance (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2010). In general, the conditionality is positive and there is no penalty imposed on countries that fail to meet the conditions. Notwithstanding this, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2010: 445) have contended that ‘the impact of the EU on democratisation in the neighbouring countries will be a function of the size and credibility of the rewards it offers in return for increased democratisation’. While in Southeast Asia, the concepts of democracy have been facing an ideological challenge and are very much characterized by the notion of ‘Asian values’. This concept is widely considered as one of the most recognized claims made among ASEAN leaders in order to deviate from the general understanding of democracy in the region. In this regard, it has been claimed by a number of political leaders that democracy is ‘an unaffordable luxury until sufficient economic prosperity was achieved’ (Thompson, 2004: 1083). Given this is also the position of some Southeast Asian governments, the role of democracy in constructing a regional community across this location remains ambiguous and needs to be examined.

Theoretically, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism do raise the matter of democratisation as a part of the enlargement mechanism. In general within these stances, the matters of democratisation are grounded in the fact that the progress of regional integration would be eased and accelerated, if all participating members have the same kinds of political and ideological norms or perspectives, specifically democratic, which are unlikely to cause conflicts between members. Therefore, in the views of Kantian theorists, enlargement would be seen as a spread of zone of peace in Europe. However, both theories provide some decisive insights about enlargement in terms of a broad explanation. In connection with neofunctionalism, according to Miles (1995), the more efficient the management of conflict, the inherent expansion of tasks assigned to supranational institutions, the significance of supranational elites and interest groups, and the concept of spillover are considered to be four elements of regional integration that link this perspective with the concept of enlargement. In

4 a detailed discussion of Asian values is provided in Chapter 5
particular, in relation to spillover, described as the process whereby successful integration in one area brings a series of further integration, is most relevant, for as Miles (1995: 7) explained, the success of integrative attempts ‘would eventually lead to a progressive and gradual altering of attitudes among these elites in favour of further European integration (Political Spillover)’. However, Miles (1995) continued that, in the context of enlargement, the concept of spillovers need to be interpreted more broadly and flexibly to include the notion that political spillover, which can also emerge from the outside in as new members and their political leaders bring their own preferences for shaping the character of further spillover and EU cooperation. Conversely, the substance and direction of spillover can also be influenced by enlargement, because at the time when accession is being negotiated intergovernmental bargaining is still admittedly influential (Miles, 1995). This is one of the important limitations of neofunctionalism in the context of enlargement.

Intergovernmental insights would appear to be more in tune with the context of EU enlargement than neofunctionalism as its framework can provide a better analytical explanation for subsequent events. In fact, enlargements increase the diversity of national interests and ideological perspectives within the union, which thus complicate the agreements and negotiations, making it more difficult to achieve consensus. Moreover, while neofunctionalism fails to explain the economic impacts of enlargement, the accession of poor countries highlights the intergovernmental perspective as this brings economic disparities, which can impair the cohesion and effectiveness of current policies as well as the public attitudes towards European integration (Miles, 1995). Furthermore, the more diverse environment that is followed by a greater prioritising of national interests in order to compete for scarcer resources, then the more governments will act defensively to ensure that national interests remain intact (Miles, 1994). Lastly, Miles (1995: 29) also pointed out that enlargement encourages intergovernmental manifestations, such as ‘the pragmatic tendencies’, ‘the use of opt-outs’ and ‘the pursuit of political and economic expediency’.

In the context of EU enlargement, neofunctionalism is found wanting as it overlooks the continuing importance of national governments. That is, enlargement has resulted in critical decisions in the EU, such as accession negotiations, still being resolved in the national dimension rather than by supranational elites; one prominent example would be the French attitude towards British accession. Indeed, as the union has become larger, neofunctionalism seems not to provide a framework to understand the competing plurality of interests, in the way that intergovernmentalism does (Miles, 1995). Perhaps, the former was intentionally created for the purpose of explaining the development of a relatively firm and homogeneous
organization, such as that covering the original six founders of the EU. In sum, the evidence suggests that employing an intergovernmental perspective is likely to hold for understanding the future of bigger union than that of neofunctionalism (Miles, 1995).

To a certain extent, the regional integration process could be a democratisation process in itself, because it tends to increase cross-border interactions and transnational linkages, both among governments and people. Regarding which, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2010: 446-447) proposed that ‘the level of democracy in a country increases with the intensity of the transnational linkages that it entertains with democratic countries in its international environment’. Empirically, integration theories do not seem to be interested in whether or not participating members have to become democratically governed. What do matter are the consequences after democratisation or enlargement, in relation to whether these heighten the diversity or impair the homogeneous environment within the union. For instance, democratic peace theory suggests that democracy is a very important factor to ensure peace and stability among nations. Subsequently, once trust is established between member states, laws and institutional settings can be adopted across a region to secure mutual commitments. In this sense, democratisation would be considered as an important mechanism for founding a zone of peace and long-term cooperation in the region in question.

3.3.2 Identity

In recent decades, regional identity has increasingly gained attention from scholars and the public as a way to support European integration. This has been increasingly urgent since the EU has recently been experiencing significant internal problems and external challenges. The main belief among some is that the EU should offer some sort of values that link nations and their citizens together, thus providing them with a sense of identity and community. Surprisingly, a well-established study of regional identity that identifies its importance and impact has been rarely conducted. Regarding this, as loyalties are shifted from national to regional levels, this can raise a number of important issues, including: whether identity should also be constructed at regional levels, what consequences this would bring to the regional community and can regional and national identity persist dually.

In a broad sense, optimal distinctiveness theory has given an explanation of how identities are formulated in that ‘social identity is derived from the opposing forces of two universal human motives – the need for inclusion and assimilation, on the one hand, and the need for differentiation from others on the other’ (Brewer, 1999: 188). In the context of the EU, Brigevich (2011: 2-3) has pointed that regional identities work at two levels in support of these
motives. That is, national identity serves the individual’s need for differentiation, while that of inclusion is satisfied by European identity at the regional level. However, according to the list of theories in the previous section, constructivism seems to fit the research context more precisely than the others. That is, it contributes and directly relates to the issues of identity, by providing explanations and understandings in almost every dimension. In particular, it highlights the significance of internal socialization and the belief that regional community is created from common interests and understanding of the key issues along with the construction of identity (Zhang, 2007: 3).

In relation to identity, constructivism defines it as a creation of meaning and views the regional integration process as a socializing structure that shapes the actors’ identities and interests. According to Copeland (2000: 189), it ‘focuses largely on the intersubjective dimension of knowledge, because they [constructivists] wish to emphasize the social aspect of human existence - the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining and shaping behaviour’. Along the same lines, Wendt (1999: 231) stated that ‘interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is’. Regarding how actors gain their identities, constructivism argues that, in the context of regional integration, states can obtain meaning - ‘who they are, their goals, and the roles they believe they should play’ (Copeland, 2000: 190) - from both domestic and regional levels. However, before interacting at the regional level, states have already defined themselves through domestic social and cultural contexts, which thus inform them with whom to interact and with what intention, at least in part. Subsequently, the state’s behaviour will be constrained by regional norms and at the same time identities will be redefined through systemic interaction aimed at generating regional cooperation (Wendt, 1992: 392). That is, these norms are not only functioning to regulate a particular state’s behaviour, but are also redefining its interests as well as developing the construction of collective identities (Acharya, 2001: 4).

Moreover, identity and institutions are strongly correlated, which is because once states have constructed their identities, they create institutional structures to protect them at both the domestic and international levels (Chafetz, 1997: 665). Similarly, Jepperson et al. (1996: 62) stated that ‘states seek to enact their identities (potentially shifting or multiple ones) in interstate normative structures, including regimes and security communities’. However, during the institutionalization process at both the domestic and political levels, states are shaped by domestic and international environments too (Katzenstein, 1996: 22). On the whole, in explaining the regional integration process, constructivism provides another important piece of the jigsaw, as it commits itself to describing the issues relating to identity involved. That is,
under the constructivist lens, identities are a crucial element that plays a key role in providing meaning to state actions, to those individuals who act in the name of state, and the foundations of state interests.

A key contribution in this respect, with direct reference to ASEAN, is Jones’ (2011) analysis of the norm of non-intervention in ASEAN, which he clearly and directly links to the dynamics evolution of the institutions underpinning the region’s emergence. In his own words:

‘ASEAN’s sovereignty regime can only be properly understood in relation to the social conflicts underpinning ASEAN states, and the wider context of economic and geopolitical transformation in which they are embedded. The historical survey of ASEAN’s sovereignty regime since its inception to the present day falsified the notion of non-interference as a timeless, unchanging norm, showing that the principle is actually relatively dynamic, shifting in terms of its content and application as the nature of state power and the challenges faced by state managers have evolved.’ (Jones, 2011: 211)

Furthermore, he argues that ‘ASEAN should abandon the non-interference principle – would not necessarily lead to greater regional peace and cooperation’ (Jones, 2011: 226).

3.3.3 Institutions
It is logical to begin with the definition of institutions as the term has been widely defined with a variety of conflicting explanations, and also the reasons why they are created and continued. In a broader sense, institutions are simply rules and practices where all political behaviour is founded or so-called ‘the rules of the game’ are played out. Moreover, they provide space for members to exercise their power and influence. Indeed, they structure politics and are a prelude to social and political organization. In general, they are important as all modern governance nowadays occurs in and through institutions and as such they play a key role in shaping political perceptions and behaviour as well as powers of political actors.

To be more specific, (new) institutionalism provides the means to think theoretically about institutions and their influences on behaviour and outcomes. It was introduced as an alternative way of viewing institutions by focusing on their sociological aspects, in particular the way they affect society, the way they interact with other institutions and the way they shape the behaviour of their members through rules and norms. The three strands of new institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, although they share the notion that ‘institutions matter’, they offer different
definitions regarding their characteristics. Historical institutionalism highlights their historical determination, defining them as ‘the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938). Whilst rational choice institutionalism focuses on rational decisions, seeing institutions as sets of rules, which are agreed upon the actors, created for the purpose of facilitation (Thelen, 1999), whereas institutions are viewed more broadly by sociological institutionalists to include conventional practices and informal norms: ‘Institutions are conceived of as influencing and determining the norms of acceptable behaviour, providing scripts and determining the actor’s preferences and identity’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948).

Fundamentally, new institutionalism suggests that institutions can govern the behaviour of actors and organisations in one of two ways (March and Olsen, 1976, Schmidt, 2010). Firstly, as suggested by rational choice institutionalism, they can influence actors to act based on positive cost-and-benefit calculations, the so called ‘logic of consequence’. That is, subsequent decisions will be calculated and made on the basis of rational choice. Secondly, as contended under sociological institutionalism, institutions can cause actors to behave out of duty or to act according to what they are supposed to do, or the so called ‘logic of appropriateness’, as they feel the action is appropriate or perceive that there is some kind of moral obligation. This logic is ‘based on normative beliefs that make behaviours or actions appropriate under certain conditions and inappropriate under others’ (Nalbandov, 2009: 25). That is, actors possess their own social identities that shape their actions in the international arena and the logic of appropriateness ‘essentially leads us to derive actions from given identities’ (Goldmann, 2005: 44).

Another important point to be noted about institutions is that they are rigid and not changed easily. More specifically, according to Steinmo (2001), new institutionalists argue that once an institutional equilibrium sets in and an institution becomes stabilized, the rules will become difficult to change because of the uncertainty about any alternative. This is because institutions shape strategies, so changing the institutional rules would imply new strategies throughout the system. On the whole, institutions do matter because they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, facilitate greater efficiency and cooperation as well as ‘provide a system of incentives and punishments to encourage the desired behaviours’ (Williams, 2010: 2). Overall, the new institutionalist treatments confirm that EU politics have to be understood in the context of institutional competition (and cooperation), not in terms of intergovernmental competition (and cooperation) between the member states (Peterson and Shackleton, 2011).
How do the two integration theories depict institutions? In fact, both neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches view institutions as a central unit in the integration process. That is, they both accept that all political activities occur and are understood through rules, norms and procedures within an institutional context (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). Neofunctionalists see supranational institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, as playing a central role in the integration system. In line with intergovernmentalist accounts, member states established the union to serve their own purposes and in order to achieve collective goals, but the member states also felt that new institutions were required (Pierson, 1996). However, the neofunctionalist stance diverges from intergovernmentalism in that supranational institutions are considered by the former as new actors on the political scene, possessing their own interests, which may vary from those of their creators (Moe, 1990). Moreover, under neofunctionalism the EU is viewed as a complex political game with increasing numbers of players and interests and these political organs are clearly the tools of the member states (Moe, 1990, Pierson, 1996). Furthermore, Pierson (1996: 21) added that institutions exist due to ‘the need to create arrangements that would allow reasonably efficient decision-making and effective enforcement despite the involvement of a large number of governments with differing interests’.

Institutions are closely associated with the process of spillover of the neofunctionalist approach, which can be split into two elements: sectoral (functional) spillover, which involves the expansion of integration from one sector to another, and political spillover, which means politicization of sectoral activity (Moga, 2009). Neofunctionalists, for example Sweeney (1984) and Mutimer (1994), have recognised that the final product of the spillover process is very likely to be institutions at the supranational level, where the member states’ interests are pooled and balanced. These established agents will provide mandatory frameworks and procedures for reconciliation of disputes and will later become the centre of the union politically. Member states that are subject to the new supranational institutions are expected to change their behaviour and expectations as well as transferring some of their resources and policy functions to the supranational agents.

In intergovernmentalist accounts, institutions are viewed as efficient instruments that can facilitate the integration process. Moravcsik (1993: 507) argued that ‘modern regime theory views international institutions as deliberate instruments to improve the efficiency of bargaining between states’. Frequently, member states have always guarded their national interests and strictly limited the transfer of sovereignty to central institutions, such as the European Commission, that could weaken their independence and instead have preferred to
work through intergovernmental institutions, such as the Council of Ministers (Moravcsik, 1991). More importantly, there is uncertainty about the preferences, intentions, and reliability among member states, thus making agreements difficult to be completed and enforce. Institutions can assist in addressing this sort of problem by providing information reliably, monitoring compliance and linking across issues that give actors incentives to reach mutually beneficial agreements (Keohane, 2005, Pierson, 1996). They also can help in lowering bargaining costs and reduce uncertainty through the provision of ‘a forum and vocabulary for the signalling of preferences and intentions’ (Stone, 1994: 456). Briefly, in the view of intergovernmentalism, supranational institutions are only critical in the ways that they serve to provide the union with information, certainty, reduction of transaction costs and secured outcomes (Pollack, 2001).

Constructivism is another engaging approach focusing on the importance of institutions to state action in relation to norms, as they construct identities and interests. Under this lens, rules and institutions are seen as products made by human practices and states as well as institutions are viewed as cognitive and correlative entities. Moreover, the outcomes are shaped by the current institutions and also by actors’ learning through the previous ones. More importantly, according to Narine (1998), almost all international relationships that shape states’ identities and interests are developed within an institutional context and institutions themselves act as representatives of the rules and norms of these international interactions. Furthermore, institutions, in the constructivist’s view, are not rigid as argued by new institutionalist scholars. Accordingly, they, including interests and identities, can be altered by the integration process at the systematic level through various kinds of interactions (Wendt, 1992, Wendt, 1995).

With this in mind, constructivism brings to the fore that surrounding environments, external constraints and international contexts are crucial for understanding institutions in regional settings. The EU provides an international context by creating the platform for an interacting process in which its norms are used as a supporting resource for the interaction. That is, EU institutions are viewed as ‘arenas for communication, deliberation, argumentation, persuasion and socialization’ (Cini, 2007: 131). Along with their norms, they play an important role in constructing regional identities and socializing the member states. All in all, although constructivism is not considered as a theory of integration, its nature and positions provide important insights into the ways in which regional substance, such as norms, ideas and discourses are established and played out through EU institutions as well as penetrating into the various domestic polities that make up the EU (Borzel, 2002, Cini, 2007).
3.3.4 Leadership

The issues of leadership in international cooperation are complex and relatively poorly defined. This is not helped by the fact that integration theories do not clearly specify what the substantial matters of leadership in regional integration process are. This is because, according to them participating countries are expected to delegate functions of their agenda management to the supranational or intergovernmental institutional bodies and, undoubtedly, they have no desire to be subject to the influences of any other countries, expecting to be treated equally as individual sovereign states. Therefore, in this respect, leadership does not seem to give much of an impression of being an essential element or a critical factor steering the dynamics, or determining the success of regional integration. Consequently, most formal communicative discourses regarding leadership within the community tend to make reference to the formal sense of leadership, which is the presidency, or the chairmanship, of the union or regional institution that is held on a rotating basis by the various member states. As explained by Tallberg (2006: 13), ‘through the rotating Presidency, governments take turns in providing the efficiency-enhancing functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation, leaving limited demand for supranational entrepreneurship’.

In the European Union, the structures of power are relatively horizontal, whereby power is shared among the member states and the various supranational institutions. Significant decisions are made by agreements and coalitions among national governments and institutions. That is, they are interdependent and rely on each other, so no single administrative body is able to dictate to the rest of the organisation. The European Commission, the European Council and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have augmented powers from the member states and have thus established themselves as powerful agents. They are encouragingly supposed to play a leading role in the union, but so far they have not met this expectation. This is not helped by the fact that unlike other international organisations, such as the UN, they have no clearly defined leader promoting their respective policies. However, the European Union is clearly different from such organizations as it is much more complex, so managing it is a very challenging task. Moreover, although it is widely accepting across the EU that there should be the conventional ability to influence decision making, the rotating presidency is still chosen by members and hence, this would appear to be the leadership arrangement most trusted for handling the EU so far. That is, it seems that member countries prefer the diffuse benefits arising from taking turns in exploiting the privileges of the presidency, rather than relying on supranational institutions or a longer term elected chairman (Tallberg, 2006: 219).
According to Tallberg (2006: 17), formal leadership in the EU concurs with rational choice institutionalist approach which integrates core elements of rationalist bargaining theory. That is, fundamentally, this views political leadership as ‘a series of contracting dilemmas that may prevent or inhibit mutually advantageous exchange’ (Tallberg, 2006: 17) and this leads to hypotheses about the delegation of powers to the chairmanship, as well as about the influence of the chairmen of negotiations on political outcomes. This author’s central assumption is that ‘the chairmanship as an institution in political decision-making should be understood as a functional response to collective-action problems in decentralized bargaining. When designing international negotiation bodies, states create the office of the chairmanship and delegate powers of process control to this office, in the expectation that it will mitigate problems of agenda failure, negotiation failure, and representation failure’ (Tallberg, 2006: 20). However, in the sense of informal leadership, for example, the influence of the Franco-German axis in the EU, new institutionalist approaches cannot say anything more than ‘it all depends on the institutional configuration’ (Webber, 1999: 7)

As mentioned above, in case of the EU, leadership does not imply only the highest formal administrative status of the union, for it also includes the superpowers or the most influential countries within the group who possess the ability to persuade others to accept the need for change. For instance, if the keyword ‘leadership in the European Union’ is entered into any online search engine, most articles that will appear relate to the roles of France or Germany in Europe, or Franco-German relations. Recently, according to a broad literature survey, there has been a substantial number of articles calling for leadership in Europe, particularly when facing a crisis, such as the ongoing debt crisis in the Eurozone, which is shaking up the union and creating confusion and distrust amongst its citizens. These demands for leadership have increased as the EU has been seen to be more and more ineffective at dealing with these crises, which has been attributed to the lack of an identifiable leadership (Paterson, 2008). Thus, what is important to the EU now is the need for someone, who has credibility and capability, to steer the union and to increase the probability of success. Indeed, it is leadership in the symbolic and informal senses and not the rotating presidency that is being called for.

Notably, Young (1991) wrote about the nature of institutional bargaining and the differentiation of various forms of leadership that usually come into play when establishing international institutions. According to Young, leadership
“refers to the actions of individuals who endeavour to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991: 285).

Furthermore, he argued that leadership can be divided into three different modes: structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual leadership (Young, 1991: 287). In his words:

“The structural leader is an individual who acts in the name of a party (ordinarily a state) engaged in institutional bargaining and who leads by devising effective ways to bring that party’s structural power (that is, power based on the possession of material resources) to bear in the form of bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific interactions. The entrepreneurial leader, by contrast, is an individual who may or may not act in the name of a major stakeholder in institutional bargaining but who leads by making use of negotiating skill to influence the manner in which issues are presented in the context of institutional bargaining and to fashion mutually acceptable deals bringing willing parties together on the terms of constitutional contracts yielding benefits for all. And the intellectual leader, or sometime called ideational leader, is an individual who may or may not be affiliated with a recognized actor in international politics but who relies on the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in institutional bargaining understand the issues at stake and to orient their thinking about options available to come to terms with these issues.” (Young, 1991: 287-288)

Leadership in the process of European integration would fit the role of Young’s structural leader, which is based on the possession of material resources. Clearly, France and Germany, as the two largest economies whose power comes from their wealth and the abundance of material resources, have continued to be the essential engine to the progress of the EU, i.e. they have been the principals in the EU negotiation process. As for possessing great structural power, Young (1991: 288, 290) argued that ‘it is natural for such leaders to espouse institutional arrangements that seem well suited to the interests of the states they represent’ and ‘they need only lay out the provisions of proposed constitutional contracts that others are in no position to oppose’. This is why it has been seen frequently that many crucial policy decisions in the EU were made by Franco-German agreements. According to Endow (2003: 203), regarding every aspect of political and economic development, the EU ‘is directly affected by intergovernmentalist sensitivities of the member states, revolving around the Franco-German core’. However, the Franco-German axis as an engine although being essential,
has not always been sufficient for addressing the problems faced by the EU, particularly most recently. In relation to Young’s concepts, if leadership indeed does raise the probability of success, but a structural leader does not seem to work well in the EU, then one of the other two leadership concepts might be an option.

In connection with this, the notion of ‘Soft power’ pioneered by Joseph Nye perhaps can provide additional insight regarding the provision of leadership. As Nye (2008: 29) proposed in his book, soft power is ‘getting the outcomes one wants by attracting others rather than manipulating their material incentives. It co-opts people rather than coerces them’. In relation to Young’s three modes of leadership, this is probably most equivalent to a combination of entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership. Nye (2004: 5) further supported his position by pointing out that ‘a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it’. Moreover, he illustrated that a source of soft power can be associated with intangible assets, such as ‘an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority’ (Nye, 2004: 6). The idea of soft power is popular in international politics today as a substitute for structural power; it can take the form of a non-coercive means of peace and trust building in constructing cross border communities.

In relation to integration theories, neofunctionalism suggests that, based on economic and political spillover processes, ‘the development of increasingly legitimate and powerful supranational organs and a waning of the influence of national governments’ are expected (Webber, 1999: 5). Although neofunctionalism allows for an open-ended product and does not specify the length of time for completion of the process, the regional integration community is viewed as involving political systems similar to the federal states, such as the US, in which supranational organs take control of functions and power. In addition, the most important assumption here is the notion that control and power have ‘slipped away’ from national governments to supranational institutions (Marks et al., 1996: 342). Interestingly, although neofunctionalism emphasizes the roles of supranational bodies in the integration process, it also implies that those of interest groups are actually key actors who provide a driving force for the integrating region. Nevertheless, regarding the issues of leadership in regional organizations, the assumption, that national governments experience a significant loss of control, renders the theory irrelevant and misplaced in this context.
Perhaps, intergovernmentalist frameworks are more preoccupied, or at least provide better insights and more space for discussion of leadership in the EU in this respect, rather than neofunctionalism which emphasizes the pivotal roles of the supranational authorities and non-state actors as well as seeing regional integration as an incremental process. Smith (2004: 102) argued that in an intergovernmental setting, where states reject the delegation of their powers to supranational organizations, the most powerful countries often have the most influence. In this context, power is normally defined in material terms and, in the case of the EU, France, Germany and the UK are considered to have exerted the most influence over collective outcomes. For example, Moravcsik (1991) argued that the Single European Act was achieved only due to the determination of France, Germany and the UK as they had convergent national interests. Furthermore, neofunctionalists claim that the ability of national governments, individually and collectively, to control policy-making outcomes at the EU level is likely to decline as the supranational authority increases (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). On the other hand, intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes resources and economic power, allows actors to exercise and carry out their power and resources independently. For instance, according to Hoffman (1966), the European Union could be a site for exercising the classical concerns of international politics in Europe, including issues of sovereignty, coalition formation and state interests.

In sum, as stated in Moravcsik (1993), integration is a result of rational self-interested states bargaining with one another and those states who possess more ‘power’ are likely to have more of their interests fulfilled. In the case of the EU, as expected, many of the agreements have been in line with the preferences of France and Germany, the so-called ‘Franco-German core’. Moreover, a number of intergovernmental studies have pointed out that national leaders who are involved in major integrative decisions are driven by the desire to strengthen the power of their nations, rather than the will to unite Europe (Castaldi, 2010). However, intergovernmentalists have rarely stressed the importance of leadership or nature of its role in the integration process. Instead, they have chosen to view its function in regional cooperation as a common phenomenon that has emerged from the difference in the possession of power and resources among the rational actors in the multilateral bargaining system. That is, although they do stress the predominance of the governments of the most influential states in the decision-making process, they do not offer a solution to the question of who should lead the EU or about other matters of leadership. Indeed, faith in the prospects for leadership in the EU, both as having a presidential and hegemonic status, would seem to be misplaced (Moravcsik, 1998).
On the whole, the theoretical literatures on the regional integration process have provided limited insights into the issues of political leadership as well as the relative power and roles of member states. In the context of regional dynamics, leadership is a necessary factor in the process of integration, because it helps in overcoming some impediments, such as difficulties in finding mutually acceptable outcomes in multi-party negotiations and other coordination problems. In the wider global community, regional leaders are largely expected to champion and represent the interests of the regional community (Park, 2012: 295). Consequently, testing the role of leadership on other regional projects is required. In sum, whether it is in the formal or informal sense, the answer to the question of ‘who’ will speak on behalf of the regions is complicated and hence still subject to ongoing debate.
4 DEMOCRATISATION IN ASEAN

4.1 Introduction
Democratic regimes have significantly multiplied and spread across the world since the third wave of democratization beginning in the middle of the 1970s and Southeast Asia was one of major regions affected by this development. However, although some new democracies have been witnessed in the region, authoritarianism and a general reluctance to embrace democratisation is still the case in most of its countries. Owing to the fact that democracy has increasingly become an important international norm for good governance\textsuperscript{5}, failing to assert democratic values and respect political and civil rights can result in deterioration of international reputation and credibility as well as loss of economic opportunities. ASEAN is an example of organization that has been struggling to promote democratic values due to its vast political diversity and some remaining constraints. Moreover, commitment to democracy among ASEAN leaders has often been lacking, with the spreading of the belief by some that Asian culture is significantly different from that of the West and hence, the latter’s liberal democracy is unlikely to fit in the context of the former. This raises the matter of how important is democracy in ASEAN’s regional integration process and whether its promotion is the best way forward for greater collaboration between its members.

In relation to integration theory, there seems to be no correlation between the political ideologies of member states and the progress of integration. In fact, under the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, the only thing that matters is the consequences of democratisation, in terms of whether these increase the diversity and/or impair the homogeneous environment within the association. According to Kant and Doyle’s works discussed in Chapter 3, there are some strong ties between democracy and regional integration as they tend to reinforce each other. In more detail, democracy can enhance a regional integration process by fostering the creation of a zone of peace and cooperation, particularly when democracies encounter like-minded states. Furthermore, it is also argued that the progress of regional integration can be eased if all participating states share same kinds of political ideologies and values. In Chapter 4 it emerged that democracy is a fundamental norm of the EU, whereby member states have chosen to embrace it as a common value of the union. Moreover, the democratic characters of member states as well as active participatory citizens help to keep the EU functioning smoothly. However, in relation EU

\textsuperscript{5} See McFaul (2004) and Panebianco and Rossi (2004)
democratisation the levels vary significantly across the community. That is, some of its members’ decisions to join the EU have based on a cost-benefit calculation, which has resulted in democracy being imported rather than generated from within.

However, the case of ASEAN appears to have taken a different course, for the data presented in this chapter show that intrusively promoting democracy across the region could potentially trigger tensions between member states and undermine the unity of the association. Nevertheless, there are a number of signs showing that democracy is crucial for the development of ASEAN integration, especially when considering international reputation and credibility and the way towards becoming a more participatory community. This chapter starts with the European perspectives on democratisation and then continues to provide an overview that aids understanding of the political conditions in ASEAN member states and the development path of the grouping in promoting democracy. The following section presents an evaluation of ASEAN’s role in democratising its member states, through consideration of the factors that have been hindering this process. The final section provides further discussion, a summary of the important findings and suggestions for addressing the problem issues.

4.2 European perspectives

Democratisation is an important element of the EU that highlights the uniqueness of European integration. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the issues of democracy have not been directly addressed as part of the mainstream debates in regional integration studies. Rather, the focus has been on the community as a political system that lays emphasis on equality and freedom of citizens as well as setting international norms for good governance, peace and prosperity. However, the European Union has become one of the most remarkable international organizations that regards democracy as a fundamental norm of the group, most prominently through the framework of an enlargement policy, whereby all member states must agree to embrace democracy as a common value of the union. In fact, when considering the EU as a promoter of democracy in Europe, it emerges that the way in which it has developed the strategies to this end has been unique and far more successful than any other previous approach. As Jora (2006: 18) argued in his work, when compared to other democratising actors, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO, the ‘European Union has proved to be the most persistent, articulated and influential’.

Regarding this, for example, as stated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union formally proclaimed in December 2000, ‘Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality...
and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law’. Moreover, the Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 stipulated that ‘the union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be... to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’. In addition, in article 130u (2) of the Treaty of Rome, it clearly states that ‘Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’.

In relation to democracy promotion, Morlino (1998: 1-8) wrote about the main internal factors that have taken the EU down this particular path. The first is through this strategy it has been able to increase substantially its capacity and resources, which consequently has improved its position on the international stage. Second, the weakness in its military capacity has led to the transformation of the EU into a civil organization that seeks to promote stability in the region through economic cooperation, democracy and the rule of law. Third, even though the union emphasized economic cooperation at the beginning of its life, it has emerged to become what has been called ‘a community of values’ or ‘a constitutional order’. From a different perspective, Morlino also identified some external factors influencing the EU’s democratisation strategies. Firstly, during the 1970s and 1980s, the EU needed to deal with the attempts to consolidate democracy in the Southern European countries by making it a crucial conditionality of accession into the union. Next, the fall of the Soviet Union and the decision to take on ten new Eastern member states, put immense pressure on the EU to develop and strengthen its strategies and instruments in the area of democratisation, thus leading to the most extensive democratisation policies ever undertaken. Moreover, the EU has been strongly linked to democratisation activity since 1960s due to the colonial history of many of its key member states, such as France, the UK, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands. Finally, Morlino (ibid) also indicated that the EU sees democracy as a crucial element of peace and material development as well as the way to maintain security in the region.

As was elicited in the previous chapter, democratising through enlargement has been one of the most successful and effective EU policies. That is, strict political conditionality as found in the EU accession policy has helped the union to build up relations with candidate countries. The pre-accession process, together with opinions, accession partnerships, national programmes for the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria and regular reports are embedded around the progressive meeting of the Copenhagen criteria (Baracani, 2004: 43). Moreover,
the EU has assisted potential candidates by providing assistance programmes in democracy promotion with a long-term perspective so as to ensure that they stay on track (Grossmann, 2006: 5). On the other hand, prospective countries are highly attracted by the EU membership, not only because it symbolizes security and economic prosperity, but also due to the fact that new members are eligible for massive financial inflows in the form of structural funds and subsidies (Grossmann, 2006: 1). Moreover, EU membership offers them an opportunity to influence the decisions of their powerful western member states and at the same time increases their bargaining power when negotiating with external international actors.

The core of EU membership-related democratisation policy is laid out in the Copenhagen Criteria and the Acquis Communautaire of the union. Before joining the EU, candidate countries need to meet the conditions for membership as stated in the former, which requires ‘the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ (European Commission, 2012). At the same time, the Acquis Communautaire is simply the accumulated pieces of legislation of the union, which candidate countries have to accept and implement in order to become an EU member. It is divided into a variety of chapters, with each relating to a specific policy area. In order to implement these rules effectively in good time before accession, candidate countries have to meet EU standards of institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial systems at both the national and regional levels (European Commission, 2012). In general, to become a member and receive rewards, such as financial and economic assistance, the EU requires potential candidates to adopt a set of democratic rules and practices, mainly those associated with liberal political norms (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 191). However, although only few of these conditions that the EU requires candidate countries to meet are directly related to democracy, almost all of them, for example the rule of law, freedom of speech and human rights, are positive values for ensuring democratisation (Grossmann, 2006: 5-6). To summarize, the key mechanism of EU democratisation is to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and the adoption of EU legal templates in national legislation.

However, although EU political conditionality is considerably successful in democratising neighbouring countries, there have been some arguments about its limitations. For instance, Ivanov (2004: 6), who investigated EU enlargement in the Central and Eastern European countries, argued that the establishment of solid legal frameworks and institutions is necessary but not sufficient, which suggests the EU focuses too much on formal institutional and legislative reforms in potential candidate countries. As a result, some issues which involve changes in human behaviour, such as corruption and minority protection in these countries,
have not been tackled properly (Pridham, 2002: 960). Another criticism is in relation to the EU’s democratic deficit, which pertains to ‘pointing to the modest authority of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the secretive Council and the unelected Commission’ (Ivanov, 2004: 6). That is, these technocratic bodies have been accused of ‘drafting policy in an arcane jargon, secluded from public scrutiny’ that increasingly confines democratically elected national parliaments and hence, restricts their ability to act in their electorates’ interests (ibid).

To validate the claim that EU democratisation strategies have been far more successful than any other approach, one important question that needs addressing is: how effective is EU democratisation? And if it has been, what conditions determined this? In this regard, the literature suggests that EU accession conditionality has been a crucial factor for democratisation of the European neighbourhood and in fact, the effectiveness of EU political conditionality is thought to be a consequence of a credible and attractive membership perspective (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 189, 207). However, the effects of EU democratisation strategies vary in relation to the stage of democracy that a candidate country has achieved so far, in that they are lowest in autocratic countries and those that have already reached a high level of democratisation and highest in those that are in a transition period or embarking upon one (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 207-211). Similarly, Grossman (2006: 7-8) opined that EU democratisation works slower in those countries with less democratic ambition and historically close relations with Russia as they lack sufficient democratic reforms, being thus unable to understand the EU accession process. He concluded that the process of EU democratisation ‘only works if countries believe that one day they will be able to join the EU. EU approaches are significantly less effective where membership is not possible or not realistic’. In line with this, Jora (2006: 17), when investigating the EU accession of Romania, concluded that the ‘EU obtained maximum leverage power after the accession date has been within a reachable horizon’.

From the other direction, the next question is in relation to how democracy benefits EU governance or what has the EU gained from the democratic character of its members. In this regard, it is essential to understand that the original design of the EU’s political structures and decision-making mechanisms were based on a technocratic and functionalist approach (Micossi, 2008: 8), established in the context of Western democracy. Therefore, the democratic character of founding member states as well as there being active participatory citizens, have, on the whole, kept the EU functioning smoothly. Secondly, according to Lord & Magnette (2004) and Micossi (2008), the EU is a distinctive polity with its powers diffused into institutional bodies, each of which has its own legitimacy that has recently spread out to cover
many aspects of the common union’s policies. This highlights the significance of democracy and affirms that there has been growing demand for it at the regional level.

In addition, Majone (1998: 12) argued that the 1992 Maastricht Treaty clearly identifies the significance of the democratic characters of the member states to the legitimacy of the EU by stating that ‘the integration process derives its legitimation from the democratic character of the member states... Thus, the entire process is guided and controlled by sovereign democratic states’. In other words, the democratic characters of EU member states would help to improve the democratic character of the union as a whole. Moreover, according to Van Deth (2008: 242-243), ‘bodies engaged in the promotion of active and participatory citizenship’ and ‘civic participation’ as well as other collective actors from various levels are involved in making EU decision making ‘more open, transparent and participatory’.

Under analysis, it is apparent that the democratisation strategies of the EU are distinctive and, as mentioned by a number of scholars, have been outstandingly more effective than the methods of any other international actors. Regarding this, all means, activities and objectives of the EU’s democratisation policy are clearly stated in the Treaties and Charters, which gives the union legitimacy and a solid judicial support for encountering difficulties when implementing its strategies. It is also clear that, from historical evidence, democracy is respected not only within the EU’s borders, but also extends to the context of external relations, in particular in relation to the common foreign and security policy as well as in the development and cooperation with third countries (Baracani, 2004: 8). Further, the EU recognizes democracy as a fundamental and common principle to be acknowledged and respected by the member states, but also embedded in the EU as a whole, thereby becoming a key fundamental ingredient for mobilising the community.

Drawing on the classic democratic peace theory covered in the previous chapter, Europe is in need of democracy promotion because this seems to be the most realistic and sustainable way of reducing the likelihood of inter-state conflict and thus providing regional stability. That is, democratic mechanisms, such as elections, individual freedoms and public opinion as well as a peaceful reconciliation process underpin the EU’s rule-based polity, thus promoting collaboration regarding its respective institutions and preventing its members from aggressively confronting each other. As a consequence of its attempts to establish democracy, as the core principle of the union, it has made great strides towards achieving the political goal of building a peaceful community, having now enjoyed several decades of peace. Another matter of relevance to this democratizing project is in relation to the historical context of the
EU. Unlike other integrating regions, it emerged as a consequence of the Second World War and the subsequently divisions of East and West during the Cold War (Gowland et al., 2006: 26). As Morlino has argued, more recent factors, such as the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the enlargement involving Eastern member states in 2004, which have poor democratic histories, are key reasons for explaining why the EU is very keen on democratisation. Moreover, the colonial history of many of the key member states and subsequent independence struggles firmly put the issue of democracy on the map. In sum, these events have led to the notion that it is somehow impossible to think of the EU without democracy.

What is more, from the author’s point of view, democratisation as a part of political conditionality for EU accession could be construed as being somewhat ambiguous. This is because of the credibility and attractiveness of EU membership, particularly its massive financial assistance, has become a cost-benefit calculation, with countries having to weigh up their willingness to make adjustments as required by the EU, which involves sacrificing some degree of their sovereignty, if they are to reap the benefits. This entails advocating democratic reform and the adoption of EU legal templates into the national legislation. Hence, this kind of political transition is clearly different from a bottom-up democratic reform or other traditional means of democratisation which are, for example, largely influenced by economic development and civil powers. In this vein, US democratisation has emphasised the non-state components, such as civil society and party building, rather than government-to-government and legislation assistance, as it is ‘highly effective in working on bottom-up reform, capacity-building, and supporting public demands for change’ (Grossmann, 2006: 6). This is clearly different from the EU approach for the union has introduced sets of rules and demands, which members or prospective members have to adopt. ‘As a result, reforming countries can partake in the whole experience of democratic countries and be “plugged in” to the ongoing European democratic political process’ (Grossmann, 2006: 8). Thus, regarding implementation, it is vital for the EU to ensure the willingness of all the involved domestic stakeholders, such as political parties, businesses, NGOs and the media, to accept what they can gain from adhering to the rules.

Provocatively, Moravcsik (2006) provided a contrasting perspective in relation to the need for democratic legitimisation in the EU. In the main, he argued that the EU is a product of intergovernmental bargains with a satisfactory equilibrium, which is ‘pragmatically effective, normatively attractive and politically stable’ (Moravcsik, 2006: 221). However, he continued by stating that it does not need further democratic legitimisation because increasing participatory
opportunities in the union do not ‘generate a more desirable outcome in any respect, whether that be more representative, more popular, more accountable, or more effective policy’ (Moravcsik, 2006: 238-239). In the meantime, issues of democracy promotion in the EU have also been linked to collective identity by some scholars, such as Schmitter (2000), arguing that because the community has not been able to establish a common identity or sufficient shared values, democratic legitimacy is unforeseeable as these circumstances make it difficult to refer back to the EU’s legitimate authority.

In the European case, then, while democratisation is often seen as having been straightforwardly key to the integration process, recent scholarship has emphasized the extent to which this may be less clear cut and more contingent upon other dynamics, whether in terms of elite settlement and leadership or in terms of regional identity. In ASEAN, where the democratic record is less good and variations in the extent of democratisation among member states much higher, there is clear reason to question the centrality of democratisation to the integration process. These recent critical contributions to the European experience, however, give us a useful starting point by drawing attention to the conceptual relationship between democracy and other key factors. As we shall see, democracy does play an important role in ASEAN, but in a very different relationship to other key factors.

4.3 Background of democratisation in ASEAN

In the history of ASEAN, the issue of democracy is something that has never come onto the agenda. The association’s decision to accept the accession of the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) into the group reflects that the development gap, not only in economic and social terms, but also political, within the association has become wider and this could significantly affect the progress of regional integration. Moreover, ASEAN considers friendships among its members and a collaborative environment as being more important than consolidating democracy as a means to ensure peace and security in the region. However, it is important to note that, after the retreat of the colonial powers from the region, democracy was initially a driving factor for the formation and consolidation of ASEAN, as the five founding states declared themselves as anti-communists. Regarding this, Acharya (2003: 379) wrote that ‘while the outward objective of ASEAN was to promote socio-economic development of its members, its core basis was the member’s common concern with regime survival in the face of domestic and external threats, especially communist subversion.’ In the past, there were several attempts to assert or promote democratic values over the association, but since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has not laid down any plan to insert democratic values into its remit. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 has only a short statement indicating that ASEAN shall
‘promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law’, while the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation only focuses on enhancing cooperation among members. The ASEAN Concord I signed in 1976 only superficially adds in the aspects of civil participation in the field of social development.

Subsequently, the ASEAN Concord II in 2003 established the three-pillar structure, whereby some key political developments were introduced into the organisation. Moreover, this was considered to be the first time that ASEAN leaders made a commitment to democratisation in Southeast Asia. According to the proposal, it is understood that Indonesia officially proposed the democratic agenda at the ASEAN Senior Official Meeting, organized four months before the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, listing political development among the other four ASEAN Security Community’s (ASC) duties. The other four elements were ‘norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building’ (Sukma, 2009: 137). Understandably, this political initiative was strongly pushed forward by Indonesia, which viewed democracy as a new complex challenge of ASEAN in the 21st century and argued that ‘security in the region could not be attained and guaranteed unless member states paid attention not only to security in a narrow sense but also to the imperative of political development.’ (ibid) Although not declaring it openly, Indonesia realized that antagonisms and mistrust still remained among ASEAN partners. Instead, it preferred to express its views on this sensitive issue to other ASEAN members in an indirect and less controversial form. In this regard, democratisation is not a very recent development in Indonesia, for after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, it undertook this path and to some degree achieved its transition to democracy. As expected, other member states were sceptical about Indonesia’s agenda, seeing it as something that could be potentially harmful to the association’s golden principles of non-interference, respect for national sovereignty and consensus-based decision making. In the end, the reference to political development proposed by Indonesia was removed before the formal approval of ASEAN Concord II, leaving only four elements to be listed as modalities for the ASC.

However, this unsuccessful first attempt to introduce a democratic agenda did not stop Indonesia from pursuing this policy and subsequently it was successful in persuading other member states to reinsert its idea of political development. This is because the aforementioned four elements in the ASEAN Concord II did not clearly identify the concrete actions that would need to be taken to achieve the desired goals. In the meantime, Indonesia took the view that the four elements stated in the ASEAN Concord II were compatible with democracy, being also ways to establish long-term peace and avoid conflicts, and managed to
persuade other member states to reinsert the notion of political development in the proposals put forward by the ASC in the 2004 Vientiane Action Plan (Sukma, 2009: 139). This was done by using careful understatement and hence was less controversial than expected. For instance, the document did not mention that any key ingredient of democracy, such as holding a general election, freedom of expression or the political participation of citizens, should be adopted by member countries. According to the document, the ASC opined that democracy was one of the goals of the ASEAN Community in the following way:

“The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) embodies ASEAN’s aspirations to achieve peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region where ASEAN Member Countries live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment.”

From the statement it can be seen that although democracy is listed broadly as one of the goals to achieve, it does seem to imply that ASEAN does not care about domestic political conditions or that national sovereignty will be disregarded. That is, democracy is considered as an international environment or sphere that can help reinforce the other norms of association. Furthermore, it includes the promotion of human rights, the participation of NGOs and combating corruption among the list of strategies for political development. On the whole, although the statements in the VAP are still relatively ambiguous, it is a critical point for democratisation in ASEAN as it provides an initial legal framework for the organisation to drive forward.

The future of democratisation in ASEAN seems to be even brighter in the Charter era, which began with the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur held in 2005, where the leaders agreed to draft an ASEAN Charter as a legal framework for the association. It was subsequently signed and adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. Here, according to the official Charter, the democratisation effort in ASEAN was stepped up by mandating democracy and human rights as one of the main purposes of the political development of the organisation (Article 1 No.7):

“To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN.”

Nevertheless, although democracy and human rights have become a regional aspiration, the revealed Charter is not genuinely a substantive mechanism in the quest for democracy within ASEAN. Regarding this, Sukma (2009: 141) argued that ‘the Charter does not explain how these goals might be pursued, or what, if anything, will happen to members that do not pursue them.’ In other words, this highlights one of the most commonly expressed criticisms of ASEAN that it is “a talk shop”. That is, many see the association as only about paperwork and rhetorical commitments, with there being no genuine motivation among the leaders to bring these statements into effective implementation. As can be seen in Article 20 relating to the case of a serious breach or non-compliance, this has been left open-ended, for it states that ‘the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision.’ In sum, practical commitment to democracy across the region is only paid lip service by most of its members.

4.4 Different shades of democracy and enduring authoritarianism in Southeast Asia

Discussion about democratisation in ASEAN may have to take the dynamics between domestic and regional features seriously into consideration. Arguably, political diversity within Southeast Asia is one of the most vibrant issues of debate and also it is regarded as being among the most obvious obstacles to the development of ASEAN. As asserted by Mauzy (1997: 210), the concept of democracy is always controversial because it relates to the idea of how power is distributed as well as the limits of political authority. This is particularly the case in contexts where the ideas of Western democracy are not universally accepted, such as in ASEAN. In general, liberal democracy, including its ingredients, such as human rights, freedom of the press and political pluralism, are not indigenous to Southeast Asia, for they not seem to correspond with its historical context. That is, the Southeast Asia today has been profoundly affected by its historical and cultural legacies, particularly from the colonial period. Mauzy (ibid) contends that the democratic and human rights stance from the West has deeply revived bitterness about colonization and past conflicts in Southeast Asia. Consequently, due to the historical legacies of colonial rule, democracy is widely accepted only at the superficial level and most political leaders in Southeast Asia hold authoritarianism as a core value, believing that it is as an appropriate and applicable form of governance. One scholar has claimed that governments tend to authenticate their legitimacy and democratic credentials only by ensuring that elections are held on a regular basis (Rahim, 2000: 30). In sum, it is convinced

\(^7\) See the ASEAN Charter, Article 20 (4)
that democracy in South East Asia has not been genuinely adopted and in essence is defined differently from the way it is in the West.

In general, according to Carlson and Turner (2009: 377), the political regimes in Southeast Asia cover a wide spectrum ranging from electoral democracy through to various hybrid democratic-authoritarian systems and on to full-scale authoritarianism. On the one hand, the socialist countries have been facing difficulties about how to maintain their authoritarian rule when confronted with the pressure of the global trend towards democracy. On the other hand, the democratic countries have been experiencing internal difficulties, such as corruption, transparency, political patronage, instability and bad governance that have considerably weakened their regimes. Moreover, in relation to the historical context, Mauzy (1997: 210) argued that there is still suspicion among Southeast Asian countries towards Western nations, with their believing that the latter have a hidden agenda of attempting to maintain hegemony and hence, slow down Asian prosperity and competitiveness. This has led me to the conclusion that most Southeast Asian countries reject Western-style liberal democracy, with their leaders strongly believing in the virtue of their own ideology, ability and cultural values. As a consequence, a form of developmental regime driven by capitalism and authoritarianism, so-called ‘Asian values’, was established aiming to replace those weak new democracies and economically lagging authoritarian regimes. (Thompson, 2004: 1084) This is widely considered to be one of the most recognized claims made among ASEAN leaders, which deviates the meaning of democracy in Western discourses by contending that governments should be based on their own cultural particularity. As a result, it has become increasingly popular to resist Western liberal democracy, Indonesia’s Suharto, Malaysia’s Mahathir and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew being regarded among the leading advocates of this form of regime.
Table 4.1: Classification of political regimes in Southeast Asia, 2001, 2006 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberal democracy</th>
<th>Electoral democracy</th>
<th>Ambiguous</th>
<th>Competitive authoritarian</th>
<th>Hegemonic electoral authoritarian</th>
<th>Politically-closed authoritarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Philippines (2.5)</td>
<td>Indonesia (3.5)</td>
<td>Malaysia (5)</td>
<td>Singapore (5)</td>
<td>Vietnam (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand (2.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia (5.5)</td>
<td>Laos (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Indonesia (2.5)</td>
<td>Malaysia (4)</td>
<td>Singapore (4.5)</td>
<td>Thailand (5.5)</td>
<td>Vietnam (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia (5.5)</td>
<td>Laos (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Indonesia (2.5)</td>
<td>Malaysia (4)</td>
<td>Singapore (4.0)</td>
<td>Vietnam (6)</td>
<td>Laos (6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines (3)</td>
<td>Thailand (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia (5.5)</td>
<td>Myanmar (6.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The number represents the Freedom House freedom rating for civil liberty and political rights, which ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most free and 7 is the least.

Source: Carlson and Turner (2009: 381) and Diamond (2002: 26)

In essence, economic development was prioritised and instrumentalised as a path towards prosperity as well as political and social stability in Southeast Asia. In other words, there is a widely held view that democracy should be considered an unaffordable luxury and that substantial economic development has to be the main priority. (Thompson, 2004: 1083) The impressive economic performance during the 1980s and early 1990s appears to support this view in that it occurred in most cases without democratic progress and this was seen as justification for the approach by the leaders. Moreover, even though the 1997 severe financial crisis wiped out Suharto’s regime in Indonesia, it had little impact on Malaysia and Singapore, as their regimes were able survive the crisis and continued to exist. Regarding this, Thompson (2004: 1085) has provided an important explanation, whereby, particularly in Malaysia and Singapore, the co-existence of high living standards and illiberal politics have proved exceptions to ‘the rule that democracy follows economic ripeness’, for their high-income levels and the large middle classes have not led to this outcome. Or in this researcher’s words, in these countries at this time economic prosperity and capitalist development seem to be the main parameters that the middle classes use to judge the regimes, which is consistent with the observed realization by leaders that if people’s stomachs are filled, their mouths will shut.

However, according to Table 4.1, the situation has changed during the last two decades as there has been an improvement in Malaysia, and more impressively in Indonesia. Regarding these developments, Thompson (2001: 161) pointed out that nowadays the Malay middle
classes have been politicized and the political agenda has transformed as Western democracy has become an important issue in Malaysian politics. Although authoritarianism has remained and there has not been significant constitutional reform, the political system has increasingly become more competitive and participatory in recent years. In the same manner, Indonesia has successfully undergone a democratic transition, becoming the only country in Southeast Asia rated by Freedom House as “politically free” (Freedom House, 2012). The opportunity given to citizens to exercise their political rights in relatively free and fair elections, the active roles of civil society and independent watchdogs accompanied by the emergence of relatively independent and vibrant press play an important role in gathering and sustaining momentum for political development in Indonesia. By contrast, Thailand was an electoral democracy and then was relegated to being included in the group of politically closed authoritarian systems due to the 2006 military coup, even if some of its political features, such as media freedom and freedom of expression, did not concur with those of the group of authoritarian regimes. Moreover, although a new constitution has been installed to restore the political conditions and the country is now being ruled by civilian governments, Thailand has never returned to the previous position in 2001 as its political development is now in a deteriorating trend, restrained by widespread corruption, worsening media censorship, fraud and bribery as well as self-serving behaviour. In addition, according to the table, there has not been a significant change among the rest of the countries in Southeast Asia. This is perhaps due to the remaining severe restrictions on political expression and the support of the status quo from the general population owing to successful socioeconomic performance.

Moving on to more detailed background information, after the conquest over Dutch imperialism, Indonesia proclaimed its independence in the late 1940s. The decade after gaining independence was full of political orientations influenced by the sense of being part of a national revolution. Abdullah (2009: 251) characterized the newly independent Indonesia as ‘a new nation-state on a trajectory towards democracy, press freedom, a new constitution, and emerging citizenship’. Despite the fact that the provisional constitution provided the foundation for citizenship and ensured some fundamental democratic features, such as human rights, freedom of thought and expression and rule of law, Elson (2008: 193) has pointed out that the process of establishing these values was aborted by President Soekarno and his army chief, Nasution. That is, due to its weakness and instability accompanied by the subsequent beginning of the Cold War, President Soekarno decided to reinstate authoritarianism, with a system of so-called ‘guided democracy’. Subsequently, over the following three decades of Suharto’s presidency, political parties, social movements and political participation were, by
and large, destroyed. As explained by Lane (2006), this resulted in the complete absence of mass participation in Indonesian politics for the next two decades. Then, mass resistance to the regime started to transform the country in the late 1980s driven by several social groups, such as NGOs, labour unions, student organizations, social movements and Muslim intellectuals, which also were combined with the encouraging global trend towards democracy. Nevertheless, as described by Feith (1991: 63-100), this force continued to be restrained by the strength of military and the authoritarian state, the economic dependence upon authoritarianism, the religious and class cleavages in society, the continuing external support for the authoritarian regime and the lack of leadership among the opposition parties. Currently, although there have been multiparty elections at all political levels, which are conducted properly and considered to be relatively free and fair, Indonesia still has not achieved full democratic consolidation. Some scholars have argued that some of the inadequacies are ‘the continued influence of the military and the alleged pursuit of personal rather than universalistic ends by politicians’ (Carlson and Turner, 2009: 382). In other words, politicians and legislators who have been newly empowered by democracy prefer to accommodate top bureaucrats and business tycoons with whom they collude to produce skewed policy outputs. (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 185-252). Extending this view, Case (2009: 257) has given an interesting insight explaining that the configuration of elites in Indonesia has been readjusted and grown wider and more varied and, ‘as collusion deepens, democracy’s quality is diminished, of course, by the patronage that elites so vigorously pursue and the reverse domains that they tenaciously defend.’

Thailand is the only country in the region that was not colonized by the Western powers and also managed to escape Japanese rule during the WWII. As a consequence, this is perhaps why a positive attitude towards the protection of freedom as well as political and human rights can be recognized more easily, compared to other countries in the region. (Paul, 2010: 101) Moreover, the democratisation experiences in Thailand have been more indigenous, rather than being influenced by the Western colonial officials. Although the country experienced some military coups in the past, there have been ongoing attempts to advance democracy and demands for a fair and more open society over the years. The introduction of a new constitution in 1997 did install new rules and several promising mechanisms to tackle money politics, ensure government transparency and to fight corruption in the political system, including the introduction of special courts and judicial agencies. Following the years of financial turmoil in the late 1990s, there was an ambitious politician, who by 2000 was the country’s richest business tycoon. Thaksin Shinawatra, who later was accused of buying a
number of MPs from other opposition parties, ‘financed his rise in politics to become Prime Minister in 2001 (Paul, 2010: 103). Due to his popularity among the poor as well as his populist policies designed for attracting grassroots support, he won a second general election and stayed in office until 2006. During his terms in office, he was accused of corruption and concealing his assets as well as, with a majority in the parliament, managing to pass legislation that seemed to benefit his family and relative’s businesses. He also paralysed many checks and balances mechanisms, such as the anti-corruption bodies, and limited freedom of that section of the press that was critical of his government. According to Paul (2010: 105), Thaksin was portrayed as a person who wished to transform the country into a corporate state with his political party run as a business acting on behalf of the Thai people as the shareholders. Owing to widespread corruption scandals and his abuse of executive power, his government was removed from office in September 2006 by a coup. The coup was bloodless and probably the most peaceful one in history. After a year of the administration by a civilian government, a general election was held in the late 2007 under a new constitution. The result was not the intended outcome as the pro-Thaksin Peoples Power Party (PPP) won the most seats and formed a coalition government. Since then, most of the time Thai politics has been dominated by this pro-Thaksin party, whose leaders are considered as a proxy for Thaksin Shinawatra, and there have been several conflicts between pro-Thaksin (Red Shirts) and anti-Thaksin (Yellow shirts) supporters. The future of democratisation in Thailand is very uncertain as deep divisions among the people have emerged all over the country. Money politics, corruption, self-benefiting as well as problems of freedom of the press and human rights are still ongoing problems. Rahim (2000: 28) wrote that constitutions and laws are written so as to make it more cumbersome for politicians and bureaucrats to abuse state power for private gain. The practice of politicians buying votes is common in Thailand, particularly in rural areas, occurring at every level of elections and democratic forces have been able to little to improve this chronic problem.

The Philippines was a former colony of Spain between 16th and 18th Centuries. At the end of the 18th century, as a consequence of the Spanish-American War in Cuba, the land was sold to the US who retained its power over the land until 1946. After gaining independence, the two countries both maintained close political and commercial ties up to the present day. Paul (2010: 83) has explained that in Philippines democracy is considered as ‘a façade for oligarchic rule’, which continues to be a major mechanism for plundering public resources that contributes to the wealth of the leaders. These corrupt leaders have strengthened their powers amongst their families through marriage and business interests, such that it has helped
to maintain their hegemonic powers for generations. (ibid) The two decades of President Fernando Marcos’ administration deprived the country of vast quantities of wealth and public resources. Nowadays, his extended family owns, both directly and indirectly, the country’s largest corporations in several sectors, such as: telecommunications, airlines, electricity, beer, newspapers and television, banks and real estate. Notably, Franco (2004: 97-137) described the regime as an ‘elite democracy’ as its political system full of the elite’s corruption scandals and abuses of executive power. On the whole, similar to Thailand, a major obstacle to the democratisation process has been the persistent corruption of the ruling elites, which has made it unstable and resulted in many coup attempts aimed at ousting corrupt leaders.

Malaysia is a former British colony. As a result of WWII, the British had been bankrupted and had to relinquish the control over their colonies. The Federation of Malaya gained its independence from them in 1957 and this was followed by independence for Sarawak and North Borneo in 1963 when the British incorporated Singapore and the Borneo states, because of fear of communist and independent movements in the region as well as the need to protect its commercial assets. (Paul, 2010: 65) However, over the subsequent decades of independent Malaysia, the politics of race played a significant role in the establishment of authoritarianism in society. In particular, during Mahathir’s era as president, he strengthened pro-Malay policies and tightened his grip on power by suppressing any opponents of the regime (Bertrand, 2013: 101). The state and its core institutions are still controlled by his ruling political party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO). Moreover, political activities are restricted and suppression of dissent is acted out on: politicians, academics, journalists, judges, lawyers and other opponents. All kinds of media are tightly censored and controlled, being used as tools for promulgation of the regime’s values. Similar to other regional partners, corruption is common and vote-buying widespread as well as the electoral rules being shaped for ensuring favourable outcomes. Interestingly, Case (2009: 261) commented that Malaysia has lacked a determinative force for fuller civil liberties and electoral competitiveness due to the division of its mass population over ethnicity and religion. More recently, although there has been no significant political change in the level of control exercised by the regime, there have been an increasing number of demonstrations and deliberations on various reform issues. The opposition parties have clearly become stronger and been able to make greater advancement, which is evident by the results of the general elections since 2008, the year when the opposition coalition denied the ruling parties a two-thirds majority for the first time since 1969. This result and the greater prevalence of civil society activity have brought with them
considerable implications for the future of Malaysia’s politics, with the prospect for democratisation challenging the dominant-party situation. Singapore is well known for its concealed authoritarian stature. As a British colony, the island was the main naval base in Southeast Asia and a major trading port of status. It gained independence from the British together with Malaysia in 1962 as a result of a merger referendum, which also resulted in it becoming a part of the latter. Two years later, Singapore gained independence from the Federation of Malaya. According to Paul (2010: 92), during the transition period the British conveyed the politics of the People’s Action Party (PAP) into the trusted hands of Lee Kuan Yew and proceeded to eliminate the opposition in order to create and maintain a one-party system. Lee Kuan Yew was the Prime Minister of Singapore for 30 years from 1959 onwards and he still has a significant role in the government. After his successor, Goh Chok Tong, stepped down from the prime ministership in 2004, Lee Hsien Loong, Lee Kuan Yew’s eldest child, took over the position, thus becoming the third prime minister. In general, all the key positions in administration, finance, academia, the military, security and business that are necessary to retain and renew the party’s mandate are occupied by the PAP and Lee’s family. Political expression and freedom of the press are severely restricted, with many websites being prohibited or censored by the government. In fact, the government’s opponents can face criminal charges and prosecution for quite minor matters. Economic development has been essential for the sustainability of the government and the low tax rate on personal income has secured the position of the rich in the hierarchy, while leaving the poor facing a rising cost of living. Socially, there is racial discrimination in society as the Chinese are considered a superior race to the Malays and Indians. Furthermore, it has been reported that the Singaporean political leaders are among the world’s highest paid. According to the Economist (2010), the salary of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong is five times that of the US’s Barack Obama and ten times that of the UK’s David Cameron. Under these conditions, there has been only very narrow space for Singaporeans and for civil society to ‘expand into and become a significant force’ (Bertrand, 2013: 120).

Cambodia is another country that has clearly displayed continual repressiveness and authoritarianism. The country remained relatively peaceful until the year of its gaining independence from the French in 1954, when its communist party, known as the Khmer Rouge, increasingly challenged to control the country, eventually occupying the driving seat in Cambodia’s political system. (Paul, 2010: 37) However, the Khmer Rouge killed millions of their fellow countrymen and then started encroaching on Vietnam’s territory, which led to a full scale invasion by the latter. Pressure from the international community led to a troop removal
from Cambodia in 1989, but by then the Khmer Rouge had lost power. The subsequent UN operation of rehabilitation and reconstruction aimed at establishing peace and democracy in Cambodia was not very successful in preventing domestic conflicts. Hun Sen, who had been the Prime Minister of the Vietnamese-controlled government, continued to dominate a large number of key institutions. The following elections even strengthened his control and, as stated by McCargo (2005: 100), became ‘political theatre’ designed to give his party legitimacy and a mandate. Similar to other Southeast Asian regimes, the main source of Hun Sen’s political power came from the control of the state’s agencies of repression, such as the: military, police and judiciary. (Paul, 2010: 41) Over the two decades of his administration, power was distributed around his family networks, which now control a range of public resources and have close ties with powerful magnates. Corruption is perhaps the most serious problem, becoming a feature that defines authoritarianism in Cambodia. On the whole, the nation’s politics embody the progressively increased control of the ruling party, the decline of the opposition party’s strength, severe deficits in the rule of law and the weak role of the nationally elected assembly. (Carlson and Turner, 2009: 382) Consequently, as highlighted by McCargo (2005: 110), there can be no liberalization of Cambodian politics until the CPP’s formidable network of power and patronage unravels, which is unlikely to happen while Hun Sen is still on the scene.

Vietnam and Laos are under the control of a Communist government, being thus among the world’s few remaining single-party socialist states. After the French retreated from Vietnam, the country became involved in the Cold War with the partition between the North, controlled by communist forces, and the South, backed by the US. Due to the close tie of their communist parties, both Vietnam and Laos became fully involved in the conflicts. The war ended in 1975 with the victory of North Vietnam over a weakened South Vietnamese army as a result of America refusing to give any more support to its forces in Indochina in 1973. In the following years, South Vietnam was reunified with the North under communist rule. Then, hostilities continued when, as pointed out above, Vietnam began a military invasion to occupy Cambodia in order to remove the Khmer Rouge regime. Due to massive pressure from international community and the disengagement of the Soviet Union who had been the most important sponsor for the war, Vietnam decided to withdraw its troops from Cambodia after the 10 years of occupation and started to reengage with the world. As a consequence of the war, much of its economy, infrastructure and environment had been destroyed and it had to rely on its own resources, because there was no sort of compensation, unlike in Germany and Japan after the
WWII, from the US or international community (Paul, 2010: 120) and in fact, the lattermost discouraged anyone from supporting the country.

Similarly, Laos was also heavily destroyed. According to Basher (1988: 9), it is one of the most bombed countries on earth, for between 1965 and 1973 more bombs were dropped on it than on Japan and Germany during the whole of World War II. Under the control of the ruling communist government, the army is involved in many sectors of the economy and every organization including civil society groups (Paul, 2010: 122). All print and broadcasting media as well as the internet are strictly controlled by the government, although this is clearly less so in the case of Laos due to the government’s limited technical ability and the fact that it has no intention to interfere with foreign media, with people being free to access international programmes via satellite or cable television. Unsurprisingly, political expression and all kinds of freedoms related to democracy are almost absent, making it difficult for opposition groups to form alliances. In case of Vietnam, the communist party adopted a neoliberal economic policy and started to liberalize the economy. Its post-war economic performance has been impressive in that significant progress in poverty reduction and improvements in living standards has been clearly seen. However, such economic progress has had no effect on the political liberalization in Vietnam. In the case of Laos, the ruling party is changing its ideology, moving away from the Marxist-Leninist base towards authoritarianism using Buddhism to legitimise party rule, gain support from the population and to construct nationalism (Paul, 2010: 60). On the whole, the major concern of democratization in Vietnam and Laos is not so much about the introduction of democracy, but rather how long the party can maintain communist rule as well as how to isolate its authoritarianism from the increasingly liberalized economy. Political change in Laos will continue to be shaped by its core neighbouring countries as its government has close ties with China and Vietnam, due to the common political ideology, while its citizens are more affiliated with Thailand, owing to language, religion and cultural similarities.

Myanmar is a unique and interesting case. The country was colonized by the British during the eighteenth century and this brought many changes. Similar to Laos, Buddhism is a key construct of the nationalism that helped in forming resistance forces against British rule (Paul, 2010: 75). Myanmar gained independence in 1948 and it has been continually ruled by a military dictatorship since 1962 when a military coup overthrew the democratic regime and took control of the country. The regime completely isolated Myanmar from the outside world. Foreign firms were nationalized, missionaries and aid organizations were asked to leave and only very few citizens were given permission to travel abroad, while foreigners were allowed
to stay for just one and later, six days (Bertrand, 2013: 196). The government gained full control over access to information and prevented its citizens from having any outside news or contact (Steinberg, 1999: 33-58). However, in the late 1980s, a new junta regime abolished the old system imposed by the previous military government and began to take advantage of global capitalism by attracting foreign investment from outside as a new way of renewing its legitimacy. The money earned from the selling of the country’s resources to foreign firms funded ‘the growth of military power and purchase of modern weaponry’ (Paul, 2010: 18). Somewhat disingenuously, between 2008 and 2011, the government attempted to introduce a process of political reform by launching a new constitution with a civilian government, but whilst ensuring that military dominance was preserved. The reform led to the alleviation of sanctions from the Western countries, resumption of international aid and new economic opportunities. As concluded by Bertrand (2013: 208), ‘a return to civilian rule and managed elections allowed the regime to emulate effective formulas used by other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in the region, while at least temporarily keeping its own pace toward reform’.

4.5 Evaluating the roles of ASEAN in democracy promotion

Given the three decades of ASEAN not explicitly committing itself to democracy at the regional level, this section probes the intricacies of political development in Southeast Asia, and also the ineffectuality of the organization in achieving the goal of integration. To this researcher, democracy seems to be a sensitive and untouchable issue for ASEAN in which any change is securely prevented by the organization’s golden rule of non-interference. Moreover, the view is taken here that the recent enlargement of the organization to allow non-democratic countries (Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999)) into the group has prolonged ASEAN having no, or only a weak, intention to assert democratic values. That is, the preference regarding the establishment of peace and security of members is to achieve this through a cooperative and accommodating manner, rather than by democracy. At the same time, the evidence presented in the previous section affirms that the political regimes in ASEAN countries are not sufficiently consolidated and are still very much authoritarian. In other words, there are several countries firmly remaining under authoritarian rule and even in some of the democratic ones, the phenomenon is commonly accepted only at its face value. Moreover, this researcher concurs with the view that most of the authoritarian governments claim that they are politically legitimate based on the fact that elections are held on a regular basis, despite there being no regard for the ability of opposition parties to compete freely and fairly (Rahim, 2000: 30). Indeed, political and social conditions in ASEAN
countries are still not conducive for democracy to prosper. In general, as a result of the
enlargement, political diversity has been much greater and become a major obstacle that has
undermined the organisation’s unity and its ability in responding to challenges.

In the discussion of the prospects for democratisation, the theoretical aspects have shed light
on why democracy promotion seems implausible for ASEAN. Indeed, although democracy is
considered as a crucial element in the European integration, it is apparent that this has not
been justified in other regional integration schemes and in fact, has rarely been considered in
the literature outside the EU context. In Chapter 3, it was reported that Schimmelfennig and
Scholz (2010) pointed out that the influences of democracy can penetrate through
transnational relations and cross-border exchanges, particularly between non-state actors.
Due to the fact that regional integration is very likely to increase the interactions between
members, therefore in practice could provide a useful platform for democratisation
contestation to be played out. Nevertheless, in this researcher’s opinion this may not be the
case for ASEAN as the organization is highly top-down and elite-centric in such a way that
political and civil liberties are still seriously limited. Also, its decision-making is managed
through close interpersonal contacts among the top leaders and does not involve civil society
or public opinion (Acharya, 2003: 379). As a consequence, transnational activities between
non-state actors and also the spillover effects that emerge as a result of an exchange of ideas
and information are seriously lacking. Therefore, as long as these domestic illiberal conditions
continue, any attempt towards democracy promotion will not materialize, for as Acharya
(2003: 381) put it, democratisation is seen as a threat that can potentially undermine ‘the
legitimacy of ASEAN elite-centred regionalism’.

Democratic peace theory can also demonstrate some other interesting insights about the
pursuit of democratisation in ASEAN. As discussed in Chapter 3, the rationale behind
democratisation is built on the fact that the progress of integration could be eased and
accelerated when member countries share the same or at least similar norms or ideologies.
Under the democratic peace theory lens, it is held that democratic states are unlikely to cause
conflict and can resolve disputes among themselves peacefully, because the effects of
democracy will efficaciously come into play when encountering like-minded states. In relation
to the political diversity in ASEAN, as mentioned previously, although some states have made
efforts to establish democratic regimes, by and large, the association remains an autocratic
club retaining authoritarian rule as the dominant type of governance. Consequently, Kant’s
effects of democracy are very unlikely to produce a desirable outcome when placed in the
context of ASEAN. By contrast, as discussed in Chapter 4, because in case of the EU candidate
countries have to meet the political condition of guaranteeing of democracy as stated in the Copenhagen Criteria, the positive outcome of peace and security, as predicted by Kant, is a reality. Furthermore, I discovered that the insights of intergovernmentalism can also provide a critical explanation. As suggested under this optic, the more diverse is the association in terms of national interests and ideological perspectives, the more difficult for the actors to reach a consensus. In terms of ASEAN, diversity manifests itself in the varying perspectives on democracy, which thus are impeding the progress of integration and the principle of non-interference is a further barrier to the democratisation process.

Empirically, I will first begin by considering the essence of democracy itself. As described in the previous section, most of ASEAN’s citizens reside in authoritarian and repressive environments, where civil society and political freedom are largely limited. In this respect, Welzel (2009: 88) pointed out that ‘It is self-evident that democratisation is not an automatism that guides itself without agents. Instead, it is the outcome of intentional collective actions, involving strategies of power elites, campaigns of social movement activists, and mass participation’. Therefore, it is contended here that in order for bottom-up democratisation to function and thrive, favourable political and social conditions need to be in place, that can help in the fostering of progressive collective actions. The principal forces that can bring about this transformation are domestic, including institutions of non-governmental actors and civil society, which thus should be left unrestrained by the government. Moreover, according to Rahim (2000: 30), a system of checks and balances, the rule of law and principles of transparency and accountability need to be institutionalised and safeguarded. Referring back to the previous section, it has been seen that all states of ASEAN have been struggling to deal with these issues, particularly in the more intense authoritarian regimes where these problems have been completely ignored. Hence, it can be inferred that, with the principle of non-interference, these sorts of things seem to be out of the reach of ASEAN’s mandate. In any case, ASEAN does not offer sufficient channels to its members for the participation of civil society and for addressing the need to align democratic values at the regional level.

The second point to be made of an empirical nature is about the context and the original design of the organization. In Chapter 4, it was elicited that the design of the EU’s structures is based on a technocratic and functionalist approach, with its ideology being derived from the concept of Western democracy. That is, democracy is viewed as the force that facilitates and reinforces the functioning of the organization. Unlike the EU, according to one scholar, ASEAN is ‘designed to protect the rights of the member states, particularly their sovereignty’ and structured based on ‘a strong concern for state sovereignty, and narrow self-interests among
member states’ (Cockerham, 2010: 166, 168). Moreover, it is fully based on intergovernmentalism and lacks a supranational force to support and implement its decisions, with there being no sign that the latter structure is going to become a reality any time soon. An interview with the former Secretary General of ASEAN provided notable insights about the nature of Asian values and the incompatible context for a supranational power broker to be installed. He stated:

‘It depends on the meaning of democratisation. If you say that democratisation means we should have Western liberal democratic ideal, I think we are still quite far away. If you think democratisation involves open government, transparent system, the accountability of authorities, freedom for the people who make choices and the rule of law, I think democratisation will be very important for ASEAN.’

In addition, a similar statement given by a Singaporean scholar also reflects that democracy is explained differently in the context of ASEAN:

‘In ASEAN, democracy has historically been swept under the democratic carpet... If you look at the charter and official documents, the word ‘democracy’ is treated as orthodoxy. ASEAN only fulfils the aspects of economic, social and cultural rights which seem to be a positive fit to ASEAN.’

Therefore, along with Cockerham’s (2010: 184) conclusion made after his investigation of ASEAN agreements, here it is posited that the norms, traditional practices and preferences for state sovereignty will continue to be unfavourable to supranationalism and thus greatly limit the influence that it can have on democratisation and human rights in ASEAN. In other words, as asserted by Sukma (2009: 142), in this context this means ‘the democratisation of any member state can be accomplished only on that state’s own initiative’.

The third issue for discussion is the high level of political diversity between member states that is proving to be a major obstacle for democratisation in ASEAN. As discussed previously, the political regimes in ASEAN span a wide spectrum ranging from electoral democracy to full-scale authoritarianism, with no genuine liberal democracy having emerged as yet. This was recognized by Paul (2010: 197) who stated that ‘Southeast Asian democratic culture is weak

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and most political regimes are authoritarian and incompatible with each other’, which coincides with the viewpoint of one IR scholar:

‘There are so many differences within each ASEAN national political system... So, if you take this kind of seemingly pro-civil and political right agenda (for example from Philippines’s standard) and you try to test it across the rest of ASEAN. You are not going to see political stability last after being implemented.’

Some other academics have also highlighted the adversity derived from the diverse regimes in ASEAN. For example, Sukma (2009: 143) illustrates this:

‘In 2007, while Indonesia and the Philippines struggled to consolidate their fledgling democracies, Myanmar and Thailand were under military rule, although the junta in Bangkok had promised to restore democracy by the end of that year. Meanwhile, Malaysia and Singapore continued to offer successful models of soft authoritarianism. Vietnam and Laos were still basically Leninist states. Cambodia, despite talk of reform, was still an experiment in one-man rule.’

Moreover, at interview, a senior director from Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that one major problem for democratisation in ASEAN is the gap between member states in which significant differences can be seen in almost every aspect. When such political diversity and differences between regimes are acknowledged, then according to the nature of authoritarianism, non-democratic members are unlikely to accept any democratic reform proposed by more liberal members, which could potentially result in polarisation and subversion of the association’s unity.

Fourth and finally, there is the question of the quality of democracy and political conditions in ASEAN member states. Regarding the few democratic members the quality of democracy still remains very problematic. This was commented by one scholar who wrote ‘democracy in the ASEAN countries is still nascent and fragile, it is hard for them to stand on solid ground as successful exemplars of that political choice’ (Sukma, 2009: 144). Indeed, there are so many entrenched problems, such as corruption, money and self-interest politics, social inequalities,

10 Ibid.

lack of accountability and transparency, electoral manipulation, executive abuses and weak political institutions continuing to weaken and undermine democracy. These can be seen commonly in the cases of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. One further major problem is patrimonialism, or alternatively known as the patron-client relationship, which is regarded as an important feature of Southeast Asian politics. Scott (1972: 92) defined patrimonialism as:

‘an exchange relationship between roles ... involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.’

In the cases of Malaysia and Singapore, where the rule is under the dominance of a powerful single political party, as mentioned previously, civil liberty and freedom are restricted by repressive institutional and legal mechanisms that allow detention without trial and it is unlikely that civil society in these countries will develop to become a significant force in foreseeable future. This is supported by a Singaporean scholar, who said:

‘It is not enough that all the remaining communist countries in ASEAN become democratic. The rest should also practise inner democratisation in term of advancing civil and political rights.’

On the whole, I am convinced that the prospects for democratisation remain out of ASEAN’s reach because of the incompletion and unevenness of the democratisation process, the inferior political conditions and the fact that several members still remain under authoritarian rules.

Arguably, the essence of democracy (for example in relation to political freedom, participation of non-government actors and civil society and the principles of transparency and accountability) does not seem to fit in with the political environment, framework and norms in ASEAN. As Busse (1999: 56) proffered in his work, ‘democratisation is likely to weaken some features of the ASEAN Way and increase efforts to make politics more transparent and accountable’. The association itself does not have mandates and enforcing mechanisms and, without these instruments, I do not foresee how democracy can grow and prosper well once it has been put into action. Furthermore, although under democratic peace theory it is

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contended that democracy can reduce the likelihood of war, unwillingly enforcing it onto ASEAN is likely to arouse suspicions and tensions among member states, which could consequently result in the undermining of the association’s unity and integration process. Similarly, Sukma (2009: 136) explained that on the one hand democracy is one way to attain and maintain security, whilst on the other hand, if it is imposed intrusively, it could also trigger tensions among members, which could be harmful to regional security. At the same time, the cardinal principle of non-interference, along with respect for state sovereignty, consensus-building, consultation, non-binding rules and informal decision-making, have been created as the ‘by-products of the efforts of ASEAN leaders to deflect criticisms for their undemocratic practices.’ (Nem Singh, 2008: 144) As for ASEAN, I posit that democratisation within such confines, that lack opportunities for members to take on the role of critical friend regarding other states domestic affairs, is unlikely to make much progress and the integration is likely to stall.

Nevertheless, the promotion of democracy has nowadays become an important international norm for guaranteeing freedom, fundamental rights and good governance around the world. Regarding which, the following was expressed by the Permanent Representative of Thailand to ASEAN:

‘ASEAN has to walk along with other international communities. In order to maintain the cooperation, it is necessary that ASEAN members be encouraged to stay on the path of democracy’.13

Another scholar opined:

‘Of course, increasingly you (ASEAN) do not want to be recognized as a collection of undemocratic countries. It is not good field-image.’14

Certainly, I think it is going to be too troublesome for ASEAN to resist such international pressure and to say no to a commitment to democracy. For instance, this can be seen in the case of EU-ASEAN free trade negotiation where failing to make a commitment to democracy has become a major obstacle to international relations and economic development.15


15 See Pratruangkrai (2006)
Notwithstanding the discordance between ASEAN and democracy, the fact cannot be denied that democracy is crucial for regional cooperation. Just looking at what has been examined previously in the case of the European Union, where regionalism was pioneered and has succeeded, democracy has played a key role in helping the union to achieve the goals of building a peaceful community and bringing prosperity. It has also effectively helped to legitimize the EU polity and empowering its administrative functions. Possibly as a result of this success, several of my interviewees raised the matter of democratisation in ASEAN. For instance, a scholar from RSIS commented that:

‘The immediate benefit (of democratisation in ASEAN) would be that you can start addressing governance issues such as corruption, human rights and fighting against domestic and international crimes. It provides you with a broader approach towards security and governance.’

A Filipino scholar made the following points:

‘It (democracy) will give a new stage of political integration... If you are democratic state, there are such norms that you observe. And if you are not able to have the system that allows for the observance of this norm, then it will be difficult to advance many of these goals’.

And some reflection from a Permanent Representative to ASEAN was that:

‘Democratisation is useful because the development of ASEAN demands the participation from all involved parties and stakeholders. In turn, democracy will facilitate the involvement of more actors and the role of public opinion.’

Notably, Ambassador Ong Keng Yong who served as the Secretary-General of ASEAN from 2003 to 2007 provided an additional perspective to this issue by giving the example of the Myanmar case:

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‘It (democracy) is a good thing...because when Myanmar was under military dictatorship, it was difficult to socialize ourselves with the European activities and cooperation due to the strong pressure in Europe against such a form of government in Myanmar. Now the government in Myanmar has changed its form of governance. ASEAN fellow members feel that it has presented more economic opportunities and more credibility now for ASEAN to engage with other regional bodies’.19

These corroborative accounts firmly uphold the importance of democracy to the development of ASEAN integration.

4.6 Discussion and conclusion
As stated in this chapter, the EU polity symbolises ‘security, consumer prosperity, company wealth, prestige and a clear break with the Soviets’ (Grossmann, 2006: 1). Guaranteeing of democracy, also human rights, the rule of law and protection of minorities, is respectfully promoted as a fundamental norm of the union and is a prerequisite for EU accession. This sort of political conditionality has been widely considered as one of the most effective strategies for democracy promotion. Therefore, this in a way ascertains that democracy is an essential composition of EU polity and has been historically and empirically embedded in its political system as well as its affiliated institutions. Furthermore, it plays a vital role in the legitimacy of the EU and empowers its administrative functions. However, in term of generalisation, it could be argued that the EU’s individuality, and idea of democracy, has been shaped by its historical, intellectual and geographical contexts. Nevertheless, although democracy is viewed as a crucial element for the EU and it is perceived that every country who wishes to join the union needs to be democratised to a satisfactory level, it does not imply that other integrating regions have to look at the EU as a model to pursue. This is because the concept of democracy is somewhat specific to a region. Each region has different historical and cultural characteristics and has grown up from different regional contexts. Indeed, the democratisation strategies designed by and used in the EU may function properly under specific conditions and may not function in different settings.

For ASEAN, holding back liberal democracy seems to be a critical issue that has determined the continuation of the association, for it is a sensitive issue avoided by its political leaders who do not like hearing about it. According to this investigation, explicit commitments to democracy promotion so far have not been witnessed in ASEAN. However, evidence has been found that

democracy is crucial for the development of ASEAN integration in the long run, particularly in helping to improve its international image and credibility as well as allowing for the participation of all involved parties. Nevertheless, due to the vast political diversity and the remaining authoritarian forces in the region, imposing democracy onto the association is unfeasible because it goes against its chief tenets of non-interference, respect for national sovereignty and consensus-based decision making. Therefore, the delivery of democracy is a key consideration for ASEAN which can be divided into three key aspects. First, as argued previously, ASEAN as an organization can do little to promote democracy owing to the lack of any mandate as well as there being no intention and commitment by the political leaders. As long as the association remains constrained by the principle of non-interference, any top-down democratisation approach is highly unlikely to occur. Based on the belief that sustainable democracy should come from within, I posit that ASEAN should make best use of its existing powers and mechanisms to facilitate and encourage bottom-up democratic reform. For instance, according to Acharya (2003: 388), this can be achieved by moving towards a more participatory community, strengthening identity so as to make people feel attached and wanting to get involved in ASEAN as well as being more responsive to the demands of the civil society. This would help ASEAN to legitimize its activities, resulting in its fortunes being less determined by the personal preferences of leaders and more by the rule of law. Although such a strategy will face with many challenges, if these can be addressed, this will deliver a long-term contribution to democratisation and hence deeper regional cooperation across Southeast Asia.

Second, democratisation in ASEAN will need to be carried out little by little as an incremental process. Regarding this, Paul (2010: 188) stated that democratisation in ASEAN is unlikely to happen in the near future, because it requires the active participation of citizens in the process as well as the emergence of shared political culture among people, which guarantees the protection of their political and civil rights. This perspective has also been strongly supported by an Indonesian scholar, who has contended that democracy should be a long run goal with democratic values being introduced into the region as an incremental process (Sukma, 2009: 136). That is, according to this author, each state should undertake this at its own pace driven by its own political will and thus, should be a bottom-up, not a top-down process (ibid). In addition to backing the incremental process of ASEAN democratisation, a scholar from RSIS notably depicted ASEAN as follows:
‘ASEAN is like a train that has ten different carriages and the links between carriages are not strong yet. So, if you move too fast, those links will break apart’.20

Last, this researcher is in accordance with view that the rule of non-intervention should remain, because it importantly keeps ASEAN ongoing, but that it should be rigorously redefined or reinterpreted in a way that make it less rigid, in particular allowing member states to discuss issues and problems in a transparent way, without fear of negative responses. For ASEAN, democracy will neither play a peace-making role nor be a driver of regional integration as long as the current interpretation of the principle of non-interference continues to allow for the complete shielding of the national sovereignty of member states. If this remains the case, then peace and regional cooperation in the region will keep relying on the relationships between the countries’ leaders and their willingness to coordinate and accommodate regionally. That is, ASEAN’s fortunes will continue to be determined by the elites, suspicions between countries will remain and civil and political rights will only be granted in countries where certain levels of freedom are permitted, which would result in the prospects for democracy across the whole of Southeast Asia being substantially diminished.

5 IDENTITY IN ASEAN

5.1 Introduction
In the past few decades, collective identity at the regional level has gained attention from scholars and the public as a way to boost support for regional integration. It has been increasingly demanding since the EU recently started to experience scepticism and various internal problems. As elicited in Chapter 3, constructivists argue that identity is socially and historically constructed through socializing and systemic interaction at the regional level and, in turn, identity helps to shape states’ actions and interests. Also, as explained in Chapter 4, identity is crucial for the development of European integration and plays a key role in the participation of citizens. However, the case of the EU demonstrates sophisticated relationships and conflicts between regional and national identities as well as showing some sorts of ties between collective identity and economic benefits. In the context of ASEAN, the popular notion of ‘elite organisation’ implies that the existence of identity can be found mainly only at the state level in which such common values are shared only among elites, diplomats and technocrats. The data contained in this chapter demonstrates that the principles of ASEAN way as the revered norms of the association have greatly shaped the means of multilateralism and how its states have interacted with one another. At the citizen level, there seems to be a very limited sense of collective identity among ordinary citizens, which is perhaps because ASEAN does not influence their daily lives and has never been away from elitist arrangements. So, people do not realize the benefits of this regional grouping and see no need to participate in its activities. This is where ASEAN currently has great deficits and it is probably why it has not been able to move forward to achieve deeper integration.

This chapter begins with the European perspectives on identity and then provides an overview of how Southeast Asia has been transformed from a competing field of colonial powers into an independent and definable region and the role of ASEAN in its construction. Then, it moves on to the main findings of this chapter that seek to examine and explain the existence of collective identity as well as the determining factors that are involved in identity formation, both at the state and citizen levels. The final section provides further discussion, a summary of important findings and suggestions for solutions to the problems.

5.2 European perspectives
The issue of European identity has been an ongoing discussion in Europe, particularly during the past two decades. Since the 1990s, there have been several major debates about the EU, such as the functionality of its institutions, its common policies, the calling for more EU
involvement, migration and border controls, the legitimacy of EU institutions and institutional reform. However, Mayer and Palmowski (2004: 574) pointed out that the issue of a common identity has become one of the most striking issues that the EU is facing today as it presents the disconnection between ‘the accelerated drive for integration and the manifest absence of a popular European will’. Furthermore, they continued to argue that the issue of European identity was actually accentuated by the constitutional convention and thus it demands a greater extent of scholars’ attention (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 575). Assuredly, apart from the tasks to promote democracy in the region and to create a solid institutional structure, attracting Europeans’ attention on crucial issues, increasing its reputation and credibility in European’s eyes as well as promoting European common values are other key accountability issues for the EU.

Regarding identity in academic discourse, the main problem seems to be the contradiction between its nature and the terms in the public and academic debate, for example, in the propaganda discourse, it does not really exist (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 576). However, many sociologists have discovered that identities play an important role and have thus been a persistent concern of the sociological discipline right from the outset, particularly the social identities rooted in the sense of community and society (Macdonald, 1990: 7-11). In general, identities are defined as meanings or values which are understood as being the distinctiveness of an object or a person. A sense of belonging can be socially constructed through communication, interaction, cultural myths and common experiences. Furthermore, identities require recognition and acceptance both from among members and from outsiders in which similarities are constantly constructed depending on the size and nature of the group (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 577). Thus, it should be noted that the nature of groups or boundaries is highly substantive for the formation and articulation of identities due to the involvement of the processes of inclusion and exclusion.

A consideration of multiple identities, such as in a multi-tier international organization like the EU, provides some interesting insights. Regarding which, Schlenka (2007: 9) depicted identities as with the Russian Matruska dolls, whereby they should be conceived of as one inside the next. She explained that ‘An individual commits oneself to one dominant group identity and subordinates other identities in a hierarchical manner to this one… the more abstract the dominant identity is the more it can nest other identities’. She concluded that this model of identity is institutionalized in the concept of European citizenship, that is, all citizenship of EU members should be considered spontaneously synonymous with being a European citizen. In addition, it has been contended that identities sometimes can be overlapping. In this case,
Brewer (2001: 122) illustrated that the shared in-group identity will be either enlarged to include all involved members or include only those who have the overlapping memberships in common, while if the multiple identities are not in conflict with each other, they will be limited by the time and attention that individuals can contribute to different groups. In most cases, multiple identities in a large pluralistic community can result in both increased stability and increasing factionalism of the group, thus relying on their careful management (Brewer, 2001: 123).

What about some common perceptions regarding the antagonism between national and European identities? According to the literature, it is no longer surprising that individuals can possess multiple identities as people can feel being a part of both Europe and their respective nations at the same time. On the one hand, several studies such as those of Usherwood (2002) and Carey (2002), confirmed that national identity can have a significant negative impact on the promotion of regional identity. Whilst another group of scholars, including Herrmann, Risse-Kappen and Brewer (2004), found evidence that national identity and European identity can work in tandem; both can be strong at the same time and they reinforce each other. This situation can be found in several pro-European countries where people strongly identify themselves with their nations as well as with Europe, such as: Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. On the whole, a conclusive statement about the relationship between multiple identities is that, firstly, various identities can be nested in a single collective identity if there is not too much contradiction and, secondly, ‘the European polity does not require a demos that replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities coexist and complement each other’ (Schlenker, 2007: 32-33).

In relation to identity in the context of EU and how it contributes to the development of a European identity, a number of EU initiatives have been created since the enforcement of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 in order to make progress and achieve this goal of the integration project. Significant steps in this direction that have been witnessed are the introduction of a single currency, the EU constitution and cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs. Moreover, a large number of promotional messages and projects have been launched to improve people’s perception of EU institutions and their responsibilities. These aimed to remove people’s nationalist sentiments and convince them that the EU is tied by some sense of common agreements, understanding and recognition based on shared historical and cultural features (Valentini, 2005: 197). However, the situations in Denmark, Sweden and the UK, for example, after the introduction of the single currency, revealed that they totally opposed the idea. Indeed, the EU’s reputation in these countries is very low, compared to
other member states, because people are largely sceptical towards its development, not wishing to participate further in the integration scheme. These represent clear cases of how the economic situation and strong national identity can combine to overcome the integrating force and thus ‘where image, identity and reputation do not correspond positively to each other’ (ibid).

Moreover, one significant factor that confirms the declining trend in European identity is the low rate of participation in the recent parliamentary elections. The turnout rate of European elections is regularly used as an indicator of the popularity or image of the EU in the eyes of its citizens. According to Figure 5.1, the turnout in the European elections of 2009 varied greatly from the highest (90.8%) in Luxembourg to the lowest (19.6%) in Slovakia, with an average of 43% of EU citizens turning out to vote. Firstly, it should be noted that voting in the two highest rate countries (Luxembourg and Belgium) is compulsory and failing to do so can result in a fine. So, in essence the Maltese should be considered as having highest participatory rate. Notably, the turnout was very low in the six former communist countries (Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia), which suggests their lack of engagement with the European integration project.

Figure 5.1: Turnout in European elections by country, 2009

Source: (European Movement, 2009)
Furthermore, Figure 5.2 demonstrates the turnout rate over the last seven European elections and clearly this has gradually declined from about 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2009, while the union has grown larger from 9 to 27 member states. These figures really challenge the democratic legitimacy that the EU’s elites have been trying to promote amongst its citizens. What is more, the Special Eurobarometer 320 (2009: 27) reported that of those who did not turn out to vote, ‘lack of trust or dissatisfaction with politics’ was the most frequently given reason for abstention (28%), while ‘lack of interest in politics and ‘voting does not change anything’ came second quite a long way behind (17%). In sum, these data indicate that the EU policy makers still have a lot more to do regarding the electoral process and, perhaps more importantly, the creation of a European identity, which has credibility in the eyes of the vast majority of European citizens.

Apart from the turnout rate, the Eurobarometer, a favourite source for EU researchers, published a variety of reports regarding European identity and the sense of belonging to the community. In general, according to the Special Eurobarometer 346 (2011: 95), 53% of Europeans felt they belonged to the EU, while it was reported by the Standard Eurobarometer 75 (2011: 51) that 62% of the Europeans think of themselves as citizens of the EU, with this sentiment being particularly strong in: Luxembourg, Slovakia, Finland, Germany, Malta, Poland and Ireland. Furthermore, the survey continued by asking respondents about the most important elements that they felt gave them a European identity. 36% and 32% agreed that the euro and democratic values were the most important element of European identity, respectively, followed by geography (22%), common culture (22%) and common history (17%), and only 3% of the participants did not recognize any feature relating to a European identity.
In general, in terms of a sense of belonging to the community, the data indicate that the majority of EU citizens feel attached to the union and can recognize, to some degree, their EU identity. However, a relatively large number of EU citizens continued to distrust the EU, thus failing to give their support to its operations. Clearly, a major task that still remains for the EU and its policy makers is creating a positive image that will convince sceptics that it has their interests at heart.

As can be seen, the survey data confirm that both national and European identities continue to coexist in EU polity, but how important are these different identities to the EU and should it be creating or promoting such differences? It has been argued that a solid sense of identity can benefit the EU in various ways. Firstly, the EU commissioners are aware that the absence of emotional attachment to the union as well as the blurred European geographical borders have been undermining the legitimacy of the EU and so they have been working hard to promote European identity and public awareness (Weiler, 1999: 329). That is, a massive amount of money has been spent on investing in constructing European values and social cohesion. The well-known slogans of 'Unity in Diversity' and 'Ever Closer Union' have become the important goals of the EU, for as it is stated in the Treaty of Rome the goal is to ‘lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Shore, 2004: 33). Valentini (2005: 11) contended that unification among members would guarantee them an equal distribution of common benefits that are not provided at the national level, which are related to the creation of a larger or greater community, such as: peace, economic prosperity and social protection.

Next, there is the matter of the notion that democracy will fully work at the European level only when a collective common values exist. In this respect, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000: 166) argued that in agreeing to make collective decisions at the European level if individuals do not recognize themselves as members of the community, ‘then democratic rule appears to become an imposition, a non-consented procedure for those who do not consider themselves part of the collectivity’. Similarly, ‘the creation of a supranational democracy is only possible when citizens from different member states share a sense of being involved in a common project and forming part of a single community’ (Valentini, 2005: 12). Thus, identity and citizens’ support for the union is a precondition for EU legitimacy and the functioning of democracy at supranational level. Finally, it should be noted that there is a considerable gap in the degree of enthusiasm for the EU between the political elites and mass publics, for a substantial number surveys have exhibited far less enthusiasm among the latter than the former. Although these data collections were not aimed at evaluating European identity, as long as the public continues to be lukewarm about the EU, this implies that the EU elites will
still face difficulties claiming legitimacy and consent for their policy programmes (Risse, 2001: 6).

Similar to democracy as discussed in the previous chapter, it emerges that supranational democracy is directly related to identity, because sufficient levels of collective values play a vital role in ensuring the EU’s legitimacy. That is, as long as people do not recognize themselves as Europeans and do not feel genuinely attached to the supranational polity, it is difficult for democracy at the supranational level to be realized. As Schmitter (2000: 45) has argued, common identity or shared values could assist the EU, by guiding institutional and political action so as to achieve democratic legitimacy of the union. That is, democratisation attempts without the promotion of a collective identity and raising people’s motivation in support for EU projects would prove fruitless. Furthermore, such efforts would be even more effective if accompanied by increasing political participation of individuals as well as openness and transparency involving more actors and particularly, those who have been excluded (Schmitter, 2000: 29).

In turning from the European experience to the Southeast Asian experience, we can again observe at the outset that the conditions for identity dynamics in ASEAN are radically different from those in Europe. As we will see below, ASEAN is often seen as having a much weaker regional identity than Europe. Firstly, Europe has a much longer history as a self-identified region – even if not institutionalised until relatively recently. Secondly, the level of ethnic, and religious diversity in ASEAN is much higher than in Europe. Yet, while Southeast Asia has experienced episodes of violence and conflict over its history from pre-colonial days until the modern era, it has never seen the kind of region-wide conflict that engulfed Europe twice in the twentieth century. Moreover, the shared experience of colonialism for much of the region could plausibly form the basis of collective identity, as it indisputably has in Indonesia. Hence, there is no a priori reason to discount the possibility of identity playing an important role in ASEAN integration.

5.3 Background of identity in ASEAN: Southeast Asia as a region

Southeast Asia has a relatively short history which has been punctuated by a sustained period of conflict. After the end of colonisation period, newly-independent states that had been plagued by a long-standing grievance against colonial rule began to build up their nations and strove to manage to remain non-aligned from the influences of competing external powers. At that time the recognition of Southeast Asia as a definable region was not widespread. Regarding this, as Roberts (2011: 378) explained, ‘the construction of Southeast Asia can also
be considered to be a recent phenomenon because, prior to independence from colonialism, there was no concept of a region or regional identity’. The vast diversity of the region with people from a rich variety of backgrounds somehow demonstrates the absence of cultural homogeneity in Southeast Asia. This can be seen, for example, in the context of language and ethnicity. Fuller (2000: 307) pointed out that while the population of Southeast Asia accounts for only 9% of the world’s population, Southeast Asian people speak about 17% of its languages. For instance, Indonesia alone has about 250 languages for a population inhabiting 6000 islands (Roberts, 2011: 370). Moreover, geographically, Southeast Asia is divided into two dissimilar sub-regions, mainland and maritime, regarding which there is no homogeneity in terms of culture, ethnicity and religion in each sub-region or even in a single country. One key consequence of this diversity can be seen in the fact that most scholars identify themselves as either national or subnational specialists, which as Roberts (2011: 370) has argued is as a result of the wide cultural span.

On the other hand, a number of scholars have contended that the origin of Southeast Asia cannot only be traced by the recognition of an independent region, but also owing to cultural similarities, patterns of interstate relations, interactions and interdependence (Acharya, 2000: 164). Despite geographical features, such as a tropical climate and some common agricultural products, such as rice, these countries also share some cultural traits, such as animism and they blend animistic beliefs and practices with their local religions. This was, for example, explained by Phillips (2009: 59), who pointed out that animism is strong in Southeast Asia, particularly in those countries where the beliefs in spirits influence ‘the thinking that people have about nature, ancestors, illness and community’. Moreover, the political culture in Southeast Asia is also an important concern and has had a significant impact on regional identity. Blondel and Inoguchi (2006: 94-96) wrote that geography, colonisation and the emphasis on superiority of ‘Asian values’ are the factors affecting the socio-political characteristics of Southeast Asia.

In addition, Goh (2003: 114-115) wrote about the characteristics of Southeast Asia’s politics as being critical factors, arguing that, to a large extent, the political culture found is ‘personalistic, informal and non-contractual’. Moreover, after gaining independence from decolonization, Southeast Asia’s polity has been transformed into being ever more bureaucratic. Despite the existence and functioning of political institutions, the states were, by and large, ruled by small elite circles operating on the basis of patronage networks, which resulted in their political culture being highly private and informal (Busse, 1999: 48). Such cultural practices could be seen at the regional level where most of the past conflicts were resolved through means of
personal contacts and lobbying between political leaders. Furthermore, as presented in the previous chapter, political culture in Southeast Asian countries has been characterised by many entrenched problems, such as money and self-interest politics, patrimonialism, corruption as well as lack of accountability and transparency. After taking everything into account, despite some commentators’ views, it is relatively clear that Southeast Asian countries do share some degrees of common values and practices. However, with no obvious region-wide identity as can be found in the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America, the differences clearly outweigh the similarities, thus supporting the contention that Southeast Asia is considered as one of the most diverse regions on earth (Weatherbee and Emmers, 2005: 11). I would argue that this identifies the key problem that ASEAN is currently facing in trying to establish cooperation and a regional community, for there is very little common ground in terms of identity amongst the nations of the region.

Then, how has ASEAN worked with the diverse populations to form a regional identity? With the exception of Timor-Leste, it has been admitted that the current membership of ASEAN fits with what has become generally accepted as Southeast Asia, although the nature of its evolution remains contested (Roberts, 2011: 367). Minh (2011: 27) explained that Southeast Asia has developed regional patterns and characteristics through its international relations and interactions, which have helped to forge its regional identity. In line with this, it is contended here that ASEAN has played an important role in constructing and shaping region-building, thus contributing to the definition of what constitutes Southeast Asia today, in particular, in making it appear distinct to external perceptions. Furthermore, the notion of work in progress is backed by Acharya (2005: 104) who took the view that the international politics of Southeast Asia prior to 1997 showed apparent evidence of ‘identity-in-the-making’, rather than ‘identity in being’. While there were not many differences between South Asia and Southeast Asia, he explained that the attempt to make the latter recognized as a region began when delegates from Southeast Asia rejected attaching themselves too closely with the Indian and Chinese regional frameworks at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. Subsequently, according to the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN’s founding document carries a sign of identity building, as can be seen in the following:

“Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture”
After its foundation, although the Bangkok Declaration stated that ASEAN ‘is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes’, its members turned down a number of membership requests from countries, such as Sri Lanka, India and Australia, based on the grounds that they lacked certain features that could be attributed to Southeast Asia. Consequently, in almost every subsequent important document, identity building was always listed as one of the main purposes of ASEAN. For instance, according to Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter, one of the purposes is ‘to promote an ASEAN identity through fostering of greater awareness of the diverse culture and heritage of the region’. Similarly, as stated in the ASEAN Vision 2020 presented at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, one of the important statements is written as ‘we envision the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity’. However, this seems to be an incomplete task because it does not indicate what is considered as this common regional identity and how it will be achieved.

5.4 ASEAN as a collective identity

The literature on regional integration tends to focus more on political and economic aspects of interactions among member states within this process, and less on the social issues relating to the ideational force that ties citizens from diverse historical and cultural background into a wider regional entity, or the politics of identity formation. A review of the literature reveals that there is the lack of a well-established study of regional identity that explains its importance and impact, as well as providing answers to questions relating to such matters as the disharmony between national and regional identity. As referenced in Chapter 3, Brewer explained that identity is constructed by ‘the opposing forces of two universal human motives: the need for inclusion and assimilation and the need for differentiation from others’ (Brewer, 1999: 188). Nonetheless, in the context of regional integration, identity is understood as a creation of meaning and regional integration process is viewed as a socializing structure that shapes actors’ identity and interests. In association with Wendt (1999: 231) and Copeland (2000: 190), constructivists argue that the regional integration process helps states to gain meaning and identity by defining ‘who they are, their goals and the roles they believe they should play’. Thus, states that have been already defined themselves and have gained identity through domestic and cultural contexts will be redefined or constrained again when they go out to interact at the regional level through systemic international interaction. In summary, as enlightened by constructivist perspectives, this researcher is convinced that identity plays a
crucial role in providing an explanation for state actions, including regarding individuals who act on behalf of the state, and the foundations of state interests, whereby a sense of belonging can be socially constructed through communication, interaction, cultural myths and common experiences.

Furthermore, according to Mayer and Palmowski (2004: 577), as outlined in Chapter 4, identity building requires recognition and acceptance both from among members as well as from outsiders. That is, due to the highly involved processes of inclusion and exclusion, the boundaries and nature of groups are very important for the formation and articulation of identity. With respect to the competing roles of national and regional identity, EU literatures and empirical data have revealed that these can coexist and be strong in that people can feel being a part of both Europe and their respective nations, which is a condition found in several pro-European countries. Regarding this, the EU has been trying hard to promote and improve people’s perception of the union by launching promotional messages and projects aimed at convincing the masses that member states are tied by some sense of: common agreement, understanding and recognition. As a result, although a relatively large number of citizens still distrust and do not support the integration scheme, as the data in Chapter 4 has shown, a majority of EU citizens, to some degree, feel attached to the union and can recognize some EU aspects of identity, such as the euro and democratic values. In sum, as elicited in Chapter 4, identity has emerged as being a crucial factor in the development of European integration, because it provides a platform for its policies and activities as well as also giving its citizens participatory motivation, a sense of unity and a notion of brotherhood, albeit some do not want to have a community identity.

In the context of ASEAN, empirically, for this research it was found that a majority of discussions on norms refer to the elements of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as reflecting its identity. For example, one interviewee stated that:

“Well, it is not unique to ASEAN, but I think the ten Southeast Asian countries share some core principles. Those are the principles that you find in the UN Charter as well, non-interference, non-use of force and respect for national sovereignty”

Also, a Filipino scholar who used to work as a Director at the ASEAN Secretariat office in Jakarta point out:

“There is a notion of ASEAN if you are looking at the official level, all these gestures about the ASEAN Way... insistence on observance of ASEAN practices would be an indication that there is in fact already that ‘We Feeling’ within ASEAN”

In fact, the ASEAN Way is a set of fundamental principles adopted among member states as a means of diplomacy and multilateralism. Acharya (2001: 63) defined it as ‘a process of regional interactions and cooperation based on discreteness, informality, consensus building and non-confrontational bargaining styles’. That is, these principles are respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, settlement of disputes in a peaceful manner and renunciation of the threat or use of force. Solidum (1981: 136) emphasized that the most important of these values was perhaps the use of ‘very low-key diplomacy (which) avoids fanfare before an agreement is reached’. This sort of manner is used to avoid interstate conflicts and disunity and is thus seen as a crucial element that keeps the association thriving, for it has been instrumental in helping ASEAN to become, as Beeson (2008: 16) put it, ‘the most enduring organization of its sort to have emerged from the developing world’.

Nevertheless, regarding its perceived norms and identity, I discovered that the ASEAN Way is largely recognized only among the elites and technocrats. This can be seen in the work of Goh (2003: 115) for example, who wrote about the time when ASEAN held the pre-APEC Business Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1998. The US Vice President Al Gore criticised Malaysia’s policies for the dismissal and subsequent incarceration of that country’s Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. However, ASEAN members considered his message to be unsympathetic and uncaring as well as an aggressive imposition of American democratic values on the politics of one of its own. Subsequently, ASEAN diplomats gathered to stress their adherence to the ASEAN Way as a cardinal doctrine of their political identity. This example shows that collective identity does exist as common values will be expressed or come out when this faith was challenged by others, although it has not been proved so far that this sort of expression could happen beyond the elite and technocrat levels.

In detailed analysis of ASEAN’s collective identity for this work, different layers emerged, such that it was considered insightful to divide the discussion into two levels, namely the: state and citizen levels. This was due to the considerable differences in the development of collective identity discovered between the two levels, which were not apparent in the case of the EU. That is, ASEAN is widely recognized as an elitist organisation which lacks involvement or

participation from civilian sectors. As a consequence, there is a substantial gap in identity building between the groups of political leaders, deputies and technocrats, and those from the grassroots organisations as well as ordinary citizens. At the state level, it was observed that the concept of identity consistent with a constructivist stance, because this is able to provide insights into the formation of identity in ASEAN and the actions of states. Regarding this, in one of his prominent works, Wendt (1994: 389-390) made some important observations about the formation of collective identity among a group of states, claiming that through increased interdependence and transnational convergence of domestic values, a collective identity is formed at the international level. Extending this, Adler (2006: 102) pointed out that interaction, communication and socialization are salient for the emergence of new intersubjective knowledge in the form of new rules, social structures or new processes. In the context of ASEAN, Busse (1999: 45) opined that collective identity implies that states identify themselves and their interests with each other which may lead to the development of a feeling of community. In research it has been elicited that although the development path of ASEAN has recently been slowed, the primary concern of ASEAN integration is still always peace and security. This can be seen, for instance, in the statements laid down in the Bangkok Declaration and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, wherein it is indicated that a strict behavioural norm of ASEAN is the avoidance of conflict. However, tension could arise anytime and this is why its members continue to spend substantial sums on improving and upgrading their armed forces. Thus showing that antagonism among ASEAN countries is something deep inside that has never gone away. In spite of this, since the establishment of the grouping there has been no large-scale war, or planning for such an event, against a fellow member. This is witnessed by the fact that Article 13 to 17 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concerning a peaceful settlement of any arising disputes has never been invoked by the calling of a meeting of the High Council. That is, despite some emerging conflicts among members, most of them were resolved by low-key diplomacy and informal practices between political leaders. In this researcher’s view, this shows a positive evidence of the construction of norms and the existence of a collective identity owing to a heightened level of trust among members.

Through dynamic international interaction over time, the degree of interdependence and convergence between ASEAN members has increased. As a consequence, ASEAN states, including individuals who represent or act on behalf of these, have begun to develop a feeling of togetherness and that they share a common fate. Recently, they have started to promote

\[23\] See Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
these norms to the outside world and to express their shared values as a collective identity. This can be explained by Wendt’s (1994: 289) stance that ‘dependency, whether intersubjective or material, is a key determinant of the extent to which an actor’s identity is shaped by interaction’. It also coincides with the viewpoint of one interviewee who argued:

“I see identity as something that evolves as we do things together as we work together. And then as this evolves it can have a positive feedback loop into the whole integration process. So, it is a loop thing… as soon as you build more common values, then you come to share more similar idea and values. Then, the level of trust will be increased and, with the increased trust, it is easier for the integration process to proceed.”

From a slightly different perspective but also underlining this line of reasoning, another interviewee said:

“ASEAN Way is something created for an instrumental reason that is projected to the rest of the world... It is something they rely on. It is something they find useful. This is the way ASEAN works (no matter they feel that). There are so many things that ASEAN needs to cooperate about and if we start messing it up by moving away from the ASEAN way, commenting on internal affairs and interfering, that will break up ASEAN... So, we cannot afford to deviate from the ASEAN way.”

From this researcher’s perspective, if Wendt’s viewpoint is taken into consideration, the ASEAN way will increasingly be seen as the norms of the organisation that reflect a collective identity shared among its member countries and their political elites at the regional level. That is, it could be considered as being a by-product of the regional integration process, being formed and very much influenced by the political leaders’ experience, knowledge, beliefs and values. Moreover, it gives meaning to actions as well as shaping the group and individual state’s foreign policies.

According to the current investigation, ASEAN’s response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 perhaps is a good case for reflecting the formation of collective identity as well as how the organisation’s norms were able to influence the policies of the member states. By way of explanation, in order to respond to the Vietnamese aggression, Busse (1999: 48-51) pointed

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out that ASEAN had a few options to choose from. The first was to ignore the situation and stay neutral, which was deemed sensible by the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore who were not stakeholders in the conflict as the war had no direct impact on their security. The second choice was to form a military alliance against Vietnam, which would also have been beneficial to ASEAN, particularly in safeguarding the validity of its norms and providing additional security to a fellow member, namely, Thailand as a frontline state. In the end, the existence of the ASEAN norms directed the decision to adopt a third option. Seeing that the building up of a military alliance was too provocative and that the revered norms should be preserved, ASEAN decided to use its favoured style of diplomatic campaigning against Vietnam, through informal practice as well as personal communication between leaders. To some degree, this was productive because, on the one hand, it demonstrated the reiteration and validity of its norms, and on the other hand, it avoided the confrontation which could possibly have led to a widespread war. In sum, this case underlines the regional political culture and ASEAN’s adherence to procedural norms of the Association.

In this context, it is also important to consider the South China Sea disputes as exemplars of ASEAN’s norms and collective identity. Investigation of this for this thesis, unearthed significant implications in relation to Thailand’s response to the South China Sea territorial dispute. Regarding this, Thailand having centuries-old extraordinary relations with China has been widely seen as a broker, between its ASEAN fellow members and China in this territorial conflict. Considering alone Thai national interests and individual bilateral relations with all the involved parties, the relationship, both economic and political, with China seems to be much more important than with the Philippines or Vietnam and hence it would be detrimental Thailand’s interests if were to sacrifice these valuable relations by allowing it neighbours’ conflict with China to escalate. However, Thailand responded to the situation quite uncommonly. It stood up along with other ASEAN fellow members against the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, a maritime feature claimed by the Philippines. Also, as a broker or mediator for the conflict, in general, Thailand has dealt with such situations quite neutrally, but constantly reiterating calls for a peaceful resolution, which as explained above is one of ASEAN’s norms, and unity amongst members. This can be seen in a speech given at the

26 ASEAN foreign ministers issued a statement on 18 March 1995 in response to the Chinese encroachment expressing their ‘serious concern’ and urged those involved ‘to refrain from taking actions that de-stabilize the situation’.
45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2012 by the Thai Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul. He noted that:

“(ASEAN and China) should build trust and a win-win situation... (As the ASEAN Dialogue Coordinator for China) Thailand will try its best towards this end. We will push ahead with concrete implementation of the DOC, while ensuring the COC drafting process that is inclusive and comfortable for all sides. We must get it right from the start.... ASEAN should have a positive influence on regional and international issues; ASEAN needs to speak more with one voice. Our collective voice does matter internationally. Unity would enhance credibility and centrality in the regional architecture.”

Notably, Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, opined that the problem of the South China Sea disputes was a concern for all ASEAN countries as it could destabilise the region. He stated:

“We must have an ASEAN outlook... on the matter. It is self-evident whenever ASEAN speaks with one voice we are able to maintain our centrality and ensure that we deliver results... The situation on the ground at sea is showing signs of concern for all of us. We have been following what has been transpiring. All those developments reinforce the need to get the COC concluded as soon as possible. (If there is no progress on the COC) the situation will become more destabilizing. (This is) not in our common interest.”

These kinds of statements manifest the emergence of togetherness, the elements of the ASEAN Way and the notion that its member states, to be more specific the political leaders and technocrats, are tied by: common principles, interests and values.

In brief, it is contended that the ASEAN Way, inherently, has been playing a substantial role in shaping ideas, decisions and action at the state level. After members have recognized that they belong to the group, the feeling of togetherness and construction of identity have begun to be developed through the sharing of certain principles or values, or the sense that members feel they have something important in common. The case of the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict posed a threat to regional peace and security, which led to the demand for an instant response and

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27 For more details, please see http://www.japanfocus.org/-Carlyle_A_.-Thayer/3813

28 ibid
mutual commitment towards this by ASEAN. Similarly, the unresolved disputes of the South China Sea signal that these are going to pose a major security concern for a number of ASEAN members, regarding which, high expectations have been placed on ASEAN to come up with a viable solution. This links to the previous contention that collective identity and shared values will be explicitly declared when they are challenged by outsiders or when it is threatening the ultimate goal of association which is security. As the association could survive and overcome such challenges through a number of intra-regional challenges, the belief here is that at the state level such an emerging collective identity is strong enough to provide cement for the sake of regional peace and unity at least for the foreseeable future. One interview with a scholar raised some interesting points about the influence of norms in the region, particularly non-interference, when he said:

“Before the era of democratisation, this was not an issue. They (Sukarno, Suharto, Mahathir and etc.) didn’t have to worry so much about public opinion. They didn’t have an election to win four years down the road. So, there was less need to play up national cards. With the process of democratisation, politics become messier and those elements started playing a more important role. ... It is against, making integration more difficult.”

This can be seen in the discussion of the previous chapter regarding the incompatibility between ASEAN and democracy. In connection with such a perspective, it is also proffered here that the vitality of ASEAN’s norms are actually one of the most significant forces that hinder the development of democracy in the region.

Moving away from the elites and technocrats, collective identity at the citizen level is a different story. As mentioned earlier, constructing collective identity among the diverse ASEAN citizens seems to be a great challenge for the regional and national governing bodies, which will require substantial change by all the involved parties. The key questions are those of does collective identity exist at the citizen level in ASEAN? Also whether and if so, to what extent do people in the member countries feel attached to ASEAN? Unfortunately, only a few studies focusing on ASEAN awareness have been published to date. Perhaps, the most prominent work is that by Thompson and Thianthai (2008) under the title “Attitudes and Awareness toward ASEAN: Findings of a Ten Nation Survey”. They conducted a survey of university students from the ten member states in order to measure their awareness of and attitude

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toward ASEAN, including their general knowledge about it as well as their orientation towards the grouping. However, this survey was aimed at targeting only a group of students from the top or national universities of each member state and consequently, was restricted to finding the views of the most highly educated members of the next generation of ASEAN citizens.

The findings of this survey do generate some interesting implications for the future of ASEAN. On the whole, Thompson and Thianthai (2008: 63) concluded that ‘students across the region demonstrate a fairly high level of knowledge about the Association and have generally positive attitudes toward it. They go so far as to generally agree when asked if they consider themselves to be citizens of ASEAN’. According to the report, the most enthusiastic attitudes were found in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the least affluent and most recent member states, while the most sceptical ones were found among Myanmar’s students. Singapore students also expressed some scepticism, but the researchers concluded their attitudes could be categorized as ‘ambivalence’. The rest of the countries had generally positive attitudes. On the whole, over 75% of the students recognized themselves to be citizens of ASEAN, while nearly 90% and 70%, respectively, felt that ASEAN membership was beneficial to their countries and to themselves.

In this researcher’s view, although this research provides future implications for ASEAN, particularly the way to detach itself from being an elitist organization, the outcomes do not truly reflect general awareness of ASEAN at present. One reason for this is that this survey was funded by and conducted on behalf of the ASEAN Foundation, an important institutional body of the Association in charge of promoting greater awareness and participation in ASEAN’s activities. More importantly, targeting only students from the national universities betrays the fact that they were only interested in measuring the attitudes of people who were young, highly-educated and well-financed, not just ordinary citizens of ASEAN. As such this research does not represent an accurate picture regarding the level of awareness of middle-class citizens, who are supposed to be the main driving force behind ASEAN. It should also be noted that in many of Southeast Asian countries access to good education is very much determined by economic circumstance. Therefore, most of those targeted students were likely to have come from elite or high-income families and, in relation to the social structure and culture of business and networking in Southeast Asia, likely to become elites, technocrats or upper-class citizens in the future.

30 The functions of ASEAN Foundation are identified in Section 7.3
Perhaps, the findings from my interviews can give better insights and reflections on the existence of collective identity among ASEAN citizens. Addressing the first question about the existence of collective identity at the individual level, in contrast with the results of the above survey, there were quite a substantial number of participants in this study who agreed that collective identity in ASEAN does not exist at the citizen level. For instance, these following statements are some of the reflections recorded on this matter:

“I must admit that I am a little bit more sceptical at that (citizen) level. That is where you do have a great deficit.”

“(About existing identity at the citizen level) As far as popular perception is concerned, I am afraid to say that there is nothing... There have been surveys across Southeast Asia recently asking people on the street, such as what do you feel about ASEAN? Do you know what ASEAN is? And a lot of people don’t know.”

“Nothing at all. It is only at a diplomatic or elite level. But if you go below that, then I would say no.”

“(About identity at citizen level) that is (clearly) less because ASEAN is well-known as a project of the elites... (For Identity) among students, journalists, woman groups, that is something that is in its very very early days

“(That is) only among the elites and only scholars who work on ASEAN. I don’t think there is really identity at the ground level.”

Additionally, this was supported by an interview given by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak in the New Straits Times, which demonstrates the presence of detachment from ASEAN and the need to cultivate awareness about it among the youth. He stated:

“It is precisely this mindset that we need to change by increasing the younger generation’s interest in ASEAN and helping them see and understand their power and their potential.”

Finally, it also coincided with the result of communal surveys conducted by Christopher Roberts (2012: 173). In his analysis, he revealed that ‘while grassroots regionalization does appear to have contributed relatively high levels of regional knowledge and awareness, it has not yet generated a significant collective identity’, due to the remaining lack of trust in considering whether other ASEAN countries are ‘good neighbours’. Thus, it is concluded here that the evidence points to the fact that, at citizen level an ASEAN collective identity barely exists.

The next question is about the emergence and the role of collective identity in constructing the regional community. As mentioned earlier, constructivists advise that collective identity is socially constructed through communication, interaction and common experiences among members and, in return, collective identity helps to create meaning and provide an explanation to state and individual actions as well as regarding the foundation of common interests. Therefore, for ordinary citizens, I would contend that identity helps people to distinguish themselves as a member of the group and thus construct a sense of belonging. This issue was clearly made by one of the respondents when asked about the accommodative culture in ASEAN who concluded that:

““It is part of the process that brings us to distinguish ourselves as ASEAN.”

To be more specific about this concern, the viewpoint expressed by a Singaporean scholar perhaps best explains this concern:

“It (identity) can foster unity and familiarity among people. Identity is not something that you arrive at. It is always influx. It is always being redefined. So, it is apparently a moving target. I think the important thing is the process through which people try to craft or construct common identity. The process means that we try to find a common ground, I try to understand you and you try to understand me... And the best way to

36 To see the full article, please go to http://www.nst.com.my/top-news/young-people-show-disinterest-in-asean-1.70904

find a common ground is (through) common interests, (such as) concerns over survival and security.”

This statement advocates the constructivist explanation and the earlier position put forward by this researcher that identity is a by-product of the regional integration process. This implies that collective identity cannot be promoted right away, because it is highly dependent on the ongoing process for its construction. Although the issue of identity is relatively intuitive and very hard to quantify, all the interview respondents did agree, in general, that identity should play an important role in ASEAN integration.

The last point for discussion is about how to create or promote collective identity among people and a number of respondents gave constructive insights into this matter. A Malaysian scholar posited:

“If ASEAN starts maturing to its people and people can look to ASEAN as a way that... ASEAN can actually safeguard me or help us. Then, maybe that identity will grow... ASEAN should do things that benefit ordinary people and that people can see (or feel) that ASEAN is useful to them.”

Also, as observed by a former director who worked at the ASEAN Secretariat:

“(the idea is that) Once you let people visit each other and they see neighbouring countries, then identity that (showing) we are in the same region, we are in the same ASEAN community will slowly emerge.”

This implies that collective identity will be constructed, as for the elite level, when there is sufficient interaction between people from different ASEAN nations. Moreover, some of the collected data stresses the role of education in constructing a regional identity, with, for instance in this regard, the former Secretary General of ASEAN commenting:

“We should have more knowledge of one another... and the devotion to provide good education for our young people.”

The viewpoint of the former Secretary General corresponds with work written by Michael E. Jones. He wrote about how ASEAN’s identity and a sense of belonging together can be constructed, by emphasising the role of education in the process as this has been found to be of key importance in the study of collective identity. In his own words:

‘For the citizens of ASEAN to become truly regional, it will be necessary to know other cultures outside of their own community and country. Borders will be made “fluid” and citizens will be able to move much more freely in the region... The responsibilities to know others, how to be respectful of others, and how to empathize and communicate cross-culturally will require education as these, like democracy and politics, never come intuitively. A broader view of the world and how to engage in it will be crucial tools for ASEAN regional citizens.’ (Jones, 2004: 147-148)

5.5 Discussion and conclusion
The empirical study of European identity has generated several noteworthy insights. First, it is clear that individuals in EU polity can possess multiple identities, most evidently national and regional identities, and relationships between them remain unclear and sophisticated. One of revealing examples in this regard is the result showing that citizens of some countries not only greatly declare their national pride, but also identify themselves as Europeans (Risse, 2001: 7). Moreover, the evidence has confirmed that national and regional identities can coexist, but the consequences of this depend on the management of those identities at the supranational level as well as the nature of the community. Second, some of the literature has elicited that EU member states are tied together mainly by its attractive economic benefits. However, survey results in some countries, such as Portugal, Greece and Ireland, reveal that the idea that the more benefits countries gain from European integration the more they are likely to feel attached to Europe has been rejected (ibid). This outcome is perhaps influenced by other factors, such as history and culture, and hence may require further consideration. Third, people’s attitudes towards the EU vary to a great extent within member states and there seems to be a large number of EU citizens who distrust and do not support the overall project. This relates to concerns about such matters as the lack of information dissemination, bottom-up communication, openness, transparency and lack of legitimacy. Finally, it would appear that European identity is crucial for the development of European integration. That is, it can mentally give the EU support and comfort for its policies and activities, whilst at the same time providing its citizens participatory motivation, sense of unity and a notion of brotherhood. A strong identity would drive EU citizens towards ‘a deeper political involvement and attachment’ and strengthen the future of European integration (Valentini, 2005: 1).
In case of ASEAN, collective identity is one of the most complicated issues in the study of regional integration, for it is intuitive, very subjective and involves multidimensional factors in the process of its construction. Southeast Asia has evolved from a region dominated by European colonial powers to one that has been attempting to shape its own destiny. Its diversity and the absence of cultural homogeneity make it difficult for Southeast Asia to be recognized as a definable region and underpin the fact that it has been encountering difficulties in constructing regional unity and identity. However, ASEAN appears to be the most important mechanism to tackle this problem by promoting the necessity of deepening the interdependence between member states. Using conventional patterns of international relations and interactions, it has helped in region-building, having now distinguished itself from the rest of the world, thus making it a distinct entity to external perceptions. With respect to this, this researcher concurs with the view that the regional integration is a process of identity building itself and thus fully supports Acharya’s (2005: 104) perspective that the construction of an ASEAN identity is ‘identity-in-the-making’, rather than ‘identity in being’. Regarding the study of collective identity in Southeast Asia, he also went further to purport ‘regionalism in Southeast Asia is not a slideshow to power politics, but a potentially transformative dynamic. Without taking cognizance of norms, identity and institutional-building, one would only gain a partial and distorted view of regional order in Southeast Asia’ (Acharya, 2005: 98). In the analysis of identity formation, constructivism solely emerges as a well-suited theoretical framework that can explain the formation of a collective identity at the regional level. Repeatedly, it has been made clear that identity helps states to gain meaning and define ‘who they are, their goals and the roles they believe they should play’ (Wendt, 1999: 231) and (Copeland, 2000: 190). Additionally, as appeared in the work of Acharya and Stubbs (2006: 127), these constructivists have pointed out that ‘ideational forces, including norms and identity, are very much a part of the regional environment or “structure” that shapes Southeast Asia’s regional order’. From this it can be inferred that identity plays a crucial role in providing an explanation for state actions, including those of individuals who act on behalf of the state, and the foundations of state interests at the regional level.

In the context of ASEAN, it has emerged in this research that a majority of discussion about norms and identity have revolved around the elements of the ASEAN Way. This set of crucial principles, proclaimed as an association’s form of multilateralism, acts as a mechanism for avoiding conflicts and disunity within the group and as such greatly determines the formation of identity at the state level. That is, it plays an important role in shaping ideas, decisions and action of states. As pointed out by constructivists, by the increased interdependence and the
convergence of shared values, i.e. ‘we-feelings’ or feelings of togetherness, are gradually formed through systemic international interaction, communication and socialization. It is claimed here that to some extent, through the dynamics of regional integration, collective identity will, more or less, occur automatically because it comes as a by-product of the regional integration process, which is very much influenced by political leaders’ experience, knowledge, beliefs and values. The cases of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and the South China Sea disputes has convinced this researcher that ASEAN’s identity does exist among elites and technocrats, being strong enough to provide the cement for the sake of regional peace and unity.

The formation of collective identity at the citizen level is a thought-provoking matter and demands a significant change by all the associated parties. According to the documents and interviews, the data demonstrated that collective identity only rarely exists at the citizen level, but that, as at the state level, citizen identity is socially constructed through communication, interaction and common experiences among people across the region. Thus, it is concluded that the collective identity and feeling of togetherness among ordinary people cannot be achieved overnight. That is, the forging of identity needs to take time and involve the proactive promotion of interaction as well as the sharing of common experiences. As mentioned by one respondent for this work, identity is a moving thing, in flux, always being redefined and highly dependent on the process. In the author’s view, a transnational system that facilitates and encourages the connectivity and movements of people and information needs to be created.

Finally, the literature and findings discussed in this chapter clearly highlight the importance of collective identity in ASEAN integration and the need to transform the Association from an elite organization, into a people’s one. The remark of a former ASEAN technocrat clearly affirms this, when he states:

“In the long run, you cannot build a regional community. You cannot push for regional objectives without support from (regional) people. They must know. They must recognize. They must support.”

The opinion here is that it is not the citizen’s responsibility to be in touch and acquaint themselves with the Association, but rather, it is ASEAN’s responsibility to perform this task, by engaging with the citizens and bringing them on board. Furthermore, it is crucial to make them

41 Ibid.
see, feel and experience how ASEAN can be beneficial to their routine lives. Finally, education, particularly in a way that empathizes and familiarizes people with the region, could prove to be a vital factor in determining the success and the continuation of ASEAN. As Acharya (2005: 112) concluded in his work, ‘ASEAN’s success then as now depended on defending its norms, increasing socialization and pursuing a regional identity’.
6 INSTITUTIONS IN ASEAN

6.1 Introduction

Despite regional integration having been introduced in Europe since the 1950s, in Southeast Asia it was not until the 1980s that it began to gain attention. The 1997 financial crisis highlighted the high degree of interdependence among ASEAN members and the urgent need for closer cooperation towards more intensive regional community building. To fulfil this ambition and match the speed of European integration, institutional development is accepted as being one of the most important driving factors. In fact, ASEAN has undergone significant transformation over recent decades by revamping its institutional structure in ways that can now support its administration and activities in such a way as to be able to invite comparisons with the European Union (Jetschke and Murray, 2011: 176). Such efforts can be found in the ASEAN Vision 2020 introduced in 1997, the 2003 Bali Summit and the 2004 Vientiane Action Programme. However, the ASEAN Charter adopted in 2008 would appear to be the most important document aimed at strengthening its institutional organs. That is, it has improved the organisation’s implementation and dispute-settlement mechanisms, consolidated its decision-making structure and provided the association with more rule-based conditions as well as more legally binding obligations. Regarding its institutional development, ASEAN has been facing difficulties, which have led to growing criticism. This has been mainly focused on the problems of deficiency, whereby ASEAN institutions have not been awarded a sufficient mandate or resources to perform its day to day business or to carry out effective policy implementation.

New institutionalists claim that strong institutions are a prerequisite for constructing a regional community, for they act as the rules of the game and they link all actors and their action together. Moreover, they are important in shaping individual behaviours and perceptions, influencing policy outcomes, imposing constraints and can also reduce uncertainty within the group. Similarly, integration theories also highlight the importance of institutions in the process. Under neofunctionalism institutions are viewed as the backbone of the association where all political activities take place, while liberal intergovernmentalism underlines their role in facilitating and accelerating the integration process to achieve mutually desired outcomes, for example, by providing reliable information, monitoring compliance and linking across issues. Finally, under the constructivist lens regional integration is depicted as a social interaction, which includes international contexts by considering states and institutions as cognitive and correlative entities. This supports the perspective that international contexts are
vital for understanding institutions in the regional settings as they construct states’ identities and interests. In sum, these theories identify the key roles of institution and hold that to construct a successful regional community a certain form of institutional arrangements is required.

In terms of institution, the case of ASEAN could make an insightful contribution to the study of regional integration. It contrasts the picture of European integration in that so far it has mainly bypassed the role of the institution, concentrating more on the influence of national states in the process. Consequently, examining the institution in the context of ASEAN and its impact on integration would shed new light on regional contexts in the developing world that do not have a tradition of strong institutions. This chapter will begin with the European perspectives on institutions. The second section provides the background to the path of institutional development in ASEAN. The following section presents in detail the current institutional structure of the organisation after being enhanced in 2007 by the ASEAN Charter. Then, the main discussion section provides evidence for evaluating the role of institutions in the development of ASEAN’s integration. Finally, the chapter is concluded by providing further discussion and a summary of the important findings as well as giving constructive suggestions for solutions to the problems identified.

6.2 European perspectives
Institutions have been at the heart of European integration since its establishment as the union has relied on a number of institutional agencies to keep it functioning. In fact, these institutional bodies set up the framework for cooperation between member states and have dedicated themselves to every aspect of European life. That is, they have played a vital role in initiating and setting the agenda, law-making, budgeting, policy implementing as well as monitoring procedures. The functions of EU institutions are prescribed in the treaties, agreed by the leaders of all the EU member states and ratified by their parliaments, which empower them and determine everything the EU does (europa.eu, 2012). Indeed, institutions represent the common interests of the EU as a whole and are viewed as the backbone of the union; places where member countries pool some of their sovereignty and confidence.

In Chapter 3, one definition of institutions as put forward by new institutionalists is that they are ‘the rules of the game’ and as such ‘institutions matter’. Put simply, their role is to provide shared space for members to exercise their power and hence, according to new institutionalism, ‘political analysis is best conducted through a focus on institutions or, more specifically, when starting off with institutions’ (Lecours, 2005: 6). While sharing the notion of
‘institutions matter’, the three strands of new institutionalism (rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism) offer different approaches to thinking theoretically about them and their influences on action and outcomes. In particular, the sociological institutionalist definition proposed by March and Olsen (1989: 21) provides a significant departure, defining institutions more broadly in non-materialist terms to include conventional practices, such as norms, beliefs, culture and values. Consequently, it is crucial to understand institutions in the context of European integration, because they clearly structure the politics of the European Union. Taking new institutionalism’s perspectives into account, EU institutions do not just have the structure of authoritative units that offer common goods and services, for they are also mechanisms that shape the perceptions and action of all concerned parties in the way that favours the goals of regional integration.

The structure of the EU is very unique and complex which is reflected in its institutional design. Its system of governance is like:

“a contraption with many rough and fuzzy edges, consisting of a set of machines with roughly interacting parts designed by many hands, inspired by different ideas, frequently adapted and roughly tuned. The system comprises a network of interdependent institutions, none of which can function without reference to others” (Jones, 1996: 105-106).

The most important constituent is that, in the absence of a constitution, everything implemented in the EU is arranged and based on a series of treaties, agreed upon by its member states. This includes EU institutions whose action, remit, procedures and objectives are set out. Apart from enabling small and large states to compete equally and reassuring all that their individual interests will be safeguarded, the existence of treaties is crucial as they provide solid legal support and a functioning platform for institutions.

There are several treaties that streamline the institutional framework and thus provide the foundations for the EU. In a chronological order, the Paris Treaty in 1951 began the story of the EU by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Subsequently, the Treaty of Rome in 1957 paved the way to what later became the EU by introducing two more important institutional bodies: the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community. In 1965, the signing of the Brussels Treaty merged the three organizations into a single unified body known as the European Community. Then in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty established the three-pillar structure of the union, changed the official title from the European Community to the European Union and kicked off the process of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice in 2001 amended the previous treaties to ensure that the institutional structures could meet the challenge of enlargement. Finally, the latest, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, was passed with aim of clarifying the goals, structures and direction as well as gave a legal personality of the EU.

In terms of institutional structure, the EU retains a solid appearance of legality and institutionalisation. Its institutional framework of the EU comprises seven main institutions, two intergovernmental bodies (the European Council and the Council of Ministers) and four supranational bodies (the Commission, the Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank). In short, ‘the Commission put forward the ideas, the European Parliament gave its opinion on the proposal, the Council of Ministers took the final decision and the Commission was responsible for putting the agreed policy into effect and monitoring its progress’ (Gowland et al., 2006: 325-326). Although the Court of Justice does not directly involve itself in the decision-making process, it is vital in the sense that it provides authoritative interpretation of the treaties and the powers of those institutions (ibid). Indeed, this embodies the fact that all EU institutions have a close interaction and cannot perform without the others’ involvement.

In detail, the EU decision-making process begins with the exclusive right of the Commission proposing legislation and the budget, i.e. with a role of initiative or agenda setter. Any proposal is then passed to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament as the joint legislative

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**Figure 6.1: The structure of EU decision making**

decision makers (Bache et al., 2011: 229). The latter is the single body that involves EU citizens whose representatives are voted for every five years by their national electorates, while the former comprises government ministers from EU member states who can have their say, subject to what is being discussed. Moreover, the European Parliament is responsible for supervising the commissioners and possesses the sole power to sack them, whereas the Council of Ministers is in charge of their appointment (BBC, 2010). Once legislation has been passed, the Court of Justice will ensure that there is a correct interpretation across all EU member states. The Court of Auditors monitors the budget in order to ensure that the money is spent properly.

The stage of policy implementation can be prolonged, because quite often it involves the conflicting views between the member states and the various EU institutions (Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011: 272). After a legislative proposal has been agreed by all involved parties, the primary implementation will belong to the administrations of the member states. However, the Commission also has responsibility for implementing the decisions by working actively with the member states, monitoring the implementation of policies ‘with respect to a timely and correct transposition of legislation into national law, as well as with respect to a correct and complete practical application of policies’ (ibid). If it is found that a member state has failed to implement a decision, the Commission is required to begin an infringement procedure and the case may go to the European Court of Justice. However, in order to help member states to implement EU policies, the EU has also created a variety of regulatory agencies to provide proficient advice on policy implementation.

There have been a number of significant modifications to the EU institutional framework owing to the passing of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, including amendments to the previous treaties. Most importantly, there has been a considerable decrease in the power of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, while by contrast the European Council and the European Parliament have been granted more power and significance. This has been evidenced in the debates in recent years where member states have played the key role, rather than the Commission (Mahony, 2010). In particular, the motor of European integration has been switched from the Commission to the European Council, which has been assigned the role of moving forward EU activities and defining its political goals. Also, an independent president has been appointed to the European Council in order to ‘act as a consensus-builder and umpire among these leaders’ (Broin, 2009). Moreover, the Parliament has been increased in size and has become an evenly empowered co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in almost all cases. Furthermore, a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy has been created for the purpose of making EU policy more coherent and to ensure that the union speaks with single voice. The EU legislative process has been made more directly democratic as EU citizens now have a channel to propose laws by submitting their proposals through the Commission. A new voting system has also been introduced for decisions among national governments on EU affairs by changing from the weighting of votes based on the size of population, to a one-vote-per-one-country system (ibid). Finally, the Lisbon Treaty abolished the three-pillar structure and the union is now a united single organization.

![Organizational chart of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty](http://www.eahp.eu/News/EU-Monitor/EAHP-presentation-of-the-EU-main-institutions)

**Figure 6.2: Organizational chart of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty**

*Source: http://www.eahp.eu/News/EU-Monitor/EAHP-presentation-of-the-EU-main-institutions*

After the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has experienced some significant changes to its institutional architecture and the treaty to some extent has tidied up the complexity of the EU structure. That is, it made the EU ‘more democratic and transparent, introduced simplified
working methods and voting rules, ensured our fundamental rights through a charter, and allow the EU to speak with one voice on global issues’ (European Commission Directorate-General for Communication, 2007: 6). However, the main actors in EU decision-making process remain the same: the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, it is only the power balance that has shifted. Interest groups continue to exercise their influence on the agenda and the outcomes of the decision-making process (Bache et al., 2011: 252-253). Although some EU institutions such as the Commission are important at the implementation stage, national governments still remain a pivotal actor in accomplishing this task.

The underlying content regarding the affairs of the institutions has widely become a research agenda in the study of European integration. Generally, the structure of EU institutions is designed for the purpose of reconciling the various interests of member states in order to seek mutual agreement. In the literature, institutionalists highlight that adequate, solid and efficient institutions are essential for development at every level: local, regional and global (Rodríguez-Pose, 2010: 9). According to Putnam (2000: 325), they should be the ‘key enablers of innovation, mutual learning and productivity growth’ and smooth the path to the making and implementation of efficient development strategies across territories. Institutions facilitate the process of knowledge and innovation transfer within the region and enhance the development of economic activity by lowering uncertainty and information costs (North, 1990, Vázquez-Barquero, 2002). Lack of solid and efficient institutions restrains economic activities by creating ‘high transaction costs, widespread rent seeking, inequality and a lack of trust’ (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006: 14). This highlights the perspective of institutionalists that even the best strategy can be undermined by a poor institutional environment (Rodríguez-Pose, 2010: 14).

Much of the recent EU literature on institutions points out that the integration process is clearly linked to the politics within the existing institutional structure and hence, must not be overlooked (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: 440). Consequently, it advises that the European integration project is in need of institutionalisation, involving the creation of appropriate institutions if the scheme is to work. Not only the EU, but all current existing regional projects, to some degree, have established some sort of institutional elements to govern their regional communities. For example, the institutional structure of the African Union is similar to that of the EU, having a Commission, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice undertaking similar tasks. Akin to this, the UNASUL of Latin America has set up the South American Parliament, the Ministerial Councils and the Central Bank to assist the steps towards Latin American integration. Institutions are tasked with a ensuring a balance of influence among competing
interests in the regional integration process. Moreover, they supply rules for the game and assign a template for power exchange in the process as well as legitimising every EU process and action. Hence, for the EU, institutions not just matter, for they are the backbone of European integration, providing ‘the mainstay of effective collective governance for Europe’ (Rowe, 2012).

As recognized, European integration is a mixture of two antagonistic concepts: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Regarding the latter, the national governments are still the most influential actors and ultimate decision makers in the regional integration process. Therefore, as such, the EU is more similar to an intergovernmental organization than a federal state. However, it also exhibits some supranational elements, such as the common interests and the collective action of the union. According Haas’s notorious quote, regional integration is the process ‘whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new and larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’ (Haas, 1961: 366). This implies that institutions are the principal feature of supranationality in the regional integration process. For institutionalism, which focuses on the institutional structure of the EU, the question is that why do institutions take a more important role than concepts, such as ‘ideas, identities, processes, national interests, spillover effects, or other concepts that could or have been the starting point of the analysis?’ (Tsebelis, 1999: 2).

In this regard, Tsebelis (ibid) explained that institutions determine the sequence of moves that define the game, in relation to the set of choices and information that each actor has at the moment, specifying the process in terms of what is permitted and what is not, as well as determining the choices of actors and the information they control. As a consequence, different institutional structures will produce different strategies for the actors, and different outcomes from their interactions (Tsebelis, 1999: 2-3). All in all, under this lens the main contention of intergovernmentalism, which that national governments solely determine the development of the EU, is rejected (Tsebelis, 1999: 7).

6.3 The institutional development of ASEAN
As explained in the previous chapter, Southeast Asia became a distinct region as a consequence of it being the theatre of operation in World War II and Europeanization, which specifically led to the development of ASEAN and its institutional structure. Accelerated by the Cold War, there was the motivation to develop ASEAN and its institutions so as to establish peace and security as well as cultivate the nation-building of the newly independent states against the external powers that attempted to dictate the regional order in Southeast Asia.
With surrounding uncertainty and the unstable political environment, in particular, the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, it is perhaps unsurprising that the initial statement of purpose in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 is ‘remarkably bland, open-ended and non-specific’ (Beeson, 2008: 19). More importantly, this implies that the association agreed to preserve and reinforce their fragile sovereignty, but not to pursue the deeply integrated regional structures as appeared in Western Europe. In the same manner, ASEAN in the context of institutions has moved in ways that fundamentally differ from those of the EU. For example, ASEAN’s Secretariat, as its central institutional body, was not established until the first leaders’ summit held in 1976 and is ‘small, poorly resourced and relatively powerless’ (Beeson, 2008: 20). It is housed in a small old building in Jakarta, being under-funded and under-staffed. This is in contrast to EU headquarters in Brussels where most powerful institutions of the EU are hosted with powerful mandates as well as plenty of financial and human resources. In general, discussed in the previous chapter, the logic and practices of ASEAN’s institutionalisation have been considerably shaped by the norms of the group, or the elements of ASEAN Way. That is, with the preserving of national sovereignty and the reliance on personal contacts of political elites to reach common agreements, the supreme decision-making power is delegated to the meetings of political leaders, bypassing the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary General. That is, although it is they who are supposed to be the political spokespeople of the association, their lack of a clear mandate for imposing regulations and enforcing compliance on member states means that they have been largely ineffectual.

From the outset, the development of ASEAN institutions was highly influenced by a set of ideas that were shaped by the regional cultural values and events that ‘preoccupied politicians, intellectuals and opinion leaders over many years’ (Stubbs, 2008: 455). Regarding this, the history, ideas and the distinctive traits of ASEAN Way have served to define an appropriate means of diplomacy and multilateralism, which could provide an explanation for the nature of institutionalisation within the region. In relation to history, it can be traced back to the timing of the formation of ASEAN in 1967. The end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the rise of nationalism resulting from colonial experiences, the gaining of independence by ASEAN members, the spread of communism and the Cold War that took a strong hold on the region were the key drivers that helped to ‘shape the ideational basis of the association and its initial trajectory’ (Stubbs, 2008: 456). Similarly, Narine (1998: 33) pointed out that there were interrelated objectives involved in the creation of ASEAN: ‘to alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions, to reduce the regional influence of external actors and to promote the socioeconomic development of its member states as a further hedge against Communist insurgency’. These
concerns continued to influence the association until the end of 1970s, when the member states started to prosper, mainly from increasing foreign direct investment, and gain more confidence, which resulted in several treaties and declarations as well as institutional initiatives. To some extent, this affirms the belief that the initial decision and intention to establish ASEAN were productive and hence had paid off.

On the other hand, ASEAN is well-known for its informality as well as reluctance and discomfort towards the adoption of solid formal institutions and legally binding obligations. In terms of external cooperation, the association has demonstrated the extent of it being an ad hoc organization, as most of its institutional initiatives and development were responses to external forces and an uncertain regional environment, which could be put down to the variation in the nature of its members political regimes. For example, Narine (1998: 33-34) wrote that the reunification of Vietnam under Communist rule led to the signing of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which was aimed at articulating ASEAN's understanding of peaceful dispute settlement and respecting the sovereignty and independence of members. Consequently, Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia called for ASEAN's immediate action and resolution to the conflict, which manifested itself as an extension of the organizational scope of the association. After the end of the conflict, the association significantly widened its organizational scope to include Vietnam and three other Indochina states (Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) by the end of 1990s. It is widely thought that these countries joined the association, in part, because of the emphasis on respect for national sovereignty and equality among members.42

In terms of being multiple and open regionalism, one important characteristic of ASEAN, and of its members, is the ‘openness to mutually beneficial linkages with outside powers’ (Severino, 2009: 18). First of all, it is worth noting that the roles of China and Japan and their increasing interests in Southeast Asia are considered critical for the institutional development of ASEAN. That is, good relations with both countries have emerged over the decades and been important for regional stability as well as ASEAN's institutional-building in East Asia. For China, according to Tan and Khor (2006: 17), cooperating with ASEAN is an effective way of developing East Asia as a counter-weight to the US and the EU in terms of economic matters. China has also found that ASEAN's norms of sovereignty, non-interference and equality of

42 See Stubbs (2008: 460)
nations correspond with its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.\footnote{See Severino (2006: 279)} In the eyes of Japan, ASEAN is seen as a highly-valued partner for peace and prosperity in the region. From the other side, ASEAN has growing interests in Northeast Asia, seeing China and Japan as great economic opportunities for the region’s growth as well as the provision of networking channels. For this reason, during the years of financial crisis, ASEAN stepped up to institutionalise summit and ministerial meetings, with the inclusion of China, Japan and Korea, known as ASEAN+3 (Wunderlich, 2007: 28). Later, as envisioned by Malaysia, the grouping was extended to include Australia, New Zealand and India in 2005, being now known as the East Asia Summit or ASEAN+6. Furthermore, ASEAN is also tied in with a number of wider cooperative frameworks, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), where it has been playing an instrumental role. From these developments, it can be rightly assumed that ‘ASEAN’s goals and norms have permeated institutions well beyond Southeast Asia’, with the ASEAN Way having been strong enough to become the basis for ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 as well as how the ARF, APEC and ASEM members conduct negotiations (Stubbs, 2008: 464). This could be seen at the inaugural ASEM summit in Bangkok, where ASEAN championed the exclusion of human rights and democracy from the agenda and rather chose to focus on promoting economic cooperation between Europe and Asia.\footnote{See Palmujoki (1997: 281-282)}
Similarly, the internal dynamics of ASEAN institutions has also been forged designed based on the principal values of the organisation. Accordingly, the avoidance of armed conflict, the non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the consensus-based decision making and the non-legally binding agreements give plenty of space for member states to exercise their rights and powers freely as well as to pursue their regional agendas. To some extent, this helps to create a scene of equality in that the smaller member states feel comfortable when dealing with larger partners. However, as a consequence of its members unwillingness to delegate powers to the institutional bodies, ASEAN lacks effective institutional mechanisms to support, pursue and deliver its objectives and policy initiatives as well as being unable to act against the will of a member state. With the absence of a strong central authority, policy delivery and forceful compliance mechanisms, ‘ASEAN continues to rely primarily on the collective will of its member states, their perceived national interests, and peer pressure to ensure compliance with its agreements and decisions’ (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 125). This situation has led to number of well-voiced criticisms. For instance, ASEAN is often referred to as “a talk shop”, “a toothless tiger” or “big on words but small on action”. An assessment of this assertion is made in the following sections by considering the history of ASEAN’s institutional mechanisms and their role in regional integration process.

Figure 6.3: The network of ASEAN external relations
As can be seen in figure 6.4, the institutional structure of ASEAN is relatively complex and has wide horizontal configuration. As described in the ASEAN Charter\(^{45}\), the organisation has nine main institutional bodies as follows. The **ASEAN Summit** is the supreme institutional organ of ASEAN, taking the form of an annual meeting comprising the heads of member states and dialogue partners and is responsible for ‘taking decisions on key issues pertaining to the realisation of the objectives of ASEAN, important matters of interest to member states.’ The **ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC)** attended by the Foreign Ministers of the member states who meet at least twice a year, is responsible for preparing the summit and coordinating ‘the implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit’ and with the ASEAN Community Councils is tasked with enhancing policy coherence, efficiency and cooperation across these institutions. The **ASEAN Community Councils** together comprise the Three Pillars of ASEAN Community Councils the: ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic Community Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council. The objectives of each pillar are to coordinate the work of the relevant sectors, ensure the implementation of the relevant decisions as well as to submit reports and recommendations to the summit. The **ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies** are in charge of implementing the agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit, strengthening cooperation in the field and submitting reports and recommendations to their respective Community Councils.

\(^{45}\) See the ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 7-15.
The Secretary General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat form the organisation’s central administrative body. These staff work only for ASEAN and should not seek or receive instructions from any government or external party. The Secretary General is appointed by the ASEAN Summit for a non-renewable term of five-years and is assisted by four Deputy Secretaries-General who come from four different ASEAN member states. The Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) is a new important body, formerly known as the Standing Committee, which consist Permanent Representatives to ASEAN who act as its ambassadors. They ‘support the work of the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies’ as well as being tasked to ‘liaise with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects relevant to its work and facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners.’ The ASEAN National Secretariats serve as ‘the national focal points, being the repository of information on all ASEAN matters at the national level, coordinating the implementation of ASEAN decisions at the national level.’ The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), created to fulfil the objectives of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, operates ‘in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.’ Finally, the ASEAN Foundation was established for ‘promoting greater awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-to-people interaction, and close collaboration among the business sector, civil society, academia and other stakeholders in ASEAN.’ That is, it supports the Secretary-General of ASEAN and cooperates with the relevant institutions to promote ASEAN community building. Moreover, the Charter has paved the way for ASEAN to engage with other entities that support its purposes and principles, which can include organisations in the areas of business, academia, civil society and science and technology.

Overall, The ASEAN Charter, introduced in 2007, was a significant step forward which was aimed at promoting institutional development and silencing growing criticism by providing ASEAN with more rules-based and legally binding foundations. Moreover, it had the goal of the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as a single market and production base by 2015. It has been attested that the Charter ‘improves the organization’s compliance mechanisms, streamlines its decision-making structure, and extends its dispute-settlement mechanism’ (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 124). The ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary General can be construed as the core administrative mechanism of ASEAN’s institutions and is provided with its own financial resources and professional staff. However, although it has many responsibilities, it has very limited power. Before the restructuring of ASEAN institutions
in 1992, it served as a channel of information and was never meant to be an important body that would be able to command ASEAN activities and set agendas. Despite it having been accorded ministerial status and assigned to monitor and implement ASEAN policies after the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992, the Secretariat still has little input on policy initiatives, only operating in accordance with the directives issued by the ASEAN leaders and foreign ministers (Hernandez, 2007: 11). Even with the recent improvements in mandate and monitoring compliance given by the Charter, ASEAN is still a very top-down organisation, with the Secretariat still having to face many difficulties, as although they have to implement the policy of its leaders, they lack the resources, in terms of funding and qualified staff, to perform their function. Regarding this, Suryodiningrat (2009) has argued that ‘in practice, the secretary-general remains an official prostrate to the member countries’. Thus it becomes apparent that ASEAN institutions will not have the power to effectively implement policy as long as there has not been a significant shift in the vision of the organisation’s leaders. In particular, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, which have been rigidly upheld by its member states, need to be revisited.46

6.4 Evaluating the role of institutions in ASEAN integration

According to the literature, it is quite clear that strong institutions are crucial for regional community building and international politics at every level: local, regional and global (Rodríguez-Pose, 2010: 9). In Chapter 3, through the lens of new institutionalism it became apparent that, apart from being a central driving mechanism of a regional organisation, institutions are a prerequisite for constructing such a community. That is, they should be viewed as the rules of the game where all political behaviour is founded as well as performing the role of linking all the actors and their action together. Moreover, they play a vital role in shaping individual behaviours and perceptions, influencing policy outcome, imposing constraints and offering opportunities for action. In addition, they can reduce uncertainty and instability as well as ensuring the desired gains from cooperation and can ‘provide a system of incentives and punishments to encourage the desired behaviours’ (Williams, 2010: 2). Further, they provide space for members to exercise their power and influence. In parallel with the institutionalist accounts, integration theories have similar explanations about the role of institutions in the regional integration process. That is, as with new institutionalism, under neofunctionalism institutions are viewed as central units of the integration process where all political activities occur. Moreover, it is pointed out that supranational institutions inevitably

46 The opinion given in The Jakarta Post, March 07, 2013
have to be established due to ‘the need to create arrangements that would allow reasonably efficient decision-making and effective enforcement despite the involvement of a large number of governments with differing interests’ (Pierson, 1996: 21). Such arrangements include mandatory frameworks and procedures for reconciliation of disputes, which will serve as the centre of the union through which members are expected to change their behaviours and expectations as well as delegating some of their resources and policy functions to the supranational agents.

Correspondingly, liberal intergovernmentalists claim that institutions are mechanisms that can help facilitate regional integration by improving ‘the efficiency of bargaining between states’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 507). It is the natural order that states will always guard their sovereignty and national interests by resisting the transfer of their authority to central regional institutions. Under such circumstances, institutions could help facilitate the integration process, for example, by providing reliable information, monitoring compliance and linking across issues, such that mutual agreement is more likely. However, under the intergovernmentalist lens institutions are only perceived of serving as an information provider, confidence builder, transactional cost cutter and interest broker. Whilst constructivism extends the theoretical role of institutions by bringing the international context into the discussion, that is, states and institutions are seen as cognitive and correlative entities. Accordingly, through systemic international interaction, outcomes are shaped by institutions, which act as representatives of rules and norms of those international interactions (rule of the game). In other words, with this perspective institutions are tasked with securing and maintaining the norms as well as the constructed identities. In sum, this introduces the idea that the surrounding environments, external constraints and international contexts are vital for understanding institutions in the regional settings. Thus, according to Cini (2007: 131), institutions are ‘arenas for communication, deliberation, argumentation, persuasion and socialization’ among actors.

In section 6.2 above, the role of the EU’s institutions in European integration has clearly accorded with most of the theoretical explanations in that they are at the heart of the integration process. That is, they play a key role in initiating and setting the agenda, law-making, budgeting, coordinating, implementing policies as well as monitoring procedures. They are the backbone of the union and a place where member states pool some of their sovereignty, resources and confidence. All these functions are legally underpinned as prescribed in the EU Treaties and ratified not only at the central level but also by members’ parliaments, which thus provide robust legitimate power for its institutions to perform EU’s
activities. Further, the system comprises a mix of intergovernmental bodies and supranational one,\textsuperscript{47} which are independent from each other, but have close interaction, for ‘none of which can function without reference to others’ (Jones, 1996: 105-106). The European Parliament can ensure the involvement of the citizens as they have to vote for their representatives every five years. The European Court of Justice is a crucial body as it provides authoritative interpretation of the Treaties and the powers of EU institutions (Gowland et al., 2006: 325-326). However, although EU institutions are solid, powerful and seen as a principal feature of European integration, to a certain extent, national governments still play a pivotal role in determining what policy is made. In sum, the evidence regarding the EU concurs with the view that the institutional configuration required in a regional integration project is determined by the ‘historical circumstances of the group of countries’ (Best, 2005: 43).

In the context of ASEAN, its institutions have always been at the centre of any criticism about the association. Moreover, according to the collected research data, institutions have been a problematic area and given their importance as purported in regional integration theory, clearly require attention. ASEAN leaders have accepted that this is a key weakness and this is why there have been a number of attempts to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat recently, which can be most explicitly seen in the ASEAN Charter. However, it is accepted that these efforts have been insufficient to make them a reality owing to several obstacles that continue to limit the role of its institutions. First of all, any study of ASEAN institutions would uncover that they fundamentally have to work within the context of intergovernmentalism, whereby the organisation prefers non-intrusive decision-making and has no intention of following a path of supranationalism. That is, it has been ‘deliberately designed for flexibility to allow national governments sufficient autonomy in deciding which sectors to liberalise deregulate or reform and at what speed’ (Nesadurai, 2012: 4). Perhaps as reflected by its name, the ASEAN Secretariat is never far away from being a glorified secretary who works in an office sorting out the daily paper work, making phone calls and arranging meetings for the organization. This perspective was backed by an Indonesian scholar from CSIS who depicted the ASEAN Secretariat as:

\textquote{\textit{The ASEAN Secretariat is exactly like the name. It is a secretariat. It is for administrative issues only... documents, letters. It is not a decision-making body.}}\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{47} Please refer to the organisational chart of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty in Section 4.4, Chapter 4

The first matter to address is the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and its performance. As discussed in the previous section, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary General of ASEAN, although having been enhanced by the Charter, still have a very limited role in policy-making and are not capable of acting against obstinate members. There is quite a significant amount of evidence to support this view. For example, Hund (2002: 118) contended that ‘the ASEAN Secretariat remains at the margins of ASEAN policy-making’ as it does not possess delegated powers for commanding individual member state compliance or devising common policies on its own initiative. Similarly, according to Capannelli and Tan (2012: 14), the ASEAN Secretariat’s remit has principally been to ‘furnish administrative support rather than been invested with powers of delegation… and did not aim to create regional bureaucracies promoting a more independent agenda for integration beyond the scope provided by intergovernmental cooperation structures’. During interview, a scholar from RSIS stated regarding this matter:

“I think it (the role of the ASEAN Secretariat) is marginal. To me, the decision-making process in ASEAN is not at the Secretariat… It really looks at the key ministries… The Secretariat to me is predominantly a coordination actor.”

Another scholar from the same institution had a similar opinion:

“The ASEAN Secretariat has got no teeth. So, they are only reacting.”

Interestingly, the opinion of a former Director of the ASEAN Secretariat clearly highlighted the importance of the central institutional body, when she shared that:

“Who else in ASEAN can actually advance all this (democracy, identity, institution and leadership)? It should be the Secretariat together with the leaders … who is supposed to do all these things.”

In addition, a recent review conducted by Desker (2008) found that during the preceding forty years only 30% of ASEAN agreements and initiatives were actually implemented, which points to the incapacity of the ASEAN Secretariat and concluded that it does need to be strengthened. In order to coordinate ASEAN activities, I am convinced that expansion in the size and strengthening of the mandate of the Secretariat is crucial and will in turn speed up the


process of ASEAN integration. However, one Indonesian scholar from CSIS expressed the view that ASEAN’s Secretariat has done a good job to serve the leaders and in promoting coordination among members. She said:

“If you ask me how they are performing as a secretariat, they are performing really well. But other than that [shrugs]...”

Strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat prompts concerns about how this could be funded. In general, it is widely agreed that the Secretariat has inadequate financial and human resources to manage the association’s growing activities and to service the needs of deeper regional cooperation. Its operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat mainly relies on equal annual contributions by the member states, thus reflecting the norm of equality across the organisation which stemmed from the belief that different contributions might lead to a hierarchy of powers. It has been pointed out that ASEAN’s system of equal contributions is unique among international organisations that its leaders have avoided any substantial increase and held back to the level of the poorest members’ capacity to pay (Severino, 2009: 25). In other words, the budget is kept low enough for the poorest state to be able to pay without being too demanding on its resources. However, as a lone central institution, the Secretariat is overloaded with region-wide administrative and coordinative activities as well as research, analysis, technical support and monitoring tasks (Nesadurai, 2012: 16). Although ASEAN does not make its financial statement available for the public, Termsak Chalermpalanupap, a former Director for Research and Special Assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, wrote that ‘in the 2007-08 financial year, the Secretariat’s operating budget was US$ 9,050,000’ (Chalermpalanupap, 2009: 122). He also noted during interview:

“Our budget this year (2012-2013) is only US$ 15.763 million and next year I heard there is only going to be a 3% increase. So, it is still a very small shoestring operation.”

If the 2012-2013 figures are taken into consideration, this means each member contributed US$ 1,576,300 and represents a very small proportion of their GDPs or annual national budgets. For instance, according to Bower (2010) and Poole (2011: 6-7), the total budget of the ASEAN Secretariat was reported to be around US$14.3 million (including funds from partner


countries), which accounted for 0.0001% of Laos’s GDP and 0.000001% of that of Indonesia and amounts to about 0.137% of the EU’s annual administrative budget. Calculated in terms of per capita, ASEAN citizens spend less than $0.024 per person per year on supporting the servicing of the organisation.⁵⁴

ASEAN members, of course, contribute to the association in some other ways, for example, the offices of the National Secretariat are housed in members’ foreign ministries. In addition, some countries run special projects as well as hosting and attending meetings or events. Furthermore, ASEAN is also substantially funded by dialogue partners or external donors, mostly through specific projects or operations, such as capacity building, improving infrastructure and information technology. Interestingly, Bower (ibid) noted that the external contributions are well over 20 times the Secretariat budget. The former Secretary-General of ASEAN reinforced this point when he stated at interview:

“We have many cooperation projects with different dialogue partner countries. These countries are developed nations. They are willing to give more resources to ASEAN. We always say ASEAN is an OPM organisation – Other People’s Money.”⁵⁵

However, relying on external resources could lead to unavoidable outside interference by the donors in the affairs of the association. Certainly, this is not sustainable in the long run and not sensible if ASEAN wants to present itself as a non-aligned and independent power on the international political stage. Another important concern is with regards to the lack of professional staff. According to the figures, in 2012 ASEAN employed roughly 300 people, including 65 managers and experts, 180 local staff and 55 persons from donor organizations (ibid). Although these figures do not include coordinating staff who work in member countries, they are minuscule compared to the EU, which has about 55,000 staff working under the umbrella of its institutions.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, there are some detractors from the view that ASEAN is underfunded, who prefer to highlight the problem of staff shortages. For instance, the former Secretary General contradicted the previous arguments and pointed out that the main problem of the ASEAN Secretariat is not lacking budget, but rather the lack of well-trained bureaucrats. He shared:

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⁵⁴ In 2011, ASEAN has a population of approximately 602,658,000.


“It’s always being said there is not enough budget. But in the last few years, my understanding is that the budget is not spent... The problem is that we are lacking in capacity. We don’t have enough ASEAN-level bureaucrats working at the Secretariat to make sure that all the implementation is carried out.”  

This view has been supported by Severino (2009: 25), who wrote ‘the problem is not only the availability of funds. It is also the difficulty of finding personnel who know ASEAN and the requirements and limits of regional, especially economic, cooperation and integration’. Similarly, this coincides with the viewpoint of Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN. He made the following comment:

“Do you know that every year the Secretariat also has to return the money from the contributions of the governments? There are some unspent budgets. (Why the budget is not spent?) Many reasons, improved efficiency, lack of staff... We have to differentiate between operational budget and activity budget. Operational budget based on the contribution of the governments and every year we have unspent budget. For activities, I think we need more. We don’t have enough.”

Also regarding the staff situation, one scholar shared his field experiences at the ASEAN Secretariat:

“I was focusing a bit on ASEAN transnational crimes. I met two ladies at the Secretariat for an interview. There are only two people at the transnational crime unit. They have so many meetings a year and the only thing they do is to go from one meeting to another and “copy and paste” from one document to another. Absolutely no time left for implementation and coordination. Surprisingly, both ladies left after a while. They were completely disillusioned.”

As has been seen, despite the insufficiency of staff, the ASEAN Secretariat is also facing difficulties in efficiency and in attracting talented and capable people. Areethamsirikul (2010) pointed out that ‘the ASEAN headquarters needs to create a regional and international working atmosphere and to make "working at ASEAN" a prestigious assignment for ASEAN

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peoples - akin to the perception of working at the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, or the European Union.' Thus, the budget is not the only important concern in this respect and I observe that as long as working for the Secretariat is not perceived as a well-paid and challenging career and cannot attract ambitious, capable and professional talent, it will be difficult for the Secretariat to grow into a more institutionalised organ, a powerful central administration and/or the backbone of the association.

Finally, considering the sophisticated structure of the EU’s institutions, this raises the question whether ASEAN should follow suit. In other words, what should be improved for ASEAN in terms of institutional development? Although the theories imply that institutions play a vital role in the development of regional integration, the question is it appropriate to “copy and paste” one successful model to another context. In general, there are quite a variety of opinions and views on this issue. However, the majority of evidence suggests that rather than building a more comprehensive form of institution, ASEAN should focus on strengthening its existing institutional architecture, particularly the Secretariat and its Secretary General. Indeed, the ASEAN Secretariat is its only real live institutional organ, while the rest, consisting of summits, meetings, dialogues, committees, subcommittees and task forces, are periodic events with impermanent offices (Chalermpalanupap, 2009: 121). Regarding this matter, a scholar from RSIS asserted that:

“I would strengthen the coordination role of the Secretariat. I would not reinvent the wheel. I would actually look at the Secretariat and say how can we make this more effective... for instance in terms of implementation of the decision-making process.”

Another scholar from RSIS also had a similar view on this issue:

“I think the priority is to build up existing institutions rather than creating new ones. For example, Dr Surin (the current Secretary General) needs to be given the power and mandate to initiate policy discussion.”

The former Secretary General also insisted that ASEAN should focus on the existing institutions. He gave an example of one ASEAN institution:

60 ibid.

“The ASEAN Foundation is located in Jakarta. It is not well-capitalized but can be developed into a more substantial body to promote, what we call, the ASEAN Socio-cultural Pillar - identity, belonging can be done under the ASEAN Foundation’s osmosis.”

He also highlighted the difference in political culture between Southeast Asia and Europe:

“In Europe, having a European court and a European parliament... it seems very easy to do because it has been part of some national cultures. In Southeast Asia, we still very jealously guard our sovereign quality.”

However, a number of analysts believe that, in addition to strengthening and empowering the Secretariat, ASEAN should have some new institutional ideas in order to support the overloaded work of the ASEAN Secretariat and increase the Association’s efficiency and effectiveness. For instance, Wanandi (2006: 87) suggested that an ASEAN Consultative Assembly consisting of members of the different parliaments and representatives of civil society could be a fruitful enhancement to the decision-making process, which would make ASEAN more democratic and people-oriented. Moreover, Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN supported the idea of having an entrenched sanction mechanism. He stated:

“Something to do with sanction – enforcement and punishment mechanisms”

Further, one Malaysian scholar held the view that ASEAN also needs a research wing and a mechanism that links its institutions to non-state sectors and NGOs. She suggested:

“One would definitely be a research wing... (Also) I think there is merit in creating some forms of institutional links to the non-state sectors, private actors and NGOs.”

Others support a certain degree of supranationalism. Regarding this, Hund (2002: 120) suggested that ASEAN ‘requires centrally managed policies and also more independent and preferably supranational institutions’. In addition, an Indonesian scholar from CSIS showed she agreed with this point of view when she stated:


“I support (supranationalism). Not in the way that is strong supranational. At least, it needs a body that is for decision-making. In ASEAN, everything is always consensus-based and in a lot of cases, especially sensitive cases like territorial disputes, consensus gets us nowhere.”

This does not mean ASEAN should be heading towards a supranational form of integration as has appeared in Europe. In the foreseeable future, ASEAN still has to remain within the current intergovernmental cooperative framework as long as there has been no significant reform to its principal norms and certainly national governments would be reluctant to lose their country’s national rights and control. More realistically, in my view, it is the budget that is the first thing that needs to be tackled. Wanandi (2006: 87) proposed that ‘the system now, whereby every member pays the same amount, is no longer realistic. A new formula that is more tenable and could increase the budget adequately should be contemplated’. In my opinion, the system of absolute equal contribution should be reviewed in order to support the excessive tasks of ASEAN institutions, more specifically the ASEAN Secretariat. Despite limiting the funding to its lowest possible level, the current system does not help narrow development gaps between the members and does not reflect the notion of ‘a community of caring and sharing societies’, something that the association has been trying to promote. However, I would contend that the members’ contributions should perhaps be based on either the possible gain in interest or a country’s ability to, that is, the EU’s GDP-based arrangement is one option that should be considered. For example, if each member contributed 1% of its annual GDP to ASEAN, it does not neglect the principle of equality, because all members are asked for 1%, so I think this is just a matter of positively rethinking the issue. This is in accord with Emmerson (2007: 438) who opined ‘this step (the GDP-based contribution) would free the Association’s budget from being limited to ten times what the poorest or least supportive member is willing to pay’. I am also convinced that this new formula would help ASEAN to offset the situation whereby there is a clear hierarchy of member’s power and influence. Moreover, I reckon that ASEAN should be provided with the means to generate its own revenue in order to ensure adequate resourcing and financial flexibility, for example, through some kind of taxation, import duties or licensing.


66 See the Cebu Declaration Towards One Caring and Sharing Community.
6.5 Discussion and conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, every process and action in the EU has to be legitimised by its established institutions. In order to build up a regional community elsewhere, the case of the EU suggests that it would not be a question of whether institutions matter, but rather a question of how to establish their suitable form, whilst taking into account the different institutional environment. That is, ‘The institutional arrangements of any regional integration scheme must be appropriate to – and indeed should grow out of – the specific historical circumstances of the group of countries’ (Best, 2005: 43). Similarly, Rodríguez-Pose (2010: 20) argued that ‘development strategies may need to be specifically tailored to the conditions of different regional institutional environments, thus requiring an in-depth understanding of local conditions and an assessment of the feasibility of different types of interventions under current institutional circumstances’. Therefore, there would appear to be no precise guidelines for making institutions in the regional integration process. Although measuring institutions, such as their space and variability, and defining the mix of the formal and informal are still problematic, what can be said is that the best regional policy is the one that ‘acknowledges institutional factors, their variability and limitations and attempts to address the potential shortcomings of institutions in a place-specific manner’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2010: 20-21).

Similar to the EU, the empirical data from the case of ASEAN demonstrates that having solid, sufficient and efficient forms of institutions is essential as a prerequisite for constructing a regional community. Theoretically, under new institutionalism the role of the institution is providing the rules of the game and linkages between actors and action. Moreover, neofunctionalists see institutions as being the central units of all political activities and the main mechanisms for decision-making and enforcement. Whilst liberal intergovernmentalists emphasise the role of the institution in brokering and facilitating the process of regional integration, such as providing reliable information, monitoring compliance and linking across issues. Under the lens of constructivism, an important perspective is added to the discussion, whereby institutions are viewed as cognitive and correlative entities that act as representatives of rules and norms. That is, they are created to maintain the norms and the constructed identities. As has been seen, although focusing on different perspectives, all these theories grant that institutions play a crucial role in the regional integration process. However, for understanding ASEAN integration, I would put more stress on the constructivist explanation, as it seems to provide a better framework to explain ASEAN institutions in that the institutional structure of the organisation can be viewed as a by-product as well as a representative of its norms and principal values. For according to Stubbs (2008: 455), ‘ideas
must be institutionalised in order to be converted into concrete action and have a long lasting impact’. I hold that the constructivist explanation regarding institutionalisation that surrounding environments, external constraints and international contexts are the key drivers, best fits with what has transpired within ASEAN. That is, the unique configuration of features for South East Asia has determined a markedly different institutional path than taken by the EU.

Even though the case of the European Union decisively demonstrates the crucial role of institutions and the importance of supranationalism in the regional integration process, ASEAN has not chosen this path, preferring a non-intrusive manner and placing its faith in cooperating on the basis of intergovernmentalism. The ending of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, the rise of nationalism as result of colonial experiences and the gaining independence of ASEAN members, the spread of communism, the wars that affected the region and the influence of external powers are the main factors that have shaped this ideational basis of the association. One simple explanation could be that ASEAN was established as an ad hoc resolution in order to meet regional expectations and in response to those perceived challenges. Although the system has responded well to these expectations, to great extent, its current regional architecture has proved insufficient to handle the growing roles and activities as well as to remain in tune with the regional and global trends. In sum, the theoretical explanations, the empirical evidence from the case of the EU and the different contexts of regional settings point to the need for a rethink regarding ASEAN’s institutional structure so as to make stronger and thus able to help the association meet the challenges of increased globalisation.

On the practical level, I would divide the problems of ASEAN institutions into three major interrelated areas of deficiency. Firstly, its institutions, particularly the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary General, lack any mandate to ensure compliance or have the ability to initiate policies that can help fulfil ASEAN’s ambition. In general, the ASEAN Secretariat, as a lone central administrative body and the main driving force, has been only tasked with serving and provide administrating support for the national governments without any delegation of power to it. That is, it has not been the intention to build up regional bureaucracies that could promote an independent agenda for integration beyond the scope of intergovernmental cooperation structures (Capannelli and Tan, 2012: 14). Instead, supreme power has been wholly retained at the national government level and ASEAN institutions remain at the margins of policy-making. Secondly, the ASEAN Secretariat is currently experiencing financial hardship. This concern has been expressed in much of the literature and by almost all of the interview
respondents. This is essentially due to the system of equal member contributions, which has been maintained as low as possible in order to accommodate the less-developed nations. Finally, there is strong evidence that ASEAN is understaffed, both in terms of quality and quantity. Moreover, it cannot attract talented and capable people because they do not see “working at the ASEAN Secretariat” as a well-paid and challenging career. These three concerns are clearly interrelated and are mainstream criticisms of the ASEAN Secretariat that need to be resolved.

A general conclusion would be that ASEAN institutions should be strengthened and provided with a mandate and sufficient financial and human resources to support its administration and activities. Also, the current contribution system should be substantially revised, because it is not realistic and applicable to the growing activities of the Association. Regarding this matter, I propose that in order to increase financial flexibility the ASEAN Secretariat should seek other sources of income, rather than solely rely on member contributions and external donors. This could take the form of, for example, import duties, a percentage of tax levied by each member country or even fines from companies that breach ASEAN regulations. In my view, the institutional structure of ASEAN met the task, by and large, of serving the national governments and upholding the association’s norms and therefore there is no need to replicate the EU’s integration experience by a complete overhaul with the imposition of completely new institutional initiatives. As most of the contributors to the empirical research have opined, ASEAN should focus on strengthening its existing institutions by giving them more mandate, more money and more professional staff. However, some of the suggestions about an institutional invention are worth considering to address deficiencies in the organisation, such as establishing a research wing and a mechanism that can get non-state actors involved in the process of regional governance. Furthermore, in line with Wah (1998: 165), it is noted that long-term institutional reform cannot be achieved without the reconsideration of the relationships with the wider institutional structure of ASEAN that the Secretariat is nested within, particularly with the Coordinating Council, the Ministerial Bodies, the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the national governments.

Above all, I am convinced that ASEAN decision-makers are aware of the institutional weaknesses in ASEAN and want to address. This is evidenced by ASEAN leaders introducing the ASEAN Charter, which was seen as an important step forward for institutional reform as it strengthened its implementation and dispute-settlement mechanisms as well as consolidating its decision-making structure. However, although the ASEAN Charter did improve the power of ASEAN institutions and provided the Association with a juridical foundation, it seems to have
codified traditional norms and practices as well as reinforcing the idea of non-intervention (Narine, 2008: 425). Therefore, in the post-Charter era I doubt that ASEAN will become a more effective organisation and the all the institutional problems discussed will be properly tackled any time soon. In essence, it would appear to me that all the complications arise from the fact that ASEAN integration does not involve like-minded states in that the members do not have similar political ideologies and values. Furthermore, this political dissimilarity is safeguarded by the association’s norms and the consensus-based decision making, which continue to limit the role of its institutions, thus allowing member countries to enjoy cooperation and exercise power without fear of their sovereignty being at stake. This situation has resulted in deadlock, which has prevented the Association from making any considerable progress and so it ‘remains robustly intergovernmental, with little delegation since it relies on “offshoots” rather than independent agencies to implement policy’ (Capannelli and Tan, 2012: 14). However, granting mandates and pouring resources into the central institution will not fully resolve the problems, because would still lack some of the most important ingredients for deeper cooperation. That is, in order to maximum benefits from constructing a regional community, this would need centralised policies, some degrees of supranationalism as well as the national governments’ willingness to cooperate and to delegate powers.
7 LEADERSHIP IN ASEAN

7.1 Introduction

Political leadership is one of the most imperative issues in political science. In general, it is admitted that leadership is a key mechanism in any kind of grouping or organizations and plays a decisive role in steering them towards success. In particular, in regional community building efforts where countries have to operate in the international public sphere, the lack of or indecisive leadership can spell trouble, or even the end of an organization. However, the role of political leadership in ASEAN has received little attention in the literature, even less than the scant scholarship on this matter relating to the EU. As stated previously in Chapter 3, intergovernmentalism provides a constructive platform for the discussion, viewing leadership in the regional integration process as a common phenomenon that has emerged from the difference in the tenure of power and resources among rational actors. It also emphasizes the predominance of the most influential actors in the process. In addition, Young’s well known three modes of leadership form the backbone of the discussion as they can provide a supportive framework for conducting the analysis. In chapter 4, the EU’s experiences provided two contrasting insights. On the one hand, leadership is seen as a powerful driver that accelerates and facilitates the negotiation and decision-making process, thus helping to achieve mutually desired outcomes. As such, it acts as an important factor for facilitating the achievement of the union. On the other hand, leadership can deter the integration process, because the conflicts of interest and the uneven distribution of benefits among members result in uncertainty and scepticism. The main aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of leadership in the context of ASEAN, where it is expected that this plays out somewhat differently than in relation to the EU, owing to South East Asia’s distinct characteristics that have been discussed in previous chapters.

The demands for active regional leadership have recently been high on the agenda. This has been attributed to European countries appearing to be incompetent owing the lack of an identifiable leadership and also, in the South East Asian context, the insufficient presence of leadership in ASEAN being widely claimed to be a key obstruction to the progress of integration. Repeatedly, Beach and Mazzucelli (2007: 19) have stated that the success of leadership depends on whether the type supplied is suitable for the demands created by the regional context. In other words, it is necessary to probe the underpinning features of a particular region in order to decide upon the most appropriate leadership form. Regarding this, due to the historical colonial experience and the vast diversity among members, the
leadership process involved in integrating Southeast Asia has been complex, somewhat ambiguous and as a result, is still an unresolved issue. Although it is clearly identified in the Charter and other legislative documents that ASEAN is grounded on the basis of equality regarding which the chairmanship, as a formal leadership is alphabetically rotated, various forms of political leadership, such as issue-based and that driven by individual charisma can be seen in the system. More recently, the rising regional power and more benevolent role of Indonesia in Southeast Asia appear to hold up the idea of a hegemonic leadership. Understandably, this could be problematic because it challenges ASEAN’s official motto of manifesting non-interference and equality among members. In the meantime, this seems to concur with the European manner of Franco-German leadership, as identified in Chapter 4, based on intergovernmentalist arguments and Young’s concept of structural power indicating that power is derived from the possession of material resources and it is going to be the most powerful countries who are in a better position to take the lead and get more out of the union.

This chapter begins with the European perspectives on leadership and an historical overview that helps in understanding the context of leadership in ASEAN and thus leads the way to constructing an analysis. The following section address the historical nature of ASEAN’s leadership, with particular consideration of the notion put forward by many scholars and political activists that it is in fact leaderless. The next section sets out to examine various patterns of leadership that have emerged in the organisation since its inception, by drawing on the related the literature and data collected from interviews. This will lead on to a discussion regarding the most practically feasible form of leadership for ASEAN based on the structural and ideational reality. Finally, there is a summary of the important findings gained from this chapter.

7.2 European perspectives

In the EU, the story about leadership in essence involves two countries as they have continued to take a leading role in shaping the development of the European Union, namely, France and Germany. Their influence is widely accepted as having been the predominant driving force in the union since its creation in 1958, whilst the UK has not been so heavily involved due to its sceptical attitudes towards European integration. That is, Franco-German co-operation has been essential for shaping the union’s major decisions and thus making progress in the integration process (Webber, 1999). As a consequence, two antagonistic stances regarding the regional integration process have emerged. On the one hand, there are those who accept that such leadership is a crucial driver for integrating the region. On the other hand, some member states, object to the EU’s fortunes being under the control of the Franco-German dominion,
and these two polarised positions have often resulted in gridlock that has deterred progress and development of the union. In this regard, it is interesting to see what the Franco-German relationship suggests about leadership in regional integration process and what can we learn from the European experience.

It is considered useful here to try to provide a precise definition regarding the nature and scope of leadership. However, according to Blondel (1987: 15), political leadership is hard to define substantially due to its reliance on the specific institutional, cultural and historical contexts. Indeed, the issue of political leadership in regional integration has been one of the most complex and ill-theorised issues. In this research context, leadership might simply be understood as ability to lead or steer a group, thereby accompanying them to a destination and is frequently concerned with influencing goal-setting and motivation. Moreover, Beach (2007: 6) asserted that leadership is about exercising influence over other actors and he broadly defined it as ‘any action by one actor to guide or direct the behaviour of other actors toward a certain collective goal’. However, in the EU context the definition given by Lübkemeier (2007: 7) is perhaps more appropriate: ‘leadership in the EU is provided by actors who are willing and capable, acting as co-leaders, to prompt other actors to contribute to the achievement of collective goals’. This definition assures that egoistic actions, such as forming a group to challenge and benefit from integration, would not be characterized as leadership because it has to include sense of natural capability as well.

Historically, the story of the relationship between France and Germany before the establishment of the European Union is characterized by ‘a long-lasting antagonism feeding on rivalry for territory and hegemony on the European continent, as well as humiliated national sentiments and revenge discourses’ (Germond and Türk, 2008: 1). That is, the two countries were actually deep-rooted enemies before finally becoming close partners as currently recognized by the international community. The period from 1789 to 1919 saw several extensive wars brought about because of the intense antagonism between France and Germany. These conflicts and antagonistic sentiments were unambiguously driven by nationalism that, in France, took the form of a missionary and expansive character after the French Revolution of 1789 and, in Germany, actions to discharge the bond of French domination over the territories, known as the German Wars of Liberation (Germond and Türk, 2008). In general, the formation of nationalism was constructed through a conflictive and interactive process in which negative images and perceptions of the other served to reinforce national sentiments and strengthen national identity (ibid).
These hostile feelings lasted, to varying degrees, until the signing of Elysée Treaty by the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany in 1963, as the treaty emphasized the seal on reconciliation between the two countries and declared the ending of rivalry between them. ‘The two men had introduced a fundamentally new element into the politics and psychology of their peoples’ (Lappenküper, 2008: 154). The treaty contains several agreements to cooperate in foreign policy, economic, security and education, thus becoming the foundation for long-term intense cooperation and bilateral interaction between the two states. In particular, it led to the forging of close institutionalised constructive relations through the setting up regular ministerial consultations and regular meetings between the two governments. Since the enforcement of treaty, France and Germany have retained close ties, hence becoming a key to furthering European integration.

Figure 7.1: Regularized bilateral Franco-German intergovernmentalism

Source: (Krotz, 2002: 22)
To portray the Franco-German relationship since the Elysée treaty, the literature illustrates that the bilateral relationship between France and Germany is ultimate, intensive and relatively institutionalized. One important indicator is the number of meetings between the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany, regarding which Boyer (Boyer, 1996: 243) pointed out that during the period between 1982 and 1992 ‘there were allegedly 115’. Apart from heads of state meetings, there are also meetings and consultations on a regular basis between ministers. This extraordinary relationship has been commented upon by several scholars. Middlemas (1995: 323) argued that the close relationship between France and Germany has become a ‘matter of routine involvement of administrators’, whilst De Schoutheete (1990: 109) has portrayed it as the ‘closest possible of bilateral alliances’ and Klaiber (1998: 38) claimed that ‘no two other countries in the world have developed such close co-operation’. Further, Leblond (1997: 130) stated that it is ‘impossible’ to separate the two countries within the partnership from EU affairs. Lastly, EU integration is, if nothing else, about France and Germany (Cole, 2001).

To summarise, the Post-Elysée era witnessed a close and trustful relationship and regular political links between France and Germany, transforming past confrontations into cooperation in the everyday lives of their people. Although the initial aim of treaty was to harmonize security and defence matters between the two countries, it was later extended and deepened to include economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. In addition, the treaty has come to be viewed by some as a catalyst for the construction of European unification through which both countries have continued to be the driving force behind European integration for over 40 years. However, the important question is did the treaty directly promote the development of regional integration? With respect to this, Cole (2001: 12) argued that it was a direct challenge to the supranational leadership of the EU. In particular, the two countries drew attention to the NATO alliance and the role of the US in Europe, rather than pursuing regional integration, which resulted in the process being halted for over two decades. However, sceptics have argued that the pact was not simply aimed at forging a close bilateral relationship, but also at influencing the future of the European policies of other members and to counter fears that each of these two countries would attempt to impose their own policy preferences on the rest of the union (Deutsche Welle, 2012). As a result of its economic, military and diplomatic preeminence, there was no other realistic candidate for leadership in the EU and hence the Franco-German partnership remained at the core of the European integration project for several more decades.
In fact, despite these being the only European countries tied by a treaty-based alliance, the bilateral relationship between France and Germany has been relatively informal and continually inconsistent. This is because it has been highly dependent on the personal relations between political leaders, both formal and informal, via institutional structures and policy networks, which can vary according to the type of issue and the level of interaction (Cole, 2001: 47). That is, the key to the success has been the reliance upon its flexible and informal engagements rather than on its degree of institutionalisation. Moreover, informal understanding between France and Germany has been reinforced by their routine contact and the decades of working together (Cole, 2001: 54). For this reason, the Franco-German relationship is often viewed as a precondition for policy operation in European arena, whereby French and German leaders strive to reach agreement wherever possible, as they have consistently shared a common interest in developing the project of European integration.

To be more specific, what is the role of Franco-German entente in developing the European community and how does this relationship contribute to leadership in the EU? As written in his book, Cole (2001: 60-61) depicted how the relationship between France and Germany in the EU can be categorized into two major dimensions. First, they have always considered it as a primary concern, with its matters always being seen to be at the heart of their cooperation. Second, the two countries have often been behind important European initiatives, in particular, those geared towards integration. Indeed, France and Germany normally seek support from each other before starting new projects and the historical evidence suggests that this initial conciliation has to some significant extent avoided negotiation difficulties in the bargaining process. On the other hand, the progress of European integration has been stalled whenever these two countries have been in disharmony. The goal of reaching consensus as much as possible can be seen in some of policies adopted in the 1990s where Germany went against its own preferences, for example there was German intervention to prevent the franc from attack by international capital (Andrews, 1993) and negotiations with the US in the GATT meeting so as to prevent French isolation (Webber, 1998).

The nature of France and Germany’s relationship as well as their leadership role appears to support Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. That is, the close cooperation between France and Germany has helped facilitate the regional integration process by overcoming some difficulties in multi-party negotiations, for example, in reaching mutual agreements and on agenda-setting. This has been the case throughout the entire history of European integration, with the two countries playing a leading role in ensuring the success of many EU initiatives. The Schuman Plan of 1950, the European Monetary System of 1978-1979,
the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 can be seen as some obvious examples of this, in which the roles of supranational and non-governmental actors were overshadowed and underplayed (Cole, 2001: 61-62). In addition, the evidence from the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties suggests that France and Germany were important players in the drive towards further European integration. Nonetheless, the European community also experienced some setbacks regarding initiatives put forward by the Franco-German leadership because these were actually detrimental to its progress, such as the failure to agree upon the terms of the European Defence Community (EDC), the Gaullist boycott of the EU institutions during 1965–66 and some membership entries, particularly, that of Britain in the 1960s.

The issue of enlargement in the EU is also of interest as it represents an arena of Franco-German disharmony. In the eyes of France, a compact union is preferred and they view a wider European community as a threat to their national interests. In contrast, Germany supports enlargement which it views in terms of European reconciliation, based on a perceived historic responsibility to enhance its role in Europe (Cole, 2001: 77). The most notable case was De Gaulle’s vetoes of British entry which was supported by other EEC members, but not Germany and this also manifested itself in the later southern, northern and eastern enlargements where France initially as saw these as threatening to its economy. However, these disputes were subsequently resolved by the brokering management of Franco-German cooperation and the close personal relationship between their leaders (Schild, 1994). In fact, after the German unification, French attitudes towards enlargement shifted to being in favour of it, while preserving ‘its influence as a leading EC state and safeguard its privileged relationship with Germany’ (Cole, 2001: 78). Germany, on the other hand, has had no concerns about the matter of national interests and instead has focused on promoting regional stability. In sum, ‘the enlargement of the EU raised ever more pressing questions of flexible forms of integration and of Franco-German influence in an enlarged Community’ (Cole, 2001: 79).

Regarding the literature on Euroscepticism, it is apparent that the majority of such attitudes pertain to the issues of the negative effects on domestic economies and loss of national sovereignty. Moreover, with the Franco-German cooperation in place, ‘the EU does not appear as a common enterprise with shared interests and values; rather, it is a battlefield of competing national interests all trying to make the best out of it’ (Kananen, 2009) and it is surely going to be the most powerful countries who are in better position to get more out of it. When countries decide to join the EU, it means they are willing to renounce the long-established concept of national sovereignty in order to exchange this for some foreseeable benefits. However, they still wish to remain an independent country in Europe and not a state
within a Franco-German superstate. Although it is too idealistic to hope that all benefits in the EU can be distributed evenly, at least they expect to be treated respectably and fairly as a member who has a level right to secure its national interests. The lack a strategy for dealing with conflicts of interest or a situation in which benefits are distributed unevenly has been seen as one of the major weaknesses of the EU (Kananen, 2009).

The negotiations in the EU have been described as a series of Franco-German compromises, with the UK acting as a deterrent (Moravcsik, 1998, Pedersen, 1998). Evidently, when either France or Germany disagrees with something any initiatives are likely to have little chance of success or even being implemented. From the beginning, the European community was set up to operate through the formation of supranational institutions and these are supposed to serve as a key player in the decision making and legislation processes. However, it has developed in a two-man affair that has been undermining the sense of supranationalism in the EU by forging ‘an alliance within the alliance’ (Cole, 2001: 12) which has left the extant supranational institutions, for example, the European Commission, being often overlooked or malfunctioning, with the main exceptions to this being trade and economic matters. Consequently, in the case of the EU, leadership would appear to disaccord with the supranational concept and its institutional bodies. Regarding this, it has been argued that supranational institutions should be defended against attacks by those seeking to limit their roles (Grant, 2012: 87).

7.3 Background to leadership in ASEAN
Like other regional groupings, security is always the most important concern. For ASEAN, the end of confrontation and the normalization of relations with regional partners was the precursor to the formation of this regional organization. Before its establishment in 1967, Indonesia had an aggressive regime, the so called Konfrontasi, towards the British-supported foundation of Malaysia. Sukarno, who was the President at the time, was very ambitious to threaten the newly independent Malaysia, wishing to present Indonesian primacy (Antolik, 1990: 19). However, war between the two nations was too costly and fruitless, for Malaysia had previously been Indonesia’s most important trading partner and hence this conflagration was seriously economically damaging for both sides. Despite failing to gain international support, President Sukarno still pursued his hostile policy against Malaysia and finally, due to economic as well as domestic and international pressure, this led to the transition to a new order. More specifically, Sukarno’s regime was wiped out by severe domestic unrest, including military coups, kidnappings, demonstrations and several massacres. He was stripped of his executive powers, which were transferred to Suharto. Although the situation was politically
unstable, after Suharto took charge, the new regime was now on its way to ‘rapprochement with Malaysia by means of silence on contentious issues’ (Antolik, 1990: 20).

The emergence of Singapore as a new city state is another important matter for consideration. After gaining independence from the British, it was combined with Malaysia as a result of the referendum in 1962. However, a few years later, the merging process had not run smoothly, with there having been several riots, as well as conflict and disagreements between the two governments. The most important issues were Malay suspicions of the Chinese ethnic group and Singapore’s economic potentiality. In August 1965, the Malaysian parliament reached a consensus to kick Singapore out of its territory. To Indonesian eyes, particularly among Sukarno’s royalists, Singapore’s separation from Malaysia was considered as the breaking up of the nation (Antolik, 1990: 20). On the other hand, Singapore viewed the rapprochement between Malaysia and Indonesia as a promising Malay coalition and began to use a ‘Singapore-centric’ policy that pertained to it relying on its independence, sovereignty and ability (Antolik, 1990: 35). All in all, the period after the departure of President Sukarno saw the improvement of the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia as the two neighbouring states realized that normalizing their relationships would ensure peace and stability, whilst Singapore remained isolated, self-reliant and had good relations with the developed world.

Consequently, Malaysia still had to deal with the Indonesia’s strong aggression and desire to exercise its influence as well as its attempts to remove Western interference from the region. This is what Fifield (1976: 13) called its ‘sense of entitlement’, which was driven by Indonesia’s success on the revolutionary front (they had fought for their independence, with it not having been granted peacefully as with others); sizes of land, economy and population, geographical location as well as their leading role in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, Malaysia confidently managed to deal with the eager neighbour fairly well, even during the Konfrontasi, as its population acted with accord in support of the nation’s interests. Perhaps, Malaysia trusted in the sincerity of Indonesia because the new regime was engaged in challenging domestic unrest (Antolik, 1990: 24). Meanwhile, the incoming President of Indonesia learned a lot from the conflicts and completely shifted from confrontation to a more cooperative and consultative manner. He abandoned Sukarno’s aggressive foreign policy and established his New Order government in order to restore regional relations (Ganesan, 2004: 117). Indo-Malay relations registered a significant improvement when President Suharto showed good faith by helping to re-establish normality when ‘Malaysia appeared to be on the brink of civil war’ (Antolik, 1990: 29). During the first few decades of his presidency, ‘Suharto defined Indonesian interests in
ways largely congruent with both the West and his Southeast Asian neighbours, enabling Indonesia to achieve its foreign policy goals largely through *diplomasi* (Bresnan, 2005: 250).

The intensity of the relationships among Southeast Asian countries was stepped up in August 1967 when Indonesia took the lead by proposing the establishment of ASEAN, with: Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Although the organization was aimed at promoting cooperation in the economic and social areas, in fact, it was widely understood to be driven by the desired goal of nonaggression and conflict resolution through a consultation process. In this sense, ASEAN would provide Indonesia, and the rest of the group, space and a favourable environment for the growth of economies and nation building. Moreover, ASEAN has many crucial functions that it employs to serve its member countries. In particular, it performs under the principle of equality among members, non-interference and consensus-based decision making. This last feature prevents any single member from having a predominant influence on the organization or pursuing its own interests against the others (Anwar, 1997: 33). Nevertheless, member states can provide assistance during times of domestic difficulties by sharing information, cooperating with external powers or mediating with minority groups in the country concerned (Antolik, 1990: 157).

With a prime focus on leadership perspectives, the pre-1997 period, to some extent, sees Indonesia’s position of leadership in ASEAN as benevolent influence particularly in relation to politics and security. However, since the ending of the East Timor conflict and the severe financial crisis in 1997, the largest country in ASEAN has lost its standing and international credibility as it has experienced severe internal political and economic difficulties. While suffering from domestic problems and attempting to re-stabilize the economy, Indonesia has not appeared to be interested in assuming overall leadership in ASEAN anymore. Consequently, since then there has been a leadership vacuum in ASEAN and if its presence is perceived as a driver of integration, then the empty position needs to be filled. According to Anwar (1997: 29), leadership in ASEAN has become ‘functional rather than general’ referring to the idea that members can take a leading and initiative position on a particular issue of immediate interest to themselves.

On the whole, we could say that ASEAN is relatively successful in peace keeping and the diplomatic coordination of policy among its members as well as with third parties. However, by its nature, it is a relatively fragile and sensitive organization, due to the vast diversity among members and, to a certain degree, the inadequacy of leadership. Consequently, because of its superficial collaborative arrangement, tensions among member countries can arise easily and
quickly. Moreover, the insufficient and inconsistent presence of leadership has led to collective action problems, whereby it has been more difficult to drive the association towards jointly agreed goals. Another thing that should be taken into account is that the maintenance of regional cohesion and the preservation of regional unity are priorities which have always stood above other considerations, even at the expense of being less dynamic or efficient (Anwar, 1997: 28). Since the late 1990s, as pointed out above, the position of leadership in ASEAN has vanished due to the domestic turbulence in Indonesia. Although since then it has attempted to regain this role, its efforts have been restricted by various circumstances, such as ongoing economic malaise and interference from external powers. With this lack of strong regional leadership, ASEAN would appear to have been weakened and hence, progress to towards further integration has been stalled. Regarding future development, while other member states take turns to play an important role, the core of ASEAN will continue to be Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and hence the degree of stability in their relationships will determine the political future of the association (Ahmad and Ghoshal, 1999: 763). More importantly, the organization is unlikely to move forward without the active involvement of its largest member state, namely Indonesia, playing a constructive role in regional development (Emmers, 2005: 661).

7.4 Is ASEAN leaderless?
Southeast Asia has suffered from leadership deficiency for decades. The absence of regional leadership and the domestic weaknesses of member states has been often linked to the emergence of external interference with a variety of conflicting ideologies, which has been problematic for ASEAN. In particular, in this respect, it strongly emphasised that since Indonesia began its departure in foreign policy in the late 1990s as a result of the resignation of President Suharto, the leadership of the organisation has been somewhat rudderless. Regarding this, Severino (2004: 182) writes that ‘when that country (Indonesia) was debilitated by its economic crisis and political turmoil in the late 1990s, media and academic commentators were quick to proclaim that ASEAN had lost its leader.’ Ganesan (2004: 121) holds that the supremacy of Suharto in ASEAN clearly stabilized the regional environment and hence the willingness of member states to allow Indonesia the status of ‘the first among equals’ within ASEAN and the fall of Suharto’s regime represented its abnegation regarding the leadership role. Leading Anwar (2006: 60) to write that ‘the absence of an Indonesian posture leaves a vacuum that cannot be easily filled by other members’. Similarly, Smith (1999: 245) notes that ‘it is no longer accurate to describe Indonesia as the leader of ASEAN. This responsibility has been abdicated, but there is no obvious successor’. Ahmad and Ghoshal
(1999: 775) point out how the post-Suharto transition became a concern for the countries of Southeast Asia, which had high stakes in the stability of Indonesia and of the region. Although after recovering from this disastrous time Indonesia was able to achieve some brokering tasks, including the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam and the territorial disputes between Thailand and Cambodia as well some members’ conflict with China over the South China Sea, Ganesan (2004: 121) argues that such regional leadership as during Suharto’s era no longer exists because the latter’s attempts to resolve disputes have been somewhat half-hearted.

On the other side, Indonesia had learnt some important lessons from the past experiences. Consequently, when the country was recovering from the crisis, the government refrained from asserting its influence over the union, because it was well aware of the cynical feelings among other ASEAN partners that their taking an assertive role could spur antagonism, resulting in them being accused of attempting to dominate the association. This is important, for this key reason for the absence of leadership and the recent inactive role of Indonesia in ASEAN. Anwar (1994: 115-116) adds that one of the major reasons why Indonesia could not fully exercise leadership over the region was that its leaders were aware of increasing doubt and suspicion of the country’s dominance, particularly among smaller sensitive members, which they believed could lead to the undermining of the low-profile policy in ASEAN. The following statement by Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN, clearly questions the assumption that his country should automatically lead:

“It is not fair for me to say that this (leadership) is Indonesia. This is what people say but we never have that officially. It is only people who label us as a leader.”

However, he later slightly changed his position regarding leadership in ASEAN when he said:

“This is not about something that we are happy about or not, this is something that can maintain the unity and sense of caring and sharing in ASEAN.”

Owing to its awareness of suspicions of its intentions among its neighbours, Indonesia has viewed keeping its low-profile image within ASEAN as necessary for the continuing unity. That is, ‘Voluntary restraint in Indonesia’s role in ASEAN was designed to allay any lingering suspicions towards Indonesia’ (Anwar, 1994: 289). However, this does not mean an opportunity to lead ASEAN will be given to others, because Indonesia would not allow other

countries taking a too dominant role either. A Malaysian scholar made an interesting point here:

“Indonesia is like an elephant in the room, even it is not leading, you cannot do anything if Indonesia disagrees.”

Then, the follow-up question is whether there are other challenging candidates for leadership in ASEAN? And the simple answer to this question is ‘Yes’, Malaysia. For Malaysia, the commitment to ASEAN has been considered the first concern of its foreign policy, especially in the era of Prime Minister Dr Mahathir (1981-2003). Such a priority is conceivably emerged from the belief in the political viability of ASEAN and that the spirit of the association has been playing an important role in assisting Malaysia to maintain good relations with key neighbouring countries (Ping, 1982: 517). As pointed out above, the country participated in the association right from the beginning and has been involved in the initiation of several important ASEAN projects. One of the most influential interventions was its strong support for the expansion of the organization, whereby it played an active role in promoting ASEAN membership, which resulted in it eventually incorporating all ten countries of the region. As the second richest nation by per capita income, it would be a substitute for leadership in economic cooperation, given Indonesia’s much less impressive economic performance. In terms of the political perspective, some analysts have argued that political stability in Malaysia accompanied by its experiences in handling foreign affairs have put it in a good position to lead ASEAN (Chan, 2012).

At the same time, Singapore, a developed nation that notably has strengths in all areas of the economy, could be listed as another candidate for the regional leader. During the first phase, its decision to join ASEAN was seen as a means to survive as a newly independent state amongst pressure from neighbouring countries and against the scenario of domestic divided ethnic groups. Shee Poon Kim (1997: 69) argued that ‘if Singapore did not join ASEAN and ran against the regional tide, the prospects of Singapore surviving as an independent state would be bleak’. Moreover, due to its limited land and natural resources, the country’s motivation to join ASEAN seems to be only regarding the economic rationale of gaining access to large markets and rich natural resources. As a consequence, Singapore has always been an active supporter of economic cooperation among ASEAN countries. However, due to the slow economic progress in the first few decades of the association’s existence and weaknesses in

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the region’s economic structure (such as industrial capacity and purchasing power), Singapore did not fully have faith in ASEAN’s economic viability and thus largely bypassed these countries so as to tie its economy to that of the major developed industrial world (Kim, 1997: 74). Regarding this, Antolik (1990: 35) wrote ‘though a member of ASEAN, Singapore did not place great confidence in the pledge of nonaggression, nor did it have realistic expectations or desires about the group’s economic and cultural goals’.

Both Malaysia and Singapore have a reasonable degree of regional competence and have played important roles in shaping ASEAN. Nonetheless, with regards to Young’s concepts of leadership as presented in Chapter 3, the regional influences of Malaysia and Singapore are not based on the structural type of leadership in which power is derived from the possession of material resources. Rather, this falls into the entrepreneurial or ideational form in which the influences come from an individual (such as Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir and Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) who leads by making use of negotiating skills to influence the manner of association and by devising mutually-accepted deals that bring benefits for all. This was supported by a scholar from RSIS when he said:

“*Singapore could be a possible leader because of its wealth, very good infrastructure and English proficiency. But of course, that would be completely unacceptable to many others for a variety of reasons.*”

Interestingly, an Indonesian scholar shared her view from the perspective of national interests:

“*Singapore and Malaysia have conflicting interests with other members. That is why this makes it difficult for them to be accepted as a leader.*”

Furthermore, evidence has been provided showing that ASEAN’s cooperation has taken the form of intergovernmentalism where member states reject the delegation of their powers. According to Smith (2004), in such an environment power is normally defined in material terms and the most powerful actor, in this respect, normally has the most influence over the group’s decisions. In this regard, I propose that the influences of Malaysia and Singapore on ASEAN would not conform to the context of intergovernmentalism. For, in their case, their regional influence has only shone when a strong charismatic leader has come to power, while


Indonesia’s leadership role in the region has significantly declined since the end of 1990s as a result of the collapse of Suharto’s regime, severe economic turmoil as well as the policy of a low-key posture. Similarly, Paul (2010: 196) argues that ‘Singapore and Malaysia which are at the centre of the regional organization and communication hub, are too weak economically and adversarial in their cultural and political relations to constitute a core to hold and expand the regionalisation process.’

Furthermore, as Severino (2004: 182) contends, ‘ASEAN’s aversion to any one member’s dominance springs from its insistence on the equality of all members’. As a consequence, the association has always managed to avoid the unilateral dominance of a single country or a group of member states, leaving it without an overt leadership (Mohamed Pero, 2011: 5). I would comment that this is probably due to the remaining antagonism among member states and the association’s principles of having: equal rights, equal say and equal contributions. However, it could be argued that ASEAN has not been literally leaderless, for all the time, there has been the shadow of Indonesia’s influence in the region, or as quoted in Anwar’s work (2006: 66) its ‘leading from behind’. As explained above, Indonesia realizes very well that it cannot assert its power over the association overtly, because this would cause tensions among members that would threaten the cooperative and accommodating environment. Several of the research participants remarked upon the unclear picture of Indonesia’s leadership. For example, a Filipino scholar said:

“There are some certain countries that, at a certain point in time, take the lead but Indonesia is always a part of the picture. It is always with the concurrence of Indonesia”\(^{71}\)

Similarly, a scholar from RSIS said:

“Leadership in ASEAN is informal. This is why you cannot see it in terms of a physical embodiment.”\(^{72}\)

In addition, another scholar from RSIS added that Indonesia’s leadership is not obvious because:

“It is not ongoing and long-term, leading to a very clear end goal.”\(^{73}\)


Indonesia would fit the profile of Young’s structural leadership as it enthusiastically continues to bring ‘the sense of entitlement’ into play in the institutional bargaining and transforming it into the form of bargaining leverage. So, the conclusion can be drawn that the conditions and visibility of leadership in ASEAN are determined by Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to whether or when to lead, to react or whether to maintain its low-key profile. Due to the ongoing suspicions, anxiety, uncertainty and the strong nationalist sentiments among member states, Indonesia has not been fully able to assume a unilateral leadership role so as to protect regional unity, members’ willingness to continue accommodation and, the most important, the association’s survival. According to Antolik (1990: 163-164):

‘The past suggests, however, that ASEAN success depends on Indonesia’s (i.e. Suharto) low-key leadership style and broad vision that regional stability is a national interest. If a new leader (Indonesia) seeks to play a global role and neglects cultivation of regional relations, if he seeks to expand for reasons of prestige or to solve an insurgency, if he decides to ride the wave of fundamentalist Islam and liberate coreligionists, then it is likely the ASEAN process would disintegrate’

Moreover, it is apparent that leadership in ASEAN very much adheres to the personal stature of an individual in that power is likely to be exercised regionally when a charismatic or insightful leader who values the vitality of cooperation at regional level is in power. According to a former Secretary General of ASEAN:

“The leaderlessness in ASEAN depends on the personality involved, if you have a charismatic leader, people will go along.”

Such a circumstance can be seen in the administrations of Indonesia’s Suharto, Malaysia’s Mahathir and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and this point will be developed further in the next section. In summary, the lack of leadership in ASEAN in recent times can be attributed to Indonesia’s non-assertive and indirect approach to the role. However, although it has been refusing to exert its influence, there is no doubt that it has always been regarded as ‘the first among equals’. However, the shadow of Indonesia’s history of confrontation with its neighbours in the past has troubled ASEAN and hence it is perhaps not surprising that its exercise of leadership has become somewhat enigmatic.

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7.5 Existing forms of leadership

Another matter for consideration is that regarding existing forms of leadership in ASEAN. Despite the Indonesia’s intermittent unilateral form of leadership in ASEAN, the data illustrate some other interesting insights regarding previous existing patterns of leadership in ASEAN. As appeared in Chapter 3, it is worth noting that, in any regional grouping, most informative discourses regarding leadership refer to the formal term of leadership, which is usually the presidency or chairmanship of the union. Technically, a rotating presidency or chairmanship has the conventional ability to influence decision making and is considered as the most undisputed leadership arrangement as well as by far the best manner to manage an association. However, the intergovernmentalist perspective heralds that more attention tends to be on the informal forms of leadership exercised by a region’s superpowers or the most influential countries who possess the ability to coerce or persuade others. In Chapter 4, the EU’s experiences suggest that it is leadership of this nature that actually steers the organization and, more importantly, increases the probability of success. (Cole, 2001: 47)

Similar to the EU, the current context of ASEAN’s formal leadership refers to the rotating chairmanship, which proceeds in alphabetical order. Informal leadership is in the hands Indonesia and, to some extent, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, which are the most influential member states capable of taking initiatives that they are then able to persuade others to support. This section focuses on the various types of informal leadership in ASEAN, as the result of a synthesis of the data collected from the documentation and the interviews.

Despite the apparent intermittent unilateral leadership of Indonesia, the literature and the interview data reveals that in ASEAN informal leadership can be categorized into three additional different patterns. The first is described in a number of works by Severino (2004) and Anwar (2006) as well as being identified by some of the interviewees. Sectorial leadership or what is sometimes called issue-based leadership or termed ‘functional rather than general leadership’ by Anwar (2006), refers to that exhibited through areas or sectors of competence that a country has, which puts it in a better position to take the lead at a particular time. Regarding which, Indonesia is widely considered to be at the forefront of security and political matters, whereas Singapore and Thailand, and to some extent Malaysia, are more prominent in areas of economic development, while the Philippines is more keen on promoting socio-cultural cooperation. One classic example of this form of leadership in the case when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1970s, when ASEAN tried to achieve an effective resolution to the conflict by demanding an immediate withdrawal (Sundararaman, 1997). This time, as a frontline country with high stakes in the conflict, ASEAN’s official standpoint was led by the
Thais, who galvanised support from their regional fellow members. An Indonesian scholar expressed the view that sectorial leadership does exist, being exercised through the constructing of ASEAN pillars, which are sponsored by particular member countries.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, the view of a Malaysian scholar appeared to support the idea of sectorial leadership as an effective measure:

\textit{“Sectorial leadership is important. It is good and suitable for ASEAN.”}\textsuperscript{76}

Secondly, some scholars write about cooperative leadership or what is sometimes called coalition leadership. Basically, it is that formed by a group of countries who share a common vision and wish to play a strategic role in the region. For instance, Kassim (2005: 301) pointed out that owing to the three countries sharing more similarities than with other ASEAN partners, if Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were able to consolidate their domestic politics as well as forging solid cooperation among their leaders, ‘the basis of a stronger ASEAN could be put in place given that the three countries, individually and collectively, play a strategic role in the region’. Interestingly, a scholar from RSIS raised this form of leadership:

\textit{“I honestly believe that there is no single country that can fulfil that (leadership) role... Another model would be a coalition model where you have two or three prime ministers or heads of state who feel that we need to push ASEAN forward and we have a common vision.”}\textsuperscript{77}

At the end of the interview, he added that coalition leadership is the most effective form of leadership for ASEAN to pursue. This is similar to the view of the director of EU Centre:

\textit{“I do not agree with a single leader. There should be a coalition leader. If ASEAN wants to be effective, it should be built on each other’s strength having different countries or faces doing different things depending on what they are good at.”}\textsuperscript{78}

The last category is periodical leadership, where the role is attached to individuality or personal ability, as mentioned in the previous section. Antolik (1990: 165) contended that ‘all

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ASEAN states are subject to the emergence of new leaders who may have priorities or less appreciation of ASEAN procedures’. A Malaysian scholar said:

“It (leadership in ASEAN) seems to be periodical and it depends on which leaders come in and how they see the benefits that ASEAN can have.”

However, this pattern of leadership is heavily reliant on strong characters, regard and confidence given by others as well as a supportive domestic environment in the country. In relation to this form of leadership, the concept of ‘Asian values’, a popular debate in Southeast Asia during the last few decades, as raised in Chapter 3, also sheds light on the conventionality of leadership in ASEAN, particularly in relation to individuality and strong characters of leadership. As such, the debates over ‘Asian values’ highlight the considerable differences between the Western and Eastern concepts of key political components and give an explanation for the unique pattern of institutions and political ideologies derived from cultures and histories in East and Southeast Asia. The popular discourses are heavily centred on the core leaders of ASEAN, namely Indonesia’s President Suharto, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, three notable leaders who have played a significant role in the development path of ASEAN. Thompson (2004: 1085) contended that the Asian values discourse in Malaysia and Singapore was to ‘justify authoritarianism after economic development to help co-opt their large middle classes’. That is, this was not promoted in support of rapid economic growth, but ‘rather, it justified authoritarianism after developmental goals had been substantially achieved’. (Thompson, 2004: 1091). From this it can be seen that ASEAN’s leadership at regional level has a solid link with domestic political conditions in that the presence of periodical leadership and the strong characters of some of it leaders have come from personal beliefs and political ideologies embedded at a domestic level. In relation to Chapter 5, where in transpired that Malaysia and Singapore have had poor democracy records owing a widespread mistrust of its benefits at the domestic level, there suitability as leadership candidates is somewhat questionable.

7.6 Indonesia as a natural leader of ASEAN
To recap so as to facilitate understanding of the discourse in this section, Indonesia has widely been commented upon by many analysts regarding its silent leadership in the region. As revealed in the previous sections, during the Suharto era it was at forefront of the foundation of ASEAN and the association always gained strong support from that nation’s governments.

The departure of President Suharto and the regional financial crisis in the late 1990s did spell the end of its active and assertive influence in the region. Later, while Indonesia’s economy regained and started to prosper, Indonesia’s presence and diplomatic posture in ASEAN remained relatively humble and unassuming. This allowed other ASEAN member states to establish themselves as equal partners and feel more comfortable when dealing with each other. The recent significant progress in the economic and political spheres has led Indonesia to revert to the form regional leadership more akin that of the Suharto era, but in a much less assertive way. This comeback has not been limited to within ASEAN, but goes beyond the region as the international community now recognizes Indonesia as a major actor at G-20 Meetings, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and is also an important US partner (Areethamsirikul, 2011). Clearly, as many have argued, Indonesia’s regional and global profile is clearly on the rise. With more confidence and a better international profile, has Indonesia matured enough to become the entitled leader of ASEAN? This section examines and evaluates the different roles Indonesia has played in the development of ASEAN and the potentiality for it steering ASEAN towards success.

Indonesia is the region’s largest nation, covering an area of 1.9 million square kilometres. It is the world’s fourth largest country in terms of population and also has the world’s largest number of Muslim inhabitants. Regionally, Indonesia comprised two-third of ASEAN’s total population and territory before the accession of Vietnam. It was the country that initiated and proposed the foundation of ASEAN as the means to end regional conflicts. With the advantage of having the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Permanent Representatives located in the capital, Jakarta, it has become the centre of ASEAN diplomacy, providing an easy connection with other partners particularly when facing urgent matters or in need of calling meetings.

Psychologically, the greatest pride of Indonesia’s nationalists is the self-made independence achieved by its uprising against the Dutch in 1940s, rather than it being given peacefully as with other regional fellows, such as Malaysia and the Philippines. As a result, Indonesian people are convinced that the independence victory is so meaningful because it was entirely as a result of their own efforts and so they feel indebted to no one. As a consequence of their painful experiences from colonization, most Indonesians have anti-imperialist sentiments and do not seem to favour international interference in both their domestic and regional affairs. This could be seen during the first two decades of ASEAN, when Indonesia was the country that played a leading role in stressing non-alignment and a general interest in removing the exercise of external powers from the region (Smith, 1999: 241). At the international level, it remains neutral, independent, self-reliant and ‘uninfluenced by the imperialists’ (Callis, 1978:
Moreover, many Indonesians believe that they are different from Westerners and Chinese, because their moral and spiritual values are far above the others’ materialistic attitudes (Callis, 1978: 10). With these psychological perspectives coupled with the material advantages derived from sheer size and strategic location, Indonesia is widely regarded as the entitled leader, the most influential actor and the giant of Southeast Asia.

On these grounds, Indonesians feel the ‘sense of entitlement’, believing that due to having better qualifications for leadership, they are destined to lead ASEAN. The influence of Indonesia in the region was clearly seen even before the establishment of ASEAN. Leifer (1999: 37) pointed out that the short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) joined by Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, prior to the setting up of ASEAN never attracted international respect, because of the absence of the largest and most populous country in the region. In the same vein, Antolik (1990: 17) contended that ASEAN is significantly differentiated from its predecessors owing to the addition of the membership of the region’s largest state together with its acceptance of accommodation. This implies that Indonesia has been markedly influential in the development of ASEAN since before its creation. During Sukarno’s era, the grievous consequences from his Konfrontasi policy were the key determinants of what has become ASEAN today. With respect to Antolik’s perspective, the formation of ASEAN has been ‘a political process to obviate all future Konfrontasi’ (1990: 17). The following period of Suharto’s active administration made Indonesia’s regional leadership even more explicit. That is, his successful contributions to regional stability in the form of turning the battlefield into a peaceful environment, and domestic economic improvements provided Indonesia a position in ASEAN of more regional support and credibility.

In contrast to its benevolent regional policy, Indonesia’s coercive action towards East Timor took away its international standing. This situation was intensified by the severe financial crisis that struck the region in 1997, which resulted in its influence in ASEAN being ultimately diminished owing to several domestic problems and hence loss of belief in Indonesia’s long-term leadership role. Regarding the destabilising issues, Smith (1999: 238-239) identified the 1997 financial and economic crisis, the Indonesian forest fires during 1997-1998, that nation’s reluctance for trade liberalism and the accession of Cambodia as having caused considerable strains within ASEAN. Since then, Indonesia has tried its best to exercise benevolent power in light of its domestic weakness in order to be ‘in tune with its natural position of leadership in ASEAN’ (Emmers, 2005: 648). After the decline of its position in ASEAN as a consequence of the aforementioned circumstances, Indonesia attempted to resume its former leading role in ASEAN once its economy had recovered after the 1997 crisis. One of the key mechanisms that
have fortified the process of regaining its reputation in regional affairs is the country’s consolidation of democracy. The introduction of genuine democracy that began after the fall of Suharto at the end of 1990s was a critical turning point in Indonesia’s political history as the country had been under the authoritarian rule since its declared independence in 1945, such that its foreign policy making was always derived from the leader’s individuality and interests. The recent national democratic elections in 2004 and 2009 were considered free and fair with only a little violence being reported, which was in contrast to those of its neighbouring countries, Malaysia and Singapore, which have been under one party rule for several decades (Reid, 2012: 5). In 2012, the country was even ranked by Freedom House as fully democratic, becoming the only country in Southeast Asia, alongside Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Freedom House, 2012).

As mentioned previously in Chapter 3, under democratic peace theory it is suggested that democracies do not fight among themselves because a democratic system has many effective anti-war instruments. Moreover, when facing a dispute, democratic countries would expect the other country to sort the problem out peacefully. Also, it was elicited in the same chapter that democracy is likely to reinforce the regional integration process. Thus, such conventional insights imply that the political transition of the region’s largest state could encourage the peaceful conflict mechanisms and cooperative manners, thereby contributing to stability within ASEAN. Further, for Indonesia, the consolidation of democracy would mean the changing of values and in particular, the nature of its foreign policy, such that it transforms itself into a fundamental source of ‘soft power’ that would enhance international image of the association (Laksmana, 2011: 163-164). Nye (2004: 11) wrote in his book that the values, such as democracy, human rights, peace and collaborative manners, a government represents at the domestic level, in its international institutions and in foreign policy are an important source of soft power. This directly associates with the constructivist stance that emphasizes how benevolent power is derived from the soft power of ideas, values and institutions. Concerning this, Indonesia’s regional leadership driven by its soft power could be a key mechanism to dismantle antagonism, suspicion and uncertainty among ASEAN members, thus giving it more credibility and hence more rightful power to lead.

In the previous section it was pointed out that leadership in ASEAN is strongly tied to individual capacities and characters, which indicates that it would prove beneficial to assess the current leader of Indonesia, for given this notion a strong one implies a more confident country. The current Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, or as called by the media, ‘SBY’, is widely considered a key driving force behind the country’s recent remarkable development. He
is the first ever president to be re-elected and his two landslide wins in 2004 and 2009 have guaranteed him widespread support from the people and thus provided him with a strong mandate to exert strong leadership in order to push forward the country in a more peaceful, stable and prosperous manner. The re-election came from the credit he gained as a result of some success in dealing with the unstable economy, deep-rooted problems such as corruption and the independence movement in Aceh province during his first term of presidency (Joshi, 2009). Internationally, under his administration Indonesia’s role on the international scene has been considerably rising. He also earned widespread international respect and a number of awards: one of the 100 World’s Most Influential People in 2009 by Time magazine, the Honorary Companion of the Order of Australia in 2010, the Honorary Knights Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath awarded by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in 2012 and the World Statesman Award in 2013. In general, this international recognition, not only acknowledges his growing reputation, but also by association Indonesia’s recent impressive development. As appeared on the BBC in this regard, ‘being forced from office under successive presidents seems to have enhanced Mr Yudhoyono’s reputation as a man of principle, willing to sacrifice his own ambitions for the values he believes in’ (Harvey, 2004). Similarly Anwar Ibrahim wrote in Time magazine (Ibrahim, 2009), ‘the time is right for Indonesia, as the world’s most populous Muslim nation, to assume a more prominent position in Asia and throughout the Muslim world’. Seemingly, the right one has been found for Indonesia, and collectively for ASEAN.

Indonesia is clearly on the rise on the international stage as it has started to gain credibility and reputation. A few years ago, one of the most influential American Journal Foreign Policy titled an article as ‘The Indonesian Tiger’, which demonstrates the rising potentiality of Indonesia (Keating, 2010). Another noteworthy article came under the heading ‘Roubini: Goodbye China, Hello Indonesia’ in The Financial Times. It discusses the dramatic growth of Indonesia’s economy and its emerging importance in the global economy. In this well respected economist’s own words, ‘now, along with most of its south-east Asian neighbours, it (Indonesia) has built up “massive reserves” and is in healthy shape’ (Deutsch, 2011). Among the several favourable economic fundamentals mentioned in the articles, the most significant factors of Indonesia’s economic growth are domestic consumption, which is derived from the expansion of middle-class income, and the considerable low amount of government debt (Reid, 2012: 4-5). However, there still has been ongoing criticism about such domestic matters as corruption, ailing infrastructure and extremist Islamic rhetoric.
Henceforth, Indonesia is now clearly in the new era as the past authoritarianism and the traumas of regional conflict have faded into history. The country would appear to be preparing itself to become a more engaged regional actor as it gets closer to being fully equipped with the necessary instruments for this outcome. As stated by a Malaysian scholar:

“Indonesia has crossed a sort of democratic line and it will never go back... Indonesia now is very plural and pragmatic. Maybe, a good candidate for a leader could come out of Indonesia.”

Arguably, the material factors (sizes of land, population and economy, strategic location and natural resources), the psychological factors (spirit and self-reliance), the supplying of soft power (inducement and attraction) stemming from consolidated democracy and political stability as well as the charismatic individuality of leader co-produce the most realistic candidateship for leading ASEAN.

7.7 Discussion and conclusion

From the European experience, it has been explained that leadership during the regional integration process can involve two antagonistic positions. First, it can be an important driver playing a key role in accelerating and facilitating the negotiation and decision-making process, particularly in a large union which contains many different actors. Second, on the other hand, leadership can deter the progress and development of regional integration, because it can come in form of uncertainty and Euroscepticism, in particular, regarding economic-based and sovereignty-based worries. Indeed, the EU literature suggests that leadership is necessary for the regional integration process and hence important for the success of the community. However, if the leaders possess too much power and decide to go against the EU, they can threaten to end the union. A more viable alternative to handling leadership in the EU could be to stick to the original concept of having consolidated and commanding supranational institutions with a good balance of power, particularly with regards to the roles of: the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. That is, owing to their being established based on a supranational perspective, the institutional organs of the EU were ideally designed to be the engine driver with supreme power over the union. However, perhaps because the union has grown from 6 to 27 countries, the leadership issue has become a lot more complex. Hence, the original idea of Jean Monnet needs revision, in order to deal with the growing diversity and complexity, in the form of treaty change. In terms of leadership,
perhaps the solution lies in appointing someone who is proficient, experienced, trusted and independent from domestic politics to take charge. This would help prevent situations when national politics interfered, thus ensuring the union would keep running smoothly unhindered by domestic affairs. Therefore, the EU should not rely solely on its leadership, but rather on its solid institutional structure, which is regarded as the backbone that provides support for everything else. All in all, the Franco-German pattern does not seem to be entirely compatible with the context of European integration and thus forms of leadership need to be considered.

The matters of power and leadership would appear to be increasingly spurring on sceptical attitudes towards European integration, thereby posing a major threat further regional integration. Given that member countries are tied together by foreseeable future because of political and economic benefits offered by the EU, the distributions of power among national and supranational actors as well as the roles of national governments require significant revision. For, every deepening and widening attempt at more regional integration will put a great strain on the societies within the EU (Arato and Kaniok, 2009: 27). Thus, profound understanding of the EU should not only rest with the political elites, but it should be clearly disseminated to a wider audience so as to forge a ‘populist consensus’ (Arato and Kaniok, 2009: 34). It has become a fundamental fact that close Franco-German relations have been crucial for European integration as they have been the engine of Europe for many decades and have helped in the attainment of mutual outcomes. However, as the union has grown larger and more complex, although it cannot be denied that this shared structural leadership has resulted in vital initiatives in the building of the European community, such as the creation of the European Council, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the European Monetary Union and the Schengen Area, it is probably not this type of leadership that the EU will require in the future. That is, the success of leadership depends on whether the type supplied is suitable for making progress in the negotiating context (Beach and Mazzucelli, 2007: 19). If the EU is about going to be a united states of Europe and thus maintain the fate of supranationalism, someone who legitimately represents the whole union, on the basis of technocracy rather than someone whose accountability is derived from national electorates and under the influence of the French and German.

As illustrated by the case of ASEAN, leadership in a regional organization can be a problematic and sensitive issue because it can involve domination of one or a group of states over the others. The ability of certain states to take the lead and the acquiescence of other states to live with that kind of assertiveness depends on many factors and ‘falls more into the realm of art than science’ (Anwar, 2006: 60). Nevertheless, to some extent, as Mattli (1999: 65) has made
clear in his book the existence of a hegemonic or dominant actor, serving as an institutional focal point and regional paymaster, is an important precondition of a successful regional integration. Similarly, a Filipino scholar said:

“Leadership could help because it kick starts certain things.”

Another scholar indicated that:

“The leaderlessness in ASEAN can be a problem.”

From the discussion in this and previous chapters it clear that ASEAN is an intergovernmental and elitist-driven organization. That is, it is mobilized by the political leaders who, from the very beginning, will decide the objective, the visions, and the ideas of the organisation and later, they ‘will start to articulate how do we structured the organisation, what kind of power do we want to give the organisation’ (Mohamed Pero, 2011: 7). Regarding the matter of leadership, I posit that both the literature and interview data have confirmed that it is an important driver of ASEAN integration.

The invisibility and complexity of leadership in ASEAN provides several useful insights. Firstly, it implies that the presence of two forms of leadership can be detected in every integrating region. In this regard, Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN made it clear that both ASEAN and the EU carry out two forms of leadership, formal and informal. In the case of ASEAN:

“The chairmanship of ASEAN is what we agreed officially. It is not only chairing the meeting but it is leadership also.”

Secondly, the invisibility of leadership in ASEAN is perhaps as a consequence of the principle of equality and remaining antagonism among members. So, the rotating chairmanship system is created to secure this golden rule and ensure the group’s collaborative framework and members’ willingness to coordinate regionally. More importantly, the rotating chairmanship helps to conceal the presence of unequally distributed power in the region, which could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and unity. Indeed, as the most structurally powerful


country in the region, the invisibility of leadership in ASEAN is conditioned by the Indonesia’s compensation for the sake of regional unity, which has transpired as being one of the Indonesia’s significant commitments to the association’s survival and success.

In reality, integrating regions cannot deny the influence of structural powers, derived from material and resource capacity in every international bargain where national interests are contested. Even the European Union which has much more solid and effective institutional bodies grounded in the intention to drive decision making is influentially inferior to the Franco-German alliance. In Mattli’s work (Mattli, 1999: 14), he contended that multiple potential leaders in a region would cause a coordination problem, which could consequently act as a deterrent to regional integration. Therefore, it is advised that ‘Successful integration requires the presence of an undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties. Such a state serves as focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations and policies; it also helps to ease distributional tensions through, for example, side-payments’. The discussion in the previous sections has revealed the presence of Indonesia’s influence over the region all the time that ASEAN has been in existence, although its exercising of power has been somewhat intermittent. Thus, is in line with Lübkemeier (2007: 7), Schild (2010: 1370-1371) and Beach and Mazzucelli’s (2007: 19) stance put forward in Chapter 484, I accept that the most effective, possible, suitable and realistic form of leadership in ASEAN should be driven by Indonesia, simply because it is a natural leader of the organisation. This conclusion comes both from the literature and the interviews, which have confirmed that Indonesia has a crucial role play in deepening ASEAN’s regional integration. Challenging this view, a Filipino scholar claimed that:

“If Indonesia starts to be more aggressive, it doesn’t matter whether it is rich or poor, just by the sheer size of Indonesia it can affect and destabilize ASEAN.”

This perspective confirms that Indonesia’s foreign policy is a key factor determining the coordination and stability within ASEAN. However, Indonesia’s leadership is known as ‘leadership from behind’, which is relatively invisible and tacit due to the principle of equality among members. With the low-posture politics of Indonesia together with the design of ASEAN, the association has created multilateralism and a neutral context in which smaller

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states are able to feel less outclassed when dealing with Indonesia, thus avoiding the need to form a polarizing coalition in the region (Antolik, 1990: 159).

In connection with the previous chapter, where the considerable weakness and dysfunction of ASEAN institutions was exposed, I also propose that ASEAN cannot rely wholly on structural leadership. That is, to some degree, it should incorporate some sense of entrepreneurial or ideational leadership as well. Moreover, a leadership that is accommodative and persuasive would help promote ASEAN’s international standing, for it would change the external perspective on the region being prone to coerciveness and antagonism. In other words, the association would be perceived as having a leadership that was exercising soft power. Nye (2004: 6), in his book claimed that if a leader represents these values, or at least those that others want to follow, ‘it will cost less to lead.’ A Malaysian scholar strongly supported this notion, by saying:

“I would say the Secretary General position can be enhanced. This is the person who is able to build bridges between countries and convince the leaders. So, you also really need the entrepreneurial leadership.”

As stressed by several of the interviewees, the most important thing seems to be neutrality and realization beyond national interests. In other words, the person who is in charge of steering the association should not simply be looking at his or her own personal or national interests and political survival, but take responsibility for the region’s fortune as a whole.

Moreover, sectorial leadership has an important role to play in ASEAN, because Indonesia still lacks the capability to make a strong contribution in some areas, in particular, on the economic and social fronts. As a result, this leaves some space for other member countries, especially Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, to take the lead at certain points in time. Finally, as the former Secretary General stated at the end of his interview:

“ASEAN needs a leader like President Suharto used to be. He came from a very big country. He knew that he could not assert Indonesian influence all the time. The rest of us went to him and referred to President Suharto, he was the accepted wise-man. We

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would not overstep his limit. That kind of system heavily depends on personality and I don’t think we can rely on that.\footnote{KENG YONG, O. 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person] Kuala Lumpur, 21 March 2013.}

Although this contribution would appear to be rather confused in its message, what is important about it is the way it focuses on a particular individual as having the destiny of ASEAN in his hands. That is, this exposes the fact that the debate regarding leadership of the organisation has tended to be very much to do with leadership by powerful individuals exercised periodically, rather than other forms. Moreover, I have contended that both ASEAN and the European Union have been driven by a structural type of leadership through the informal engagement of leaders. However, both models are different in terms of dependency. ASEAN relies heavily on individuality, which in the Secretary General’s opinion, could be a major weakness because, once a new leader comes in, there is no guarantee that the association will keep running smoothly and a real possibility of a power vacuum, or a stalemate situation, which would hold the region back. On the other hand, the EU possesses a system of effective institutions that can give support to the pursuit of leadership. Therefore, it is concluded that enhancing leadership in ASEAN cannot be done in isolation for also requires collaborative activity aimed at strengthening its institutional bodies. This resonates with Nye’s account of soft power (2004: 11):

‘If a country’s culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses institutions and follow rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks’

Finally, while ASEAN is often seen to lack leadership, I have argued in this chapter that this matter will be determined in the context of elements of the ASEAN Way and the political configuration of Indonesia. Regarding the latter, the recent positive political developments in Indonesia are a good sign as they suggest that it is ready once again to play its part in the leadership of ASEAN, but this time by exercising soft power, rather than taking an aggressive stance.
8 SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction
This concluding chapter recapitulates the main arguments of the study and wrap up key findings from the empirical data. In light of the increasing trend towards regionalism, the main objective of this thesis has been to illustrate the dynamics of ASEAN integration through analysing the roles of democratisation, identity, institution and leadership in regional integration process and, from this, to distil implications for the theoretical understanding of regionalism in a comparative vein. In this chapter, the initial aim of this thesis is revisited and a synthesis of the main findings and a generalisation of the data will be presented. The chapter begins with a summary of the main findings of each empirical chapter, the central arguments and evaluation of the relationships between the four elements as well as how they interact in the process. Then, it will reveal the theoretical implications for integration theories and the study of regional integration. As a result of the synthesis of findings, this research has also provided some useful insights into the development of European integration which will be presented in the following section. Then, the chapter will end with a consideration of the research limitations and some suggestions for future study.

8.2 Summary and Discussion
The empirical premise for this study was that the case of ASEAN provides a significantly different experience for the study of regional integration from that of the EU, but that the empirical experience of the EU has typically driven theoretical examinations of regionalism. This thesis has sought to rebalance the study of regionalism by engaging directly with those Eurocentric theoretical concerns in an empirical case that varies considerably from the European experience. While the degree of economic and political integration in ASEAN is far looser than that of the EU, ASEAN clearly goes beyond ‘passive geographical codification’ to being a ‘successful consultative process that these states have used in managing tensions among themselves and in dealing with the external environment’ (Antolik, 1990: 5). In Hund’s (2002: 118) characterisation, ‘the picture... is that of an organisation trying to integrate without actually integrating, of nation states trying to coordinate without being coordinated’. While both perspectives provide important inputs, they remain locked in an approach that explicitly or implicitly views the EU as the paradigmatic case against which other regional organizations are to be evaluated. The approach of this thesis, instead, has been to take concepts key to the theorisation of the EU and examine how useful they are in understanding the ASEAN experience on its own terms.
In ASEAN, democracy is considered to be a sensitive issue that can determine continuity and unity in the regional bloc. Throughout its development path, ASEAN leaders have not made an explicit commitment to democracy at the regional level. The evidence provided in this thesis shows that ASEAN countries are not politically consolidated and, to varying degrees, still remain very much under authoritarian rules. Furthermore, such political and social conditions as well as the political diversity in the region have become a major obstacle and are not propitious for democracy to prosper. In the view of ASEAN leaders, democratisation is seen as a threat that can ruin the group’s unity and ASEAN’s elite-centred regionalism. As suggested by democratic peace theory, this would entail the incompatibility between democracy and ASEAN regionalism, particularly when considering the vitality of ASEAN norms.

Empirically, the data demonstrate that ASEAN and most of its citizens reside in illiberal environments whereby political freedoms and the role of civil society are largely limited. The association is designed and structured to protect the rights and sovereignty of the member states rather than their citizens. In addition, because there is extensive difference in political regimes in ASEAN, non-democratic members are likely to refuse any reform that could potentially threaten their political survival. Even in the case of democratic members, the quality of their democracy remains low and problematic as there are many entrenched problems that continue to weaken the states such as corruption, lack of accountability and transparency, money and self-interest politics and social inequalities, as can be seen in the current political situation in Thailand as an example. Such hindering features would inhibit the development of civil society to become a significant force and limit the effects of democracy once it has been put into action.

Indeed, the prospects for democratisation remain out of reach for ASEAN due to the political diversity, the inferior political conditions and the fact that most of the members still remain under authoritarian rule. As long as the principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision making continue to shield the member states, ASEAN would not be able to introduce any democratic reform and offer sufficient channels for the participation of civil society. Nevertheless, democracy nowadays has become an important international norm and an image of good governance. In the global scope, which is beyond the remit of this thesis, ASEAN could potentially face growing pressure from the international community calling for a long-term commitment to democracy.

In the case of the EU, the mainstream argument is that democracy is crucial for regional integration, particularly in helping to achieve the goals of peace and security. Reflecting on the
ASEAN case, however, what seems more tenable is the idea that it is broad regional consensus on democracy and democratisation that is important for regionalism, rather than an absolute commitment to democracy per se. Put another way, political convergence is important for regional integration, but democracy is not the only base for political convergence, and in ASEAN a kind of illiberal semi-democracy constitutes an equally valid basis for integration from an empirical perspective.

Beyond its own borders, of course, the consolidation of democracy in ASEAN would help the association to improve its international image and credibility as well as enable the participation of all involved parties. We may also see democracy as normatively desirable. But if ASEAN should make best use of its existing power and mechanisms to facilitate and encourage bottom-up democratic reform by moving towards a more participatory community and engaging more with civil society, the implication is that this should be carried out little by little and should be designated as a long-term goal. The principle of non-intervention could be reinterpreted in a way that makes it flexible enough to allow members to discuss existing problems and express their concerns more openly and comfortably.

Turning to the issue of collective identity, again we find a contrast with the European experience. Whereas in Europe, collective identity is seen as an emerging phenomenon on the mass level, the case of ASEAN represents the notion of ‘elite regionalism’, where collective identity can only really be found at state level in which such a common value is shared only among elites, diplomats and technocrats, while there seems to be a very limited sense of collective identity among ordinary citizens. This distinction parallels the democratic distinction above, with a more limited, elite version of collective identity constitutive of a more limited effective electoral franchise.

The empirical data suggests that the substance of identity is very much linked to the elements of ASEAN Way. Discussion of collective identity can be divided into two different levels due to the substantial differences in the development of collective identity. At state level, the ASEAN Way acts as norms of association and reflects a collective identity shared among ASEAN countries and their political elites. Indeed, the solid construction of norms and the existence of collective identity do help heighten the level of trust among members and prevent interstate conflicts. Such emerging identity is sufficiently strong to provide cement for the sake of regional peace and unity at least for the foreseeable future. At citizen level, collective identity has not been significantly generated among ASEAN citizens. This is due to the remaining antagonism among people and the lack of citizen’s involvement in the ASEAN integration
process. On the whole, regional integration is itself a process of identity building because identity is forged through the dynamics of regional interaction and transnational activities. It helps in shaping ideas, decisions and action of states and helps citizens to distinguish themselves as members of the group and construct a sense of belonging. The point here is that the difference between European and ASEAN experiences of collective identity along with the internal consistency of this with the experience of democracy in each region may be suggestive that collective identity is a consequence of the particular configuration of regional integration rather than a precondition.

Turning to the third concept we dealt with, institutions are considered to be one of the most important driving factors for the development of regional integration. ASEAN has undergone considerable changes over decades and revamped its institutional structure in ways that can support its administration and activities. The ASEAN Charter adopted in 2008 is the most recent and most significant step forward in strengthening its institutional organs. It improves the association’s compliance mechanisms, streamlines its decision-making structure and provides ASEAN with more rule-based conditions and more legally binding obligations. Nevertheless, the issues of institutions have always been at the centre of criticisms of ASEAN and demonstrate another area of great deficiency. Although ASEAN leaders realize these weaknesses and continue to strengthen the institutional mechanisms, it is understood that those commitments are clearly insufficient because there are several important factors that continue to limit the role of ASEAN institutions.

Firstly, ASEAN institutions have a very limited role in policy-making and lack a mandate to ensure effective implementation. Secondly, the ASEAN Secretariat lacks financial resources to manage the association’s growing activities and to service the needs of deeper integration. This is mainly thought to be a result of the equal contributions of member states that are retained in order to reflect the norms of equality among members. Lastly, another concern is about a lack of professional staffs to support ASEAN activities. Moreover, ASEAN cannot attract talented, ambitious and capable people because people do not perceive working at ASEAN as a well-paid and challenging job – a stark contrast to the ‘gravy train’ image of Brussels. In addressing the weakness of institutions in ASEAN, the system of equal contributions should be substantially revised because it is not realistic and does not seem coherent with the current circumstances. Additionally, some new institutional creations such as a research wing and people’s council are worth considering as they can potentially fulfil areas of severe deficiency in ASEAN.
The final concept the thesis deals with was leadership. The case of the EU displays two contradictory understandings of leadership in regional integration process. Likewise, in ASEAN, there are widely differing perspectives on leadership. ASEAN is often thought of as lacking leadership for decades which is linked to the emergence of external interferences in the region. However, the evidence here suggests that leaderlessness in ASEAN is as a result of Indonesia’s demonstration of non-assertiveness and low-profile policy within ASEAN. This is because Indonesia is well aware of increasing doubt and suspicion of Indonesia’s dominance which could cause tensions among other members. Therefore, it can be inferred that ASEAN is not literally leaderless because Indonesia manages to keep its low-profile as necessary for maintaining the unity within ASEAN and the invisibility of leadership in ASEAN is caused by the principle of equality and containing antagonism among members. The parallel between Indonesia’s role in ASEAN and Germany’s role in the EU is clear.

In the context of ASEAN, the picture of leadership is complicated. On the one hand, apparently there has been Indonesia’s invisible and inconsistent form of leadership throughout the lifespan of ASEAN. On the other hand, the data demonstrates that there are three other forms of leadership which existed in parallel with the unilateral leadership of Indonesia: Sectorial leadership, Cooperative leadership and Periodical leadership. However, after being halted by the departure of President Suharto and the financial crisis in the late 1990s, the recent significant political and economic development in Indonesia seems to indicate a new stage of Indonesia’s regional leadership. I argue that leadership in ASEAN remains to be determined by the elements of ASEAN Way and the politics of Indonesia. Indonesia’s leadership, driven by its soft power could be a key mechanism to dismantle antagonism, suspicion and uncertainty and the recent progress in Indonesia would provide a vital ingredient in building up confidence and credibility as well as enhancing the pursuit of leadership in ASEAN.

Figure 8.1: The abstract relationship between norms, identity, and institutions
In terms of the relationships between the four elements, the process of ASEAN integration has relatively intriguing and robust dynamics. The empirical data demonstrates that the four elements investigated in this research are significantly interrelated and interdependent. To a certain extent, identity, institution and leadership are crucial as the driving force in the development of ASEAN integration rather than simply the level of integration. Moreover, as displayed in Figure 8.1, I have discovered that identity and institution have solid ties with norms of the association and this is guided by the constructivist explanation. One important finding of this research is that the vitality of norms is crucial for keeping the union going in the direction that will ensure the continuity of the association and lead it to achieve its original goals, which in the case of ASEAN are peace and security. The existence of norms accompanied by states’ interaction in the dynamics of the regional integration process will incrementally forge collective identity as well as shape the behaviour of political leaders and the design of institutions. Identity, once emerged, represents the norms to provide a meaning for involved actors, distinguish them from others and inform them of what they are here for. On the other hand, institutions are something of a by-product of the process, functioning to safeguard norms and as a key mechanism for promoting the construction and managing the conflict of identity. On the whole, these three elements are evidently correlated and reinforcing each other and intricately embedded in the dynamics of regional integration.

Similar to the EU, leadership is often referred in an informal term and is more likely to be exercised based on material sense. I found that it does not substantially have influence on the whole dynamics of regional integration because integrating regions will usually arrange a formal form of leadership such as presidency and chairmanship to govern the union. But indeed, informal leadership could help the association accelerate, or increase the probability of, mutually-agreed outcomes as well as fulfilling some kind of brokering functions and building up confidence. However, it should be noted that leadership in ASEAN is incompletely functioning due to being constrained by the vitality of norms. As a result, the influence of leadership in ASEAN integration cannot be seen clearly like in case of the EU and this would explain why other leadership arrangements can be observed.

Democratisation is a complicated one for ASEAN because the idea of Western democracy is not thoroughly. Although democracy is widely accepted as an international norm of good governance and highly acknowledged as norms of European integration, democracy proves problematic and causes a lot of internal tension once put in the context of ASEAN. Indeed, democratisation is not encouraged in ASEAN because it disrupts the practices of its elitism and could pose a threat to regime survival. Arguably, there is evidence that the problem of
democratic deficit and the divergent political values among ASEAN members lie at the root of all emerging major problems and criticisms as well as lead to a retarded progress of regional integration. That is to say, the principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, equality among members and consensus-based decision-making, declared as a means of diplomacy and multilateralism, appear to help ASEAN avoid criticisms, conceal the authoritarian nature of most ASEAN countries and prevent them from potential threats to state’s weaknesses and their political survivals. This coincides with the viewpoint of Christopher Roberts (2010: 17-18), he argued:

“Divergent political systems and values, combined with state weakness, will continue to inhibit regional cooperation over key issues... ASEAN members will need to continue with a process of internal consolidation.”

In addition, democracy is globally considered as an international norm of good governance and has become a basis for international socialization. This could precisely have an impact on the organization’s image and international credibility. Thus, I foresee that more and more pressure will be exerted on ASEAN to demand explicit commitment to democracy and human rights. Acharya (2003: 377) clearly highlighted the importance of democracy in the development of ASEAN integration:

‘Democratisation creates more domestic transparency in ways beneficial to regional understanding and trust... This could reduce suspicions among neighbours and expand regional security and economic cooperation. Democratisation may lead to more open and regularised interactions among states, reducing the importance of interpersonal contact. Democratisation produces greater openness and the rule of law not just within states, but also between them... This can be more conducive to regional collective problem solving.’

This is perhaps a deadlock that we need to find the way to break. Without the realisation of domestic consolidation, I believe that ASEAN would not be able to make a significant progress in regional cooperation. Instead of the validity of norms, the achievements in regional economic cooperation that could contribute to country’s wealth and the increasing economic interdependence between members would increase the costs of coercive foreign policy and highlight the significance of regional cooperation. Moreover, the transnational exchange and cross-border interactions through various channels and instruments would act as a mechanism that incrementally drives democratisation forces within the region.
In the final analysis, Figure 8.2 could partially depict the dynamics of ASEAN integration as it illustrates how ASEAN is structured in the regional context and how each of the elements functions, interacts and plays out in the process. The triangle in the box represents ASEAN organization which is divided into two layers: the political leader part and the institutional part. The inner square represents norms of the association which in this case are those principles of ASEAN Way while the outer square symbolises the global or international sphere which is democracy in the context of this research. As can be seen, the political elites have a lot more space and are situated above the institutions in which its lower tier serves as a supporting base of the elite’s decision-making body. The triangle laid inside the inner square implies that the Association is solidly protected by the Association’s norms from the international influence of democracy. The norms function as a barrier filtering out influences that could potentially challenge the Association’s means of regionalism, giving protection from or deflecting emerging criticisms. Therefore, this implies that the penetration of democracy into ASEAN is largely limited and it will not be able to function properly and thrive to become a significant force in Southeast Asia.

The figure also highlights the central roles of political leaders and institution in the integration process. As the empirical findings show, political leaders control the dynamics, the pace and all other key aspects of integration as well as making all important decisions. Under a command of political leaders, institutions act as a central supporting mechanism that turns the ideas, plans and decisions into concrete action as well as providing a bridge between elite and citizen...
levels. It also provides an arena for all political activities and interactions. In connection with Figure 8.1, the figure can also provide an explanation for the abstract role of norms and identity in ASEAN integration. That is to say, all the components within the triangle are invisibly cemented by the ideational force of collective identity, which contributes to the group’s unity (the strength of the triangle) and the whole dynamics of integration. Meanwhile, the association’s norms (the inner square) are crucial in the sense that it helps ensure the continuity of the association (protecting the triangle from external threats) because ASEAN members are loosely tied due to its vast diversity among members and its preference for a non-legalistic approach to cooperation. Without the barrier of norms, ASEAN would be too weak to survive on the international scene. To sum up, both norms and identity help fortify ASEAN normatively in the way of solidifying its cooperation and this supports the abstract correlations between norms, identity and institution as displayed in the previous figure. Thus, in line with Acharya’s arguments in Chapter 6, I contend that no study of ASEAN can be complete without a consideration of norms and identity in which constructivism will increasingly become a dominant approach to the study of regionalism in Southeast Asia.

Clearly, figure 8.2 represents a form of regionalism that is internally coherent but very different in configuration from the EU. In ASEAN, the configuration of identity, institutions and leaders create a bulwark against democracy; in the EU, democratisation as a precondition even for membership creates a very different configuration of identity, institutions and leadership. We can think about this in terms of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. In relation to the model, this is portrayed by the position of the line that separates the political leaders and institutions within the triangle. That is, in the case of European integration where institutionalisation and supranationalism are more prevailing, the equivalent line would move higher towards the vertex of the triangle, implying more influence of the institutions and less influence of the political leaders. The inner square will not be existed because the European norms are very much in harmony with the international force and the fact that the union is competently united by virtue of its legally-binding condition, its less diverse nature as well as its strong identity among European elites and technocrats.

Relating this back to Jones’ argument about the dynamics of identity and institutions in ASEAN, it is true that understanding ASEAN integration should be undertaken in relation to the domestic context and the regional context of geopolitical transformation. However, instead of narrowly focusing on sovereignty and the functionality of the principles of non-intervention, one alternative option would be viewing it as a dynamic process where ASEAN integration is steered by various drivers. Fundamentally, every student of ASEAN integration should be
noted that ASEAN is a collection of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian stubborn states that used to be antagonistic towards each other. They are grouped in a vastly divergent regional environment and rigorously agreed to cooperate on the basis of intergovernmentalism which is guided by political elites.

In this research context, we have seen that ASEAN is reluctant to embrace democratic values because of its vast ideological difference among members. ASEAN lacks identity at ground level and support from ordinary citizens because it never been far away from being elite-centric. ASEAN adopts minimal forms of institutions to ensure that the manners of elitism are not disrupted. ASEAN lacks a strategically clear direction and active leadership because they are restrained by the norm of equality and remaining antagonism among members. With these drivers (democracy, identity, institutions and leadership) not functioning effectively, the association would have not been able to survive without the validity of norms. It seems to me that ASEAN’s principle of non-interference was neither intended to directly halt interstate tension derived from conflicts of national interests nor to pave the way for greater cooperation. Rather, it is associated with the intergovernmentalism manners to helps give some space and certainty to its members for domestic consolidation, reduce possibility that members will wage war against each other, and more importantly prevent discontinuity of the association. In addition, according to Figure 8.2, it can be understood that the norms also help to safeguard the association from external critics and influences. Therefore, I envisage that abandoning the norm of non-interference would be likely to result in breaking up of the association.

Overall, we have seen that the concepts drawn from the EU experience do matter for ASEAN integration, but in very different ways than in the EU. The final task of the thesis is hence to return to the theoretical level and consider the implications for the study of regional integration.

8.3 Theoretical implication for the study of regional integration
As stated in Chapter 3, there has been so far no theory able to explain the whole picture of regional integration process because each of them has an emphasis on different areas of regional integration. This is why a combination of four theoretical concepts was employed to help capture the multidimensionality, offering various instruments for different aspects and levels of analysis in ASEAN integration. Due to the fact that all of them were developed to provide an explanation and interpretation for European integration, the theoretical inference and the empirical findings from this study could offer an opportunity to examine the feasibility
and the generalisation ability of these theoretical frameworks, whether they are capable to explain such phenomenon in other regions.

To begin with the main competing theories of European integration, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, although having been much criticised and amended, remain the most comprehensive arguments of regional integration. As one of the most substantial arguments made by neofunctionalists, the precedence of national governance will no longer exist in the light of a central supranational authority. Thus, although this theory is crucial in explaining EU structures and functions and it is important in the sense that it ensures the existence of supranationality and the requirements for institutional settings, as observed by this study, it is apparently unable to explain regional integration in a less developed model as most of the theoretical substance appears to be too ideal and inapplicable to the case of ASEAN. However, in my view the most significant contribution to other integrating regions would be that it emphasises the fact that regional integration process is a continuing process and such mutual commitments and interdependence between states make it too costly to be reversed or abandoned. Additionally, the theory is precise in the sense that it views institution as an important outcome of the integration process as well as a measure of the success of the integration project (see section 3.2.1), which could perhaps answer the question of why the pace of ASEAN integration is relatively slow and stagnated.

On the contrary, liberal intergovernmentalism is fully applicable and can better capture the nuanced reality of contemporary ASEAN integration. Firstly, given that the theory does not see regional integration as a challenge to a nation state but rather as a mechanism for strengthening state sovereignty, this would appear to be reinforced as the case of ASEAN shows that regional integration provides, indeed arguably reinforces, space and certainty for members to consolidate their domestic politics – a space that is not necessarily democratic. Secondly, it emphasises the issues of economic interests as a main reason for cooperation. This can be seen clearly as the most progress of integration in ASEAN so far has been in areas of economic cooperation. Finally, the emphasis of the important role of national governments and domestic interests greatly reflects the picture of elite-centred regionalism and the dynamics of ASEAN.

In relation to the four debates, I found that intergovernmentalist explanation about interstate negotiations and bargaining can be applied to make further discussions on some important debates on democratisation, institutions and leadership. For example, liberal intergovernmentalism provides some important perspectives on political diversity or different
ideological perspectives within the association (see Chapter 5). Moreover, it highlights the importance of institutions by viewing it as a mechanism that plays a key role in facilitating the negotiation process, providing reliable information as serving as some sort of a broker and a confidence builder. In terms of leadership, though the theory does not offer an answer for the question of who should lead the association or about the matters of leadership in the process, it does view leadership as a common phenomenon emerging from the difference in occupation of power and resources among involved actors and it does emphasise the predominance of the governments of the most influential states in the process.

Although liberal intergovernmentalism provides a useful theoretical framework that captures important aspects of ASEAN and EU experience alike, it is less able to explain the role of collective identity and institution in ASEAN integration. Insights from constructivism helps to clarify the relationship between norms, identity and institutional building (see Chapter 6 and section 9.1 above). As the ASEAN Way evidently plays a vital part in the dynamics of ASEAN integration, hence constructivism can deliberately explain the construction of collective identity at regional level and could potentially be one influential approach to analyse subjective issues or things relating to the ideational force within integrating regions. Similarly, new institutionalism emphasises the importance of institutions and views it as a prerequisite for constructing a regional community. Nevertheless, the way it explains the role of institutions is relatively rigid and straightforward. It does pinpoint all functions of institutions in the process but it does not exemplify the dynamics or interactions with other important elements in the process. Furthermore, it does not give a clue about how to set up or design an appropriate arrangement of institutions based on the context of regional settings. In such integration process where norms play an influential role, new institutionalism would be relatively awkward as it cannot capture the whole dynamics and things revolving around institution.

Finally, some important concepts elaborated in this research somewhat have the potential to be generalized and applied across regional settings. From Chapter 6, the notion of ‘institutions matter’ is relatively explicit both in cases of EU and ASEAN as institutions play a crucial role and act as a central mechanism in the dynamics of both integration models. Furthermore, as stated previously, the levels of institutionalisation could also be applied to assess the depth or success of other regional settings. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 7, leadership arrangements in regional integration process will most likely fall into the realm of structural leadership indicating that the most powerful country based on the possession of material resources is likely to take the lead, although this may be different in terms of dependency.
8.4 Reflections on the European Union

This research could make some contributions to the study of the EU mainly in two areas. Evidently, ASEAN has relatively clear regional boundaries and, seemingly, it is not very keen to seek further enlargement, despite the accession of East Timor which has recently gained independence from Indonesia in 2002. Instead, in terms of widening, it prefers enhancing cooperation with outside powers by dealing with them as a dialogue partner on the basis of intergovernmentalism and being multiple and open regionalism. On the other hand, the notion of “Zone of Peace” appears to give backing to the policy of further enlargement in the EU (see section 3.3.1). The privileges of EU membership and the massive financial assistance continue to attract more and more potential countries (perhaps neofunctionalist concepts of spillover were right in this sense). As enlightened by liberal intergovernmentalism in Chapter 3, enlargements would increase the diversity of national interests and ideological perspectives within the union which would complicate agreements and negotiations. In my own view, the ongoing accession of new members means more diversity, more problems and more difficulties in achieving shared outcomes and, of course, deeper integration. This could impede the current dynamics of EU institutions and is likely to spur scepticism and tensions among current members. It could also trouble the process of identity construction and lessen public support, as evidenced by the rising popularity of anti-European parties across the continent, such as UKIP.

As previously addressed at the end of Section 2.3, another concern is that the EU now is expanding into sensitive areas where there are ongoing problems such as border conflicts, ethnic relations and corruption. Really, it needs to ensure that further enlargements will not import these problems into the union. Finally, the growing number of small members could skew the balance of power as large countries may increasingly move towards a more informal decision-making while small countries may lose confidence in the system. Without rebalancing and effective institutional change, this could undermine the fate of EU supranationalism and result in polarisation. On the whole, despite the vitality of the Acquis Communautaire that acts as conditionality screening out countries who cannot successfully implement all the requirements for accession, I would argue that the EU should make clear its future enlargement policy together with clarifying the blurred European territories as well as ensuring that those new entrants are willing to commit to regional cooperation, not fully persuaded by economic benefits and massive funding or based on a cost-benefit calculation.

The other concern is that although the significant gap of identity between political elites and ordinary citizens in ASEAN has been witnessed in this research, ASEAN shows a positive sign of
enthusiasm for regionalism both among political elites and citizens. ASEAN may be encountering problems in terms of educating and cultivating ‘we-feeling’ at ground level but this is not too intricate to handle. This is perhaps because many ASEAN countries are highly diverse nations and have relatively recently gained independence from colonial powers, so they do not have a strong sense of nationalism, compared to many European countries, and there is unlikely to be conflicts of identity like in the EU. On the contrary, as described in Chapter 4, the issues of collective identity have been an important debate in the EU for decades. Evidently, there is remarkable force of continental scepticism within the union, not only among ordinary citizens but also governments of some important member countries which act as reluctant partners. In my view, if ASEAN is considered as “elite regionalism”, I would consider the EU as “institutionalised regionalism” because the dynamics revolve around institutions. Similarly, both ASEAN and the EU still have to work on how to gain their public support for integration at ground level, or how to develop “popular regionalism”. Both politicians and citizens need to realize and understand the usefulness or what benefits the schemes can bring as well as what they can do to defend their national interests in the union and how they can achieve more together. For a country, such regional commitment could develop to become a force-multiplier in which the pull of its gravity is too strong to escape.

8.5 Limitations and future directions
Throughout the study, I found that the most important limitation is the fact that there is a considerable gap of empirical and theoretical knowledge between Europe and Southeast Asia. ASEAN and international relations in Southeast Asia remains understudied and lack conceptual frameworks that are suitable for the regional context. Although liberal intergovernmentalism is relatively capable of explaining many components of ASEAN integration, it lacks clarification in some complex areas such as the issues of leadership. However, the issue of theoretical approaches for the study of ASEAN integration is still a matter of open debate. Secondly, among ASEAN countries, I also observed that there is a considerable gap of knowledge and competency relating to ASEAN between people from the five founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) and the five newcomers (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar). As a result, this exposes a methodological shortcoming in this research as the researcher could not have an opportunity to engage with respondents from these countries whose opinions may potentially lead to some other important findings. One way to figure out the problems and to enhance understanding of ASEAN and its activities would be to improve the dissemination of information to all levels of society. Finally, because most of the respondents have limited knowledge on European integration and integration
theories, this could be troublesome when drawing a comparison or a discussion on some basic concepts of regionalism, some ideological perspectives and supranationalism.

About suggestions for future studies, the findings from this research raise a number of issues and questions as well as opens up some new avenues for future studies. First of all, I would suggest that the four central concepts and the main arguments of this research could be studied in other regional contexts such as Latin America and Africa in order to examine the generalisation of the concepts. Moreover, as has been demonstrated in this research, the complex relationships between norms, identity and institution need further consideration and studies. Also, the different patterns of leadership explored in Chapter 8 could be built on and further developed to provide more precise understanding of leadership. Lastly, as highlighted in Chapter 7, the quest for how to arrange or design a suitable form of institution based on regional settings could be an important research indication for institutionalists and the study of international politics, both in Southeast Asia and other regions.
# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1: List of key informant interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Siswo Pramono</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia</td>
<td>5-Nov-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yeo Lay Hwee</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>European Union Centre in Singapore</td>
<td>13-Dec-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Termsak Chalermpalanupap</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
<td>Institution of Southeast Asian Studies</td>
<td>20-Dec-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Alan Chong</td>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>RSIS</td>
<td>21-Dec-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mely Caballero Anthony</td>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>RSIS</td>
<td>7-Jan-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Joseph Chinyong Liow</td>
<td>Associate Dean</td>
<td>RSIS</td>
<td>17-Jan-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ralf Emmers</td>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>RSIS</td>
<td>22-Jan-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Supachai Yavaprabhas</td>
<td>Dean, Faculty of Political Science</td>
<td>Chulalongkorn University</td>
<td>21-Feb-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Helen Nesadurai</td>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
<td>Monash University, Malaysia</td>
<td>5-Mar-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ong Keng Yong</td>
<td>High Commissioner</td>
<td>High Commission of the Republic of Singapore</td>
<td>21-Mar-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ngurah Swajaya</td>
<td>Ambassador, Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Indonesia to ASEAN</td>
<td>22-Mar-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shafiah Muhibat</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>25-Mar-13</td>
</tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Suvat Chirapant</td>
<td>Ambassador, Permanent Representative</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Thailand to ASEAN</td>
<td>27-Mar-13</td>
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