“Families” in International Context: Comparing Institutional Effects across Western Societies


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We review comparative evidence of institutional effects on families in Western societies. We focus on two key aspects of family life: Gendered divisions of labor and people’s transitions into, within, and out of relationships. Many individual-level models assume the effects are robust across countries. The international evidence over the past decade suggests instead that the socioeconomic and policy contexts strongly influence the significance and even direction of individual effects. A growing body of evidence also highlights important differences across social groups and family forms within countries. The pattern of relative gender, class, and other group equality varies across countries, as do related family experiences and outcomes. We conclude with suggestions for future comparative family research.

Key words: Divorce, Family and Work, Gender, International, Policy, Unpaid Work
“Families” in International Context: Comparing Institutional Effects across Western Societies

In this essay we highlight international evidence from the past decade as to how “families” vary across Western societies. We introduce the term in quotes to signal the growing diversity in what comprises families today. The topic is vast, so we focus on a few pivotal areas. We situate our review around policy effects on gendered divisions of labor. Policies codify institutional and cultural expectations of a gendered division of paid and unpaid work under different “family regimes” (Kaplan & Stier, 2008). The term “regime” refers to the configuration of policies, ideologies, and institutions commonly used to compare welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; O’Connor, Orloff, & Shaver, 1999; Walby, 2004). The policy context therefore provides an excellent indicator of the macro environment in which individuals live, love, and labor.

We focus on how policy shapes gendered divisions of labor because these divisions form the basis of several dominant theories associated with families. How individuals allocate their time between paid and unpaid labor is predicted to affect relationship formation, fertility, parenting, and relationship stability. U.S. academics developed many of the theories relating to these individual dynamics (cf, Becker, 1985; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Cherlin, 2004, 2009). The growing pool of cross-national comparative data has enabled researchers to link the micro and macro levels, filling a gap in our understanding of gender and family processes by comparing individual effects across socioeconomic contexts.

In the first section we outline how policies in industrialized countries (primarily Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and North America) institutionalized group differences in paid work and responsibility for unpaid domestic and caring work (Fink, 2001; Misra,
Woodring, & Merz, 2006; Williams, 2003). We focus on policy contrasts with the United States as Bogenschneider and Corbett (2010) provide a detailed discussion of recent U.S. policy in this volume. Policy effects derive not only from family policy per se, such as policies relating to marriage, divorce, or children, but from the full range of policies in industrialized societies. These include education, immigration, labor, public health, taxation, transportation, elder care, and pension policies, to name just a few (Baxter, 2005b; Cooke, 2010; Gershuny, 2000; Misra, et al., 2006). We do not have the space to detail all policy effects, but together a country’s slate of policies influences the ways individuals divide their time among employment, housework, and care (Gershuny, 2000; Pfau-Effinger, 2010).

Policies implemented in many countries before and shortly after World War II reinforced gendered divisions of labor along with women’s economic dependence on men. Men were expected to support a family financially and women were responsible for unpaid work in the private sphere (Crompton, 2006; Lewis, 2001; Morgan, 2006). In the latter half of the 20th Century, more partnered women remained in or entered employment whereas men’s employment rates declined somewhat (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD hereafter), 2009a). By the end of the century, increasing social welfare expenditures led many Western governments to implement policies requiring or supporting women’s, and particularly mothers’ employment.

As illustrated by the research presented in the second section of the essay, however, substantial country differences persist in the gendered division of labor. More women participate in the labor market for more of their lives, but relative gender equality in employment hours and wages varies across Western societies. Countries differ as well in
how the increase in women’s employment has affected domestic divisions of housework and childcare.

The shift away from a gendered division of labor presents a paradox for families and the state. On one hand, maternal employment reduces the risk of child poverty (Kamerman, et al., 2003). On the other hand, some theories predict women’s employment discourages childbearing, increases cohabitation in lieu of legal marriage, and increases relationship instability (Becker, 1985; Cherlin, 2009). The latter trends comprise what van de Kaa termed a “second demographic transition” (Lee, 2003; McLanahan, 2004; Sobotka, 2008). The hypothesized relationship between women’s employment and these outcomes carries several negative implications. First, policies encouraging greater female employment increase the current tax base at a cost of a smaller future labor force if employed women bear fewer children (Esping-Andersen, 1999). This scenario leads to a decline in future economic growth. Second, greater relationship instability results in more single-parent households that are at greater risk of poverty than two-parent households (Daly & Rake, 2003; Heuveline & Weinshenker, 2008; Rainwater & Smeeding, 2004). Even after controlling for household income, Pong and her colleagues (2003) found children raised by single mothers run higher risks of lower educational attainment than children raised in two-parent families. Others have reported an association between couple dissolution and other negative effects on children’s life chances (Heuveline, Timberlake, & Furstenberg, 2003; Hout & DiPrete, 2006; Sigle-Rushton, Hobcraft, & Kiernan, 2005; Steele, Sigle-Rushton, & Kravdal, 2009). So is greater gender employment equality bad for both current and future families?
In the third, fourth, and fifth sections of the essay we begin to answer this question by summarizing the evidence as to whether country differences in gender equality in divisions of paid and unpaid labor covary with the predicted family outcomes. We review the evidence on union formation, noting which women are more likely to cohabit or marry in different national contexts. We then compare empirical findings of the relationship between women’s employment and fertility and parenting under different policy contexts, and cross-national differences in the poverty risk for children residing in single-parent households. We conclude the empirical review with the international evidence as to the effect of women’s education and employment on relationship stability. The evidence presented throughout the essay highlights the importance of the socioeconomic context in shaping the magnitude and direction of individual effects on family outcomes. In the discussion section we note fruitful areas and key considerations for future comparative family research.

**Policy and the Division of Labor**

The division of paid and unpaid labor in industrial societies reflects many influences that interact with the regional demands of production, such as culture, political ideology, religion, organized labor, and social movements (Glucksmann, 1995; Pfau-Effinger, 2010). Government policies generally reflect the dominant institutional influences, with countries differing in the acceptable degree and nature of public intervention in market mechanisms and private lives (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Hall & Soskice, 2001; O’Connor, et al., 1999). The degree of state intervention varies from very little in “liberal” welfare regimes such as the United States, to a great deal as in the social-democratic countries of Scandinavia or former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The nature of public policies and
provisions exacerbates or ameliorates class, gender, or other group differences in paid or unpaid work.

The English-speaking countries and Switzerland generally pursue *laissez-faire* policy approaches characteristic of what Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) termed “liberal welfare regimes.” Liberal welfare regimes provide fewer universal provisions such as public childcare or public health services, although all offer public compulsory schooling. Individuals are expected to ensure their well-being through employment and to make private arrangements for contingencies should they become unable to work (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). The United States is the archetypical liberal welfare regime, with health insurance and other benefits generally provided by employers rather than the state (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000). Minimal state assistance is available as a last resort to those who can demonstrate they have no other financial resources (Goodin, et al., 1999). As a result, public “welfare” benefits come with a great deal of stigma in liberal regimes (Daly & Rake, 2003; O’Connor, et al., 1999).

The unregulated labor markets of liberal welfare regimes foster greater class, or “within-group” inequality (Blau & Kahn, 2003; Luxembourg Income Study, 2009; Western, Bloome, & Percheski, 2008). The theoretical justification for allowing such inequality is that it fuels economic growth, although empirical evidence of this is mixed (Aghion, Caroli, & García-Peñalosa, 1999; Kenworthy, 2008). Beyond these class effects, pure market mechanisms are presumably blind to social group differences that reflect between-group equality. Women, men, and ethnic minorities are all free to choose how much time they spend in employment and negotiate the best individual wage they can. Who performs
unpaid domestic work also remains a private decision, with the market rather than the state the source of any needed assistance such as childcare (Cooke, 2010; Morgan, 2005; O’Connor, et al., 1999; Stier, Lewin-Epstein, & Braun, 2001).

Other policies in liberal welfare regimes, however, can structure relative group access to employment or responsibility for the domestic sphere. Policies granting men preferential access to vocational training and more lucrative professions, generous dependent tax allowances, household rather than individual taxation, high marginal tax rates that penalize second earners, along with extensive maternity leave and limited public childcare provision, reinforce a male breadwinner-female carer model (Crompton, 2006; Jaumotte, 2003; Lewis, 2001; Sainsbury, 1999). For example, Australia implemented a male breadwinner model in its early welfare state with a court ruling that guaranteed employed men, but not employed women, a “family wage” sufficient for supporting a dependent spouse and three children (Baker, 2001; O’Connor, et al., 1999). Great Britain premised its welfare state on married women’s unpaid domestic work and reduced employed married women’s employment-related benefits and entitlements (Cooke, 2010).

The “corporatist-conservative regimes” of the European continent have more comprehensive sets of policies reinforcing a male breadwinner-female carer model (Crompton, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Lewis, 2001). Policies in these regimes frequently incorporate conservative religious precepts mandating women’s responsibility for the domestic sphere and subservience to a patriarch (Bettio, Simonazzi, & Villa, 2006; Carrasco & Rodríguez, 2000; Cooke, 2007, 2009; Ferrera, 2005; Morgan, 2006). Corporatist-conservative regimes offer more universal provisions than liberal regimes, but many benefits
reinforce social hierarchies. For example, a substantially larger proportion of public money goes to the elderly via pensions than to younger adults via family allowances as compared with other regime types (OECD, 2009b), and civil servants receive more generous benefits than other employees (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Ferrera, 2005).

Northern European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany implemented employment regulations that supported greater class equality than found in the liberal welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Luxembourg Income Study, 2009). Victories for working-class men, however, were often won by discouraging women’s or restricting immigrants’ employment (Bertola, Blau, & Kahn, 2007; Castles & Miller, 2003; Cooke, 2010; Misra, et al. 2006). The Mediterranean countries modernized later and developed more clientalistic welfare systems with wider employment “insider-outsider” differences between men and women, or old and young (Ferrera, 2005; Noguera, Martin, & Bonmati, 2005). Older workers have job protection in permanent positions, whereas young people entering the labor market are offered short-term contracts (Blossfeld, et al., 2005; Polavieja, 2006). Married Mediterranean women searching for employment are more likely than men to find it in black market sectors (Barbera & Vettor, 2001; Ferrera, 2005).

In contrast to the other regime types, the “social-democratic regimes” of the Nordic countries provide generous benefits to more of the population, with greater trade union density and centralized wage-setting ensuring greater class equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Universal welfare provisions demand a high rate of employment as well as high tax rates on those in employment (Kangas & Palme, 2005). To support full employment, policies in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden developed around a more egalitarian dual-earner model
(Ellingsaeter & Leira, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hiilamo, 2002). Of particular note is the provision of high-quality public childcare for children less than 3 years of age that is coordinated through the national education systems (Eurydice, 2009; Gornick & Meyer, 2003). Similar state support for maternal employment had been found in many of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but these supports fell away in some of the countries as they transitioned to free market economies (Cooke, 2007; Haney, 2003; Rosenfeld, Trappe, & Gornick, 2004). Now among them they represent the range of family regime types (Szelewa & Polakowski, 2008).

Despite these substantial policy differences across Europe, the 1993 Maastricht Treaty established a single European market (excluding Norway and Switzerland) with free movement of goods and people, along with greater policy coordination across the region. European economic coordination occurred as more welfare states faced greater cost pressures associated with high unemployment and aging populations (Brady, Beckfield, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005; Esping-Andersen, et al., 2002). In response, many countries including those in Scandinavia placed more conditions on receiving unemployment benefits, or unemployment benefit amounts and duration were reduced (Kangas & Palme, 2005; Kvist, 2000; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Countries also introduced so-called “active” labor market programs that support the transition of unemployed persons into the labor force with counseling, job-seeking assistance, or additional training (Kenworthy, 2008; Serrano Pascual, 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Active labor market policies also target groups such as single mothers or the disabled that are more likely to be out of the labor market for extended periods of time. Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom introduced new employment
requirements for single mothers, akin to those found in the U.S. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program (Baker, 2001; Henninger, Wimbauer, & Dombrowski, 2008; Paz-Fuchs, 2008). Finland and Sweden reduced the generosity of single parents’ benefits (Hiilamo, 2002).

The different national approaches to welfare provision represent different levels of public investment, as can be seen in the first column of Table 1. In 2005, just 16% of U.S. gross domestic product was spent on social programs, as compared with 29% in France and Sweden. The European expenditures include more supports for the family (Gauthier, 2002), and maternal employment (Esping-Andersen, et al., 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2009). At the 2000 Lisbon Summit, European Union (EU) member states agreed to a goal of a 60% female employment rate by 2010. To reduce the negative impact greater female employment might have on fertility rates, EU countries introduced or expanded work-family balance policies (Fagan & Walthery, 2007; Plantenga & Remery, 2005). The 2002 Barcelona Summit set new targets for public childcare provision, with member states to have coverage for 33% of 0 to 3 year old children, and 90% coverage for children from 3 to compulsory schooling age by 2010 (Eurydice, 2009). More parental leave provisions now encourage fathers’ greater involvement in care by including “use-it-or-lose-it” paternity leave that cannot be transferred to the mother (Hobson, 2002; Sullivan, et al., 2009). Sweden had been the first to introduce equal access to parental leave in 1974, followed by Norway and Finland in the 1990s (Lammi-Taskula, 2008).

European Union directives promoting greater gender equality, however, allow for substantial national latitude in interpretation. The specific provisions introduced in each
country tend to reflect the historically gendered policy base (Behning & Serrano Pascual, 2001; Pollack & Hafner-Burton, 2000). For example, female employment targets can include part-time employment. Expansion of public childcare for infants has fallen short of targets in male breadwinner regimes and some countries offer only part-time spaces for older children (Eurydice, 2009; León, 2005). Consequently, country differences in gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work persist, as discussed next.

**HOUSEHOLD LABOR IN CONTEXT**

All households allocate time to paid as well as unpaid tasks, with these allocations in heterosexual couples historically gendered (Coltrane, 2000). Bargaining or social exchange models posit the precise time allocation varies with each partner’s relative economic and educational resources (Bittman, et al., 2003; Breen & Cooke, 2005). As women attained higher levels of education and spent more hours in employment, men were predicted to spend commensurately more time in domestic tasks. By the end of the last century, a vast amount of U.S. evidence found that women retained responsibility for the private sphere regardless of their labor force participation (Coltrane, 2000). Over the past decade, comparative evidence revealed a similar persistence in the gendered division of paid as well as unpaid labor across countries, but its degree varies.

**Relative Gender Equality in Paid Work**

An economic “human capital” model predicts relative earnings based on an individual’s educational investment and accrued employment experience (Blau & Kahn, 2003). Greater educational attainment is therefore associated with women’s greater career aspirations (Coltrane, 2000). In many countries, women’s educational attainment now
exceeds men’s (Shavit, Arum, & Gamoran, 2007). Women’s educational attainment is generally higher in Scandinavia and North America, and lower in male breadwinner regimes reinforcing women’s exit from employment for family demands (OECD, 2007). These relative investments in human capital are mirrored in the female labor force participation rates, displayed in the second column of Table 1. Only 45% of Italian women aged 15 to 64 are in employment, as compared with 66% of U.S. and 72% of Swedish women.

Women comprise the majority of the part-time labor force in all countries, although the size of the part-time sector varies (Bardasi & Gornick, 2008; Drobnič, Blossfeld, & Rohwer, 1999; Kalleberg, et al., 2000). Male breadwinner regimes have been more likely to promote mothers’ part-time employment as a work-family balance strategy (Fagan & Walthery, 2007). As seen in the third column of Table 1, part-time employment represents less than 20% of female employment in Finland, Sweden, and the United States, but one third or more in Australia, Belgium, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

Women’s reduced cumulative paid work experience, either because of labor market exits or fewer weekly employment hours, predicts gender earnings differentials (Blau & Kahn, 2003). Accordingly, gender earnings equality is lower where women are more likely to be in part-time employment (McGinnity & McManus, 2007; Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, 2007). But Bardasi and Gornick (2008) found no part-time wage penalty in Sweden, and that the occupation rather than educational attainment accounted for the largest proportion of the part-time wage penalty in Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These patterns highlight that gender earnings inequality persists across countries because women are employed fewer hours than men, and also because women are
overrepresented in occupations offering lower wages, such as the retail and service sectors or other lower-paid “occupational ghettos” (Charles & Grusky, 2004).

Countries differ in the intersections of women’s relative employment hours and earnings across social classes (Bardasi & Gornick, 2008; Bertola, et al., 2007; Blau & Kahn, 2003; McCall, 2001, 2005). Male breadwinner policies of countries such as Italy or West Germany discourage mothers’ labor force participation, reducing the overall female employment rate. Those few women who are employed full-time still benefit from any policies enhancing class equality (Blau & Kahn, 2003; Christopher, et al., 2002). This results in fairly low between-group earnings inequality of employed women and employed men in some male breadwinner regimes, whereas the lifetime earnings difference between mothers and nonmothers is large (Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel, 2007).

The dual-earner policies of Scandinavia and the liberal policies of the United Kingdom and United States encourage greater labor force participation of women and men regardless of parental status (Mandel & Semyonov, 2005). As a result, Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007) found relatively modest average lifetime earnings differences between mothers and nonmothers in the United States and Sweden. The unregulated U.S. and UK labor markets, however, yield greater gender wage gaps than found in the Nordic labor markets with their wage compression policies (Blau & Kahn, 2003; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005).

Yet dual-earner policies do not eliminate gender employment differences, but instead shift where differences manifest. A legal right to parental leave or to work fewer hours to accommodate care obligations does not change the impact of care-related employment interruptions that penalize women in all labor markets (Jacobs & Gerson, 2004). In
Scandinavia, family-friendly provisions exist in conjunction with a high degree of gender occupational segregation of women in public sector jobs (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). Public childcare and similar policy supports enable more mothers to remain in employment, but the most skilled women are underrepresented in more lucrative private sector positions because of the state-reinforced employment interruptions (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). Consequently, less-skilled Scandinavian women enjoy greater gender earnings equality, but gender earnings inequality increases among the most highly-skilled (Blau & Kahn, 2003; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005).

In summary, the trend across countries is for greater household hours in employment (Medalia & Jacobs, 2008), but the policy context results in complex configurations of relative gender employment equality. Mothers in male breadwinner regimes are increasingly likely to be employed, but in part-time jobs that do not fundamentally challenge men’s privileged employment position. U.S. women have achieved greater gender equality in employment hours, but not in relative wages. Nordic women are similarly employed more hours and enjoy greater wage equality than U.S. women, but in the context of greater occupational segregation. In addition, policies supporting parental employment increase gender employment equality among the least-skilled, but possibly at a cost of increased gender earnings inequality among the most highly-skilled. The different configurations of relative gender equality in paid work suggest we should observe different configurations in the gendered division of unpaid work.
Relative Gender Equality in Unpaid Work

Unpaid domestic work includes two qualitatively different types of tasks: Housework and care. Housework includes the maintenance tasks of daily living, such as cooking, cleaning, and mowing the lawn (Coltrane, 2000). Care includes care of children as well as other family members. Comparative evidence suggests gender equality in both types of unpaid work has increased since the 1960s in many Western societies (Sullivan, 2006). Yet women retain primary responsibility for domestic tasks, with childcare more gendered than housework (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; Craig, 2007; Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg, 2004; Smith & Williams, 2007). Policies in conjunction with the labor market contour relative equality across social groups in both types of unpaid tasks (Gupta, et al., 2010; Pfau-Effinger, 2010; Sullivan, et al., 2009).

Women’s greater aggregate equality in employment participation or political representation has predicted slightly more egalitarian divisions of housework (Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Fuwa, 2004). Research found more egalitarian housework arrangements among cohabiting as compared with married couples (Batalova & Cohen, 2002), that carried over into the early years of marriage among former cohabitants (Baxter, 2005a). Analyses of Australian (Baxter, Hewitt, & Haynes, 2008), British, German, U.S. (Gershuny, et al., 2005), and Swedish (Evertsson & Nermo, 2007) longitudinal data, however, revealed women’s housework hours changed with employment status or childbirth, whereas men’s were remarkably stable. This suggests observed increases in men’s share of housework stem largely from women’s reduction in housework hours.
A gendered division of housework persists even when women are the primary breadwinner. Bittman and his colleagues (2003) found Australian women who earned more than their partners increased their housework contribution to compensate for the “gender deviance” in their economic role. In contrast, U.S. wives decreased their housework hours as their relative earnings increased, but their husbands also decreased their housework hours so that breadwinning wives still retained the greater share (Bittman, et al.). Other longitudinal analyses revealed U.S. couples are more likely than Swedish couples to “do” gender with housework in this way (Evertsson & Nermo, 2004), but less likely than West German couples (Cooke, 2006b). These country differences suggest “doing” gender in domestic labor reflects the aggregate level of gender (in)equality, not essentialist differences between women and men (Deutsch, 2007).

Other comparative evidence indicates that the socioeconomic context is as important as individual resources in predicting household divisions (Pfau-Effinger, 2010). Breen and Cooke (2005) argued it is only when a sufficiently high proportion of women in society have attained greater equality that men change their beliefs and subsequent domestic behavior in a partnership. Fuwa (2004) found significant interaction effects between aggregate gender equality and women’s time availability and ideology when predicting men’s share of housework in 22 countries. Hook (2006) compared 20 countries over several decades and reported that men spent more time in domestic tasks in countries with greater female labor force participation, regardless of their partners’ employment status.

Some studies found that women’s greater national earnings equality predicted both partners spend less total time in housework (Knudson & Waerness, 2008; Stier & Lewin-
Epstein, 2007). This suggests greater gender employment equality leads to less total housework time as couples purchase restaurant or prepared meals, cleaning services, and time-saving appliances in the market (de Ruijter, Treas, & Cohen, 2005). The acceptability of using outside help varies in its cultural context (Baxter, 2005b; Baxter, Hewitt, & Western, 2009; Pfau-Effinger, 2010), but has been increasing even across male breadwinner regimes. During the 1990s, 30% to 40% of dual-career British households employed waged domestic labor (Williams, 2004). France, Germany, and Spain reported between 600,000 and 1 million domestic workers, excluding the estimated 50% to 80% of European domestic service work that is undeclared (Williams: 203 - 204).

These trends suggest market provision of domestic tasks perpetuates class, gender, and racial divisions. Market alternatives develop where wage inequality facilitates expansion of a low-wage service sector (Cooke, 2010; Gupta, et al., 2010; Morgan, 2005). These jobs are more likely to be held by women (Bardasi & Gornick, 2008; Charles & Grusky, 2004), and increasingly legal or illegal immigrants (Kofman, et al., 2000; Williams, 2004). For example, German couples use Buelgelfrau “ironing board” and Putzfrau “cleaning” women from Eastern Europe (Cooke, 2007) who frequently come over on tourist rather than work visas (Misra, et al., 2006). Women with greater earnings can afford to purchase domestic services (Gupta, 2006, 2007; Gupta, et al., 2010). Consequently, more affluent households achieve greater gender equality in unpaid work by reducing their total time devoted to it. This represents a renegotiation of domestic tasks between women and the market, not between women and their partners.
Cross-national childcare trends differ from the housework trends. Despite the parental leave provisions that encourage more equal caring, mothers take the majority of parental leave even in the Nordic countries (Haas, 2008; Hobson, 2002; O’Brien, Brandth, & Kvande, 2007). Yet fathers as well as mothers have increased their time with children over the past few decades (Craig, 2007; Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg, 2004; Sullivan, et al., 2009). Parental time with children has significantly increased even after controlling for the decline in total number of children (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006).

Parents with more education spend more time with children than less-educated parents, but the education effect varies somewhat across countries and by gender. Sayer and her colleagues (2004) found the effect of mothers’ education was more pronounced than fathers’ in Germany and Norway, whereas the parental educational effect was more similar in Canada and Italy. Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie (2006) reported greater educational attainment increased mothers’ and fathers’ childcare time in Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States, but the education effect attenuated when including the age of youngest child and employment status. The aggregate increase in female employment, however, has not resulted in a commensurate decrease in mothers’ time with children. Gauthier and her colleagues (2004: 653) found that across 16 countries, married mothers employed full-time had on average increased their childcare time almost one hour per day over the past 40 years, as had married, employed fathers.

The degree to which childcare remains more women’s prerogative than men’s varies across national contexts (Baxter, Hewitt, & Haynes, 2008; Pfau-Effinger, 2010). Fathers in the Mediterranean countries spent the least proportional time in childcare during the 1990s
West German mothers during that same decade spent four times as much time in childcare as fathers, whereas mothers in former socialist East Germany spent three times as much (Cooke, 2007: 947; Rosenfeld, et al., 2004). For comparison, Sayer (2005: 292) found U.S. mothers on average spent twice as much time with children as fathers. Nordic parents’ proportional time with children was found to be more equal than in other countries (Blossfeld & Drobnič, 2001; Smith & Williams, 2007). Sullivan and her colleagues (2009) found that in 1990, Norwegian and Swedish fathers spent almost 50% more time with children under 5 than did British fathers, but that gap closed markedly by the year 2000 despite additional increases in Nordic fathers’ parenting time.

The degree of gender equality in unpaid care work reflects in part the degree to which it has shifted to nonfamilial providers (Kofman, et al., 2000; Misra, et al., 2006; Williams, 2004). Public provision ensures the availability of affordable care for more families, and good wages for care workers (Budig & Misra, 2008). Private provision entails more class and racial disparities, allowing affluent women the luxury of “care as emotion freed from labour” (Anderson, 2000: 87). Some policies support these group disparities. For example, the German government provides a limited number of work permits for migrant domestic workers from Poland provided they do not undertake the high-wage care jobs of German nationals (Misra et al., 2006). Many Mediterranean families use government care subsidies to employ illegal migrants from Central Europe and Africa to provide elder care (Bettio, et al., 2006; Kofman, et al., 2000). The practice has become so common that governments regularly offer programs to legalize the status of illegal care workers (Lyon & Glucksmann, 2008).
In summary, the sociopolitical context crafts the intersections of relative class and gender equality in paid and unpaid work. The Nordic countries have realized the greatest gender equality across the public and private spheres, although women still dominate unpaid as well as paid care work. Gendered divisions in public and private spheres remain most pronounced in male breadwinner regimes. Unregulated labor markets structure persistent gender differences in earnings but not employment hours, and class differences in the ability to shift domestic tasks to the market. In all markets, paid domestic work remains gendered and racialized. We next explore whether these different configurations of relative equality predict commensurate changes in partnering, fertility, and relationship stability hypothesized by the individual-level models.

**Partnering**

At the microlevel Brines and Joyner (1999) argued cohabitants embrace principles of equality and individualism to a greater extent than married couples, who tend to be bound together by specialization and interdependence. Macro indices support a correlation between women’s aggregate relative economic equality and union type. As indicated in Table 1 (columns 4 and 5), marriage is more prevalent in male breadwinner family regimes such as Italy, whereas cohabitation is more prevalent in regimes supporting greater gender equality such as Sweden (Kiernan, 2004a, 2004b). Regional differences linked to relative gender equality have also been noted. Cohabitation was more prevalent in socialist East Germany as compared with West Germany (Cooke, 2006a; Nazio & Blossfeld, 2003), industrial North as compared with agrarian South Italy (Nazio & Blossfeld, 2003), and Quebec as compared with the rest of Canada (Le Bourdais & Lapierre-Adamcyk, 2004).
McLanahan (2004) argued educated women are more likely to marry than cohabit, whereas Becker’s (1985) argument would suggest more highly-educated women should be more likely to cohabit. Comparative evidence does not support any consistent individual-level relationship between women’s educational attainment and union type. In Germany and Italy where only 12% of women aged 25 to 64 had completed a university degree as of 2005 (OECD, 2007), highly-educated women were not significantly more likely to cohabit than marry (Nazio & Blossfeld, 2003). In Britain, where about 20% of women have a university degree, Seltzer (2004) found highly-educated women were significantly more likely to cohabit than marry. A decade ago, more highly-educated Australian women were less likely to marry, whereas now the reverse is true as the proportion completing a university degree has increased (Heard, 2008). About 30% of women in Sweden and the United States have a university degree (OECD, 2007), with highly-educated women in both countries more likely to marry than cohabit (Bernhardt, 2002; McLanahan, 2004). This similar propensity is striking when considering that the cohabitation rate in Sweden is 20% of the population over the age of 15 (Table 1, column 5), as contrasted with just 6% in the United States.

In countries with greater gender employment equality, an individual woman’s employment tends to predict marriage rather than cohabitation (Heard, 2008; Kiernan, 2002). Ono (2003) found that other employment-related effects also varied in context. Women’s higher earnings decreased the likelihood of marriage in the Japanese male breadwinner regime, but increased the likelihood of marriage for Swedish and U.S. women. Ono concluded that women’s high earnings make them attractive partners in countries with higher levels of gender
employment equality, but create stresses and inefficiencies where policies and other institutions reinforce men’s breadwinning role.

One tentative conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that as aggregate gender equality increases, women’s greater individual resources predict legal rather than consensual unions. This does not support Becker’s (1985) household specialization model that predicted women’s greater economic equality would lead to more cohabitation in lieu of marriage. Those women with the fewest resources, in fact, are more likely to cohabit than marry (McLanahan, 2004). These findings suggest that any “deinstitutionalization” of marriage (Cherlin, 2004) appears to be a class phenomenon occurring among less privileged women (McLanahan, 2004; Sobotka, 2008). Trends in union formation, however, are of interest primarily to the extent they vary the life chances of children born into different union types. The class-gender equality intersections associated with fertility and childbearing are discussed next.

**FERTILITY AND CHILDBEARING**

Fertility decline comprises a central trend of the second demographic transition and has been linked to the increase in gender equality at both the macro and micro levels. Women’s lifetime fertility rates decline with industrialization (Lee, 2003), and are lower in societies with less gender stratification in family systems (Mason, 2001). Becker (1985) argued women’s wages incur an “opportunity cost” of children that predicts employed women will have fewer children. The aggregate data displayed in Table 1, however, suggests recent total fertility rates (column 6) are higher where female employment rates are higher (column 2). Some demographers credit supportive family policies as in the Nordic countries for the recent trend (McDonald, 2000), but
fertility rates tend to be higher in the more liberal regimes that offer few policy supports (Brewster & Rindfuss, 2000).

Total fertility rates are lowest in the male breadwinner regimes despite their relatively low female employment rates (Dalla Zuanna & Micheli, 2004). The majority of families in these regimes can no longer rely on a single income, but there are neither public nor market supports for female employment (Cooke, 2009; Esping-Andersen, 1999; McDonald, 2000). As greater economic insecurity generally reduces fertility rates (Blossfeld, et al., 2005; Kohler, et al., 2002; Kreyenfeld, 2003), a male breadwinner model now limits rather than supports fertility.

Further evidence of the positive rather than negative impact of greater gender equality on fertility is apparent at the individual level. Mills and her colleagues (2008) found that more unequal distributions of household tasks lowered fertility intentions among couples in Italy and the Netherlands despite the countries’ historical policy and cultural support for separate spheres. More egalitarian divisions of housework in Hungary (Oláh, 2003) and the United States (Torr & Short, 2004) increased the likelihood of higher-order births. Swedish couples where fathers took parental leave following the first birth were also more likely to have additional children (Oláh, 2003). Analyses of panel data revealed that fathers’ greater time in childcare increased the likelihood of a second birth in Germany (Cooke, 2004) and Italy (Cooke, 2009). This evidence suggests that regardless of regime type, parents’ shared domestic responsibility countervails any negative fertility effects associated with women’s employment.

Nonmarital births are another childbearing trend associated with the second demographic transition. In most affluent countries, nonmarital births occur in consensual unions
of the biological parents (Heuveline, et al., 2003; Kiernan, 2001). The United States has the highest percentage of children born to single mothers without a coresidential partner (16.2%), although percentages are similar in Germany (15.2%), Austria (13.6%), and New Zealand (12.6%) (Heuveline, et al., 2003: 56). In most European and Scandinavian countries with high rates of cohabitation, most cohabiting parents eventually marry (Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004: 1225). In contrast, more than half of the U.S. parental cohabitations end in separation, as do two-thirds or more in Canada and New Zealand (Heuveline & Timberlake).

The dissolution of the parental couple is the primary reason a child ends up residing in a single-parent household (Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004; Heuveline, et al., 2003; Rainwater & Smeeding, 2004). What differs across regimes is children’s likelihood of living with a single parent and the length of time they do so (Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004; Heuveline & Weinshenker, 2008). Heuveline and his colleagues (2003: 56) found just 10% of an Italian birth cohort experienced living in a single-parent household, as compared with about 50% for New Zealand and U.S. birth cohorts. New Zealand and U.S. children living with a single parent did so for about five years (Heuveline, et al., 2003: 59). The risk and duration for children in the Nordic countries was lower than in the liberal regimes, and lower than some northern European male breadwinner regimes (Heuveline, et al.). Consequently, policy support for greater equality does not increase the incidence of single parenthood whereas policy support for separate spheres does not reduce it.

One concern over the increase in single parent households is the poverty risk associated with them. Policy support for female employment and generous welfare benefits in the Nordic countries greatly reduce the risk of child poverty in both single- and two-parent households.
As noted in Table 1 (column 7), less than 13% of children in Scandinavian single-mother households live in poverty. The incidence of child poverty in single-parent households more than doubles in the other regime types and is four times as great in the United States (Rainwater & Smeeding, 2004). Simulations found the high U.S. child poverty rate did not derive from the high rate of single-parent households per se, but from the nature of the U.S. welfare state (Heuveline & Weinshenker, 2008). The incidence of poverty among two-parent U.S. households is seven times that of Scandinavia (Luxembourg Income Study, 2009).

The comparative evidence noted above offers some support for McLanahan’s (2004) concerns about the diverging destinies of children, but also suggests concern is most warranted in liberal welfare regimes that do not reduce class inequalities or in regimes reinforcing a gendered division of labor. Greater household income, however, does not eliminate all negative effects on children associated with parental relationship dissolution (Hout & DiPrete, 2006; Sigle-Rushton, et al., 2005; Steele, et al., 2009). We next review the international evidence as to whether greater gender equality increases relationship instability among either de jure or de facto couples.

**Relationship Stability**

Becker (1985) argued a gendered division of labor represents the optimal family form in industrial societies. Gender specialization in either paid or unpaid work increases couples’ mutual dependence and supports cultural norms around men’s breadwinning (Kalmijn & Poortman, 2006; Rogers, 2004). An increase in women’s employment is therefore predicted to increase not only the prevalence of consensual relationships that are less stable
than legal marriages, but also increase marital instability (Becker, 1985; Cherlin, 2009). Earnings are just one source of income, however. Family allowances, child credits, and other state benefits can enhance a woman’s economic position in the event of relationship dissolution (Andreß, et al., 2006; Daly & Rake, 2003; Dewilde, 2002).

Were the logic of Becker’s argument valid at the aggregate level, union dissolution rates should be greater in those countries supporting female employment and providing the most generous transfers to single-parent households. Columns 8 and 9 of Table 1 display the cumulative percentage of married and cohabiting couples, respectively, that had dissolved by the 15th year of the union (Andersson, 2003). The fewest marriages dissolved in the Mediterranean male breadwinner regimes, but marital dissolution rates in the northern male breadwinner regimes of Austria and Germany were greater than in Scandinavia. The dissolution rates among cohabitants were appreciably higher in all of the countries, but did not vary systematically with the rate of cohabitation (column 5). The United States has average marriage and cohabitation rates, but the largest dissolution rate of either type of relationship. These patterns suggest some other aspects of the institutional context shape dissolution risk rather than women’s aggregate resources.

Individual-level effects of women’s employment on dissolution risk are sensitive to how employment is measured. When measured with earnings, a wife’s greater earnings increased the dissolution risk in Britain (Chan & Halpin, 2003), Finland (Jalovaara, 2001, 2003), Norway (Hansen, 2005; Lyngstad, 2006), Sweden (Henz & Jonsson, 2003), West Germany (Cooke, 2006b), and the United States (Rogers, 2004). A measure of wives’ relative earnings, however, masks several other plausible causal factors. For example, a wife’s higher
relative earnings might be capturing effects of a husband’s under- or unemployment. British
men’s unemployment significantly increased dissolution risk (Cooke & Gash, 2009; Sigle-
Rushton, 2005). In Finland (Jalovaara, 2001) and Norway (Hansen, 2005), unemployed men
or women had greater risk of dissolution. Fischer and Liefbroer (2006) found that a bad
economy generally increased dissolution rates in the Netherlands, just as Kohler and his

A relative earnings measure also combines the possibly competing effects of wives’
employment hours and wages. The income from wives’ earnings might be welcomed by
households (Cooke & Gash, 2009), whereas long employment hours in dual-earner
households might create tensions that disrupt marriage (Jacobs & Gerson, 2004). Cooke
(2004) found when including both measures, German mothers’ greater employment hours
significantly increased dissolution risk, whereas the effect of her hourly wages was
substantively and statistically nonsignificant. Kalmijn, deGraaf, and Poortman (2004) found
that a Dutch wife’s part-time employment did not significantly increase the risk of marital
dissolution, whereas her full-time employment did.

A growing body of evidence indicates the direction and magnitude of individual
effects, as well as the relative instability of different union types, vary across countries. Using
the United Nations Family and Fertility Surveys, Liefbroer and Dourleijn (2006) found
partnered woman’s employment significantly increased the dissolution risk of de jure and de
facto couples in Austria, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, and West Germany; significantly
decreased dissolution risk in France and Latvia; and had no significant effect in the Czech
Republic, East Germany, Flanders, Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Couples
marrying directly were the most stable, cohabitants the least, but the degree of relative risk among cohabitants was lower where cohabitation was more prevalent (see also Hewitt & de Vaus, 2009; Kiernan, 2002; Le Bourdais & Lapierre-Adamcyk, 2004; Wagner & Weiß, 2006).

The effect of educational attainment on dissolution risk is ambiguous (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006). Greater education is associated with more egalitarian ideals among both men and women (Coltrane, 2000), but a key theoretical question is whether greater equality is good or bad for marital stability. Attending university exposes people to desirable partners and delays age at marriage (Schwartz & Mare, 2005), factors generally associated with reduced dissolution risk. Single-country analyses reflect the ambiguity. Both partners’ greater educational attainment significantly reduced the risk in Britain (Berrington & Diamond, 1999), Finland (Jalovaara, 2001, 2003), and Norway (Lyngstad, 2006). West German women with university degrees were less likely to divorce (Cooke, 2006b), whereas Australian (Hewitt, Western, & Baxter, 2007) and Dutch (Kalmijn & Poortman, 2006) women with university degrees were more likely to initiate a separation.

To unravel education and context effects, Härkönen and Dronkers (2006) used panel data from 17 countries and controlled for nonmarital births, cohabitation, and aggregate measures of women’s economic activity. Women’s high educational attainment significantly increased dissolution risk in France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, and Spain. The effect reached statistical significance in Norway and Spain only after including the controls, suggesting women’s greater educational attainment increased dissolution risk only among more conservative family arrangements in these male breadwinner regimes. No significant effect of women’s education effect was found in Estonia, Finland, West Germany, Hungary,
Latvia, Sweden, or Switzerland. Women with more education had a lower risk of dissolution in Austria, Flanders, Lithuania, and the United States, although the Flanders and U.S. effects attenuated after including the controls (2006: 508 – 509). The change in effects when adding the controls suggests McLanahan’s (2004) hypothesized diverging-destiny effects of women’s educational attainment on relationship stability appear significant only in the United States and Flanders.

Context also alters the effect of the household division of paid and unpaid labor on dissolution risk. Sigle-Rushton (2005) found British fathers’ greater time in housework reduced the risk of dissolution, with similar effects found in a preliminary analysis of Australian data (Craig & Sawrikar, 2007). Cooke (2006b) found the greater dissolution risk associated with U.S. wives’ greater earnings was offset when husbands performed equitable shares of housework. Among West German couples, however, any moves away from a gendered division of paid or unpaid labor increased dissolution risk (Cooke, 2006b). This rather limited body of evidence suggests the effects of a gendered division of labor on marital stability are more context-dependent than their effects on fertility. Further comparative research in this area is inhibited by the fact that few longitudinal datasets contain measures of unpaid work.

**Discussion**

Many models predicting effects of a gendered division of labor on family formation and transitions were developed by U.S. demographers, economists, and sociologists, who tacitly assumed the hypothesized mechanisms apply across time and cultures. The models hypothesized greater gender equality in paid work would unravel the family fabric by placing
pressures on women’s childbearing decisions and creating more instability in relationships (Becker, 1985). One revelation from the comparative evidence over the past decade is that the United States is unique. Its unregulated labor market results in greater class and other group inequalities despite women’s fairly high level of labor force participation. These inequalities ripple through families and generations, widening group differences over time (McLanahan, 2004; Western, et al., 2008). In the U.S. context, Cherlin’s (2009) “deinstitutionalization” of marriage is more a class than gender phenomenon, with the least-educated women more likely to cohabit, bear children out of wedlock, and face the dissolution of any relationship. Greater risks in turn accrue to these women’s children as they face the greatest risk of living in poverty for the longest period of time as compared with other affluent nations. Thus the diverging destinies of U.S. children derive primarily from the lack of policy support for the bottom of the socioeconomic strata, and only indirectly from the various demographic processes with which class inequality covaries.

Not surprisingly, models developed in a unique context prove less predictive in other socioeconomic and policy contexts. Policy can shape employment equality across social groups as well as classes, reinforce or reduce gendered divisions of unpaid housework and childcare, and alter the intergenerational implications of any demographic patterns. It is in fact the absence of policy in liberal regimes such as the United States that imposes the greatest risks on women and children as noted above. Policies that reinforce a gendered division of labor fall short of attaining Becker’s family ideal. Few postindustrial economies provide sufficient income for a sole breadwinner, and so marriage gets delayed and fertility rates decline. Policies that instead support greater gender equality in employment hours,
wages, housework, and care do not result in precipitous drops in fertility or more churn in coresidential relationships. In addition, the intergenerational chances of children in policy regimes supporting greater equality are superior to those in any other regime type. These findings emphasize that it is not women’s employment that leads to the undesirable demographic outcomes predicted by the models, but a lack of policy and institutional support for women’s employment (McDonald, 2000).

Related to this is a second revelation from the comparative research of the past decade: men matter. The models relating the gendered division of labor to family outcomes overwhelmingly focused on what happened when women ventured out of the private sphere. Little attempt was made to capture the good (income) and bad (time strains) associated with both partner’s employment. Until recently, analyses also ignored the importance of men’s behavior. Comparative evidence reveals men’s greater time in unpaid housework and caring tasks can yield higher fertility levels and more stable relationships. Future research should fully model a household’s paid and unpaid work allocations when predicting subsequent family outcomes. A practical limitation to doing so is that few longitudinal datasets contain detailed measures of unpaid labor. Researchers need to lobby secondary data providers to ensure suitable measures are included.

Comparative research has also made evident, however, that neither the market nor policy has managed to close the gender gap in paid or unpaid labor. Women in liberal regimes and Scandinavia share a high likelihood of being employed, but gendered returns are not eliminated. In unregulated markets, large wage differences between women and men persist, as do differences across women (Western, et al., 2008). In Scandinavia, gender
equality across the earnings distribution is greater, but at a slight cost of women’s lower relative earnings at the top end. That this cost is born by highly-educated Scandinavian women more than men highlights that perfect equality remains elusive even in the most supportive sociopolitical environment. Gender differences persist across countries in housework and childcare, and in individual life chances outside of a coresidential relationship. Rather than accepting these persistent differences as “doing” gender, future comparative research should interrogate the deeper institutional barriers to its undoing (Deutsch, 2007).

This review also brings to light some key methodological considerations for future comparative research. Given the importance of the sociopolitical context in contouring family dynamics, researchers need to consider whether any particular variable, even when defined in the same way, should be expected to have identical effects. An example of this is the effect of higher education on union formation or dissolution. The hypothesized effects have been premised on the U.S. system in which greater education correlates with more egalitarian ideals for both women and men (Coltrane, 2000). Higher education systems in other countries can be far more elitist (Brint, 2006), with those completing a university education possibly holding more conservative views. These institutional differences might explain some of the disparate patterns of educational effects reported here. Such substantive considerations place a responsibility on comparative researchers to learn a bit more about the institutional context of each country included in an analysis. Simply adding one or two aggregate measures in multilevel statistical models and then ignoring outliers does not further our understanding of family processes in context.
A related methodological consideration is the need for greater attention to when a life course perspective is more suitable for modeling policy effects. Many multilevel cross-sectional analyses of policy effects on a gendered division of domestic work include aggregate policy variables such as public childcare places or weeks of maternity leave. Other policies affecting household labor, such as unemployment or family allowances, are rarely included. In addition, most policies selected are applicable only to a segment of the population at any point in time, and for these people, for a finite period of time. More comparative research needs to assess the impact of different policies at that point in the life course when they could be assumed to matter. This requires either using panel data, or partitioning cross-sectional samples into applicable family status categories.

For reasons of space and scope, we have limited our review in several ways. We focused on heterosexual relationships. National policies also vary in legislative support for same-sex couples (Fish, 2005; Kollman, 2007), so comparative research on these couples and outcomes for their children would help disentangle gender from other intimacy effects. We ignored as well the growing impact of supranational organizations such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. These organizations have a large impact on individuals residing in poorer countries. For example, structural adjustment policies spur migrant flows of carers from poor to wealthy nations that have disruptive effects on families in the home country (Misra, et al., 2006; Parreñas, 2005). This example highlights as well our exclusion of recent research on other parts of the globe such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Our reading of this research suggests even greater disparities in the applicability of dominant models to the patterning of family relationships in these countries (Jones, 2007). Analyses of
non-Western societies, especially those undergoing rapid social change, can provide important insights into social processes that are obscured in studies of societies where change has occurred more slowly or in an earlier historical period (Ghimire, et al., 2006).

Finally, the global financial crisis offers up a natural experiment for assessing policy effects under widespread economic uncertainty. Marriages might be more or less stable and fertility is likely to slump. The extent to which supportive policies ameliorate negative effects over this particular period will be worth exploring and comparing with Elder’s (1999) work on family processes associated with the Great Depression. In general, further cross-national research is essential for understanding institutional effects on families in new and changing contexts.
REFERENCES


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### Table 1  
Country Comparisons of Social Expenditure, Female Employment Rates, Total Fertility, Single Parent Poverty Rates, and Cumulative Separations for de Facto and de Jure Couples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2005 Social Expenditure as % GDP</th>
<th>2005 Female Labor Force Participation Rate for those aged 15 to 64</th>
<th>2005 % Employed Women Working Part-time</th>
<th>2002 % Population over 15 that are Married</th>
<th>2002 % Population over 15 that are Cohabiting</th>
<th>2000 Total Fertility Rate</th>
<th>2000 Poverty Rate of Children Residing with a Single Mother</th>
<th>% Couples Separating by the 15th Year of Union if Married</th>
<th>% Couples Separating by the 15th Year of Union if Cohabiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>62 %</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>51 %</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>52 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>15 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>51 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>59 %</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>55 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>23 %</td>
<td>45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>55 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Social expenditure data from OECD, 2009b; female employment statistics from OECD, 2009a; part-time employment is defined as less than 30 hours per week. 2000 total fertility rates are from the World Health Organization, [http://www.who.int/whosis/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/whosis/en/index.html). Poverty rates are from the Luxembourg Income Study Key Figures, [http://www.lisproject.org](http://www.lisproject.org) and represent the percentage of children living in households earning less than 50% of the median household income. Dissolution rates are cumulative percentages from beginning of a coresidential relationship during the 1980s and 1990s, from Andersson (2003: Tables 4 and 5); “cohabit” includes those who may have subsequently married.